Revisiting the Manning-Nique Trade

The trade deadline has come again and this year’s relatively mild events had me thinking back to, perhaps, the biggest late season trade when the Atlanta Hawks traded franchise icon Dominique Wilkins to the Clippers for Danny Manning in February 1994.  Even 27 years later, it still seems odd that this deal happened.  Let’s take a look back and see if things make more sense now than they did then…

1993-94: Atlanta Surprises in a non-MJ World

Before we get into the specifics of the deal, let’s better understand the context.  1993-94 was an odd season.  Michael Jordan abruptly retired in training camp, seemingly ceding the Eastern Conference to the Knicks.  New York had the best record in the East in 1992-93 and lost a tough Eastern Conference Finals to the Bulls.  Without MJ, the Bulls looked done as a contender (the third best team in the East in 1992-93, the Cleveland Cavaliers, were also looking long-in-the-tooth).

In reality, the Knicks ended up getting  a run for their money from the MJ-less Bulls (thanks to great seasons from Scottie Pippen and Horace Grant). The Hawks, however, were the real surprise contender in 1993-94.  In 1992-93, the Hawks were 43-39 and a blah playoff team (they were swept by the Bulls).  The Hawks’ core was Wilkins, who put up 30 ppg at age-33, and Kevin Willis the big power forward (18 pg, 13 rpg).  Atlanta was relatively good offensively with those two (10th) but miserable on defense (23rd).  Coach Bob Weiss was fired after the season and replaced with long-time Cleveland coach Lenny Wilkens. 

Atlanta’s Unexpected Success While at the Crossroads with Nique

In the summer of 1993, Dominique had one year left on his contract.  He was already a dunking/scoring legend for the Hawks but they had not won a playoff series since 1987-88 and, with his age and contract, Wilkins was obvious trade bait for a stagnant team that need to rebuild.  But the Hawks didn’t trade him that summer.  In fact, the Hawks brought back the same core in 1993-94, only Nique was now 34 and Willis was 31.  The only key players added were 32-year old backup guard Craig Ehlo (a Wilkens favorite in Cleveland) and average(ish) center Andrew Lang.

That sure sounded like a recipe for a bad and boring team.  They weren’t exciting to watch but they weren’t bad.  Somehow, Wilkens got this virtually identical team to play defense really well.  The offense was basically the same effectiveness (12th) but the defense jumped to (4th).  As a result, the Hawks were tied with the Knicks for the best record in the East most of the year (Chicago was nipping at their heels too).

Wilkens got a ton of credit for this turnaround and the narrative was that the success came somewhat in spite of Dominique.  In a December 1993 New York Times article, Harvey Araton wrote a story of Wilkins sulking when he wasn’t getting shots: “Wilkins turned, facing the Hawks’ bench, and cursed. He didn’t exactly sprint back on defense. Soon, without fuming or fuss, Lenny Wilkens called him to the bench. The tranquil-looking coach knew it was going to be a stomach-churning night with the 33-year-old no-conscience scorer. Wilkins is in the last year of his $3.5 million contract. That will exacerbate any game-night situation when Wilkins isn’t in the flow.”

 Araton continued with his premise that Wilkens had taken full control of the team from Nique: “[f]or years, the Hawks have been Dominique’s team. Their recent reputation has been a reflection of Dominique’s, an exciting highlight film with no defensive core. When Wilkens’s career alarm started ringing last spring in Cleveland, where he helped make a contender out of what was a horrendous team, people wondered why this scholarly basketball teacher would choose Atlanta and this seemingly incorrigible class…. Dominique may still have the ball, but this is no longer his team.” 

Of course, it was more complicated.  Nique was set for one last big contract and he was the team’s only reliable perimeter scorer.  The easy move would be to give the franchise star his tenure contract and pay him to be a Hawk for life, even though the last few years of the deal could be dead money.  That would be perfectly reasonable, especially since the Hawks were good for the first time in about five years.

On February 24, 1994, the Hawks were in a three-way tie with the Knicks and Bulls and they decided that: (a) they didn’t want to stick with Nique long-term and (b) they had better options than Nique for the current season.  They traded Dominique to the Clippers for the more-versatile Manning (who would also be a free agent at the end of the season).

Nique v. Manning tale-of-the-tape

The trade was particularly fun because it was a classic challenge trade.  Well, almost a challenge trade.  The Hawks threw in their first rounder in 1994 (a late-first rounder who ended up being a decent regular Greg Minor, who the Clipps traded with Mark Jackson for Eric Piatkowski, Pooh Richardson, and Malik Sealy).  Manning and Nique played the same position and were directly comparable. Here were there stats at the time of the trade:

Wilkins: 49 gms, 34.4 mpg, 24.4 ppg, .526 TS%, 6.2 rpg, 2.3 apg, 21.1 PER, .166 WS48, 2.7 BPM, 2.0 VORP

Manning: 42 gms, 38.0 mpg, 23.7 ppg, .527 TS%, 7.0 rpg, 4.2 apg, 17.9 PER, .066 WS48, 1.1 BPM, 1.2 VORP

While Manning was more versatile and younger, Dominique actually was having a much better season. Wilkins was no longer the Hawks best player, that was Mookie Blaylock who blossomed into an All-Star level PG and he led the team with a 5.7 BPM and 5.7 VORP.  Wilkins ranked as second best player with SG Stacey Augmon (Augmon-Mookie was a suffocating defensive backcourt). 

From the Hawks’ perspective, they weren’t sold on Wilkins.  After the trade was done, it was revealed in Sports Illustrated that the deal was discussed as early as the summer of 1993 (when it would’ve made even more sense to all parties).  Lenny Wilkens told Sports Illustrated that “Danny’s smart, and I like that.  You have to have that type of player on the floor if you’re going to win, because you have to make good decisions down the stretch.”   The obvious unstated insinuation was that Dominique was not a winning player. 

Kevin Loughery saw the trade differently, calling it “a franchise killer.  By far the toughest trade for Atlanta fans.  In all honesty, skill-wise this was not a bad trade. However from a fan base, it set the Hawks back a long way. I’ve been in Atlanta for 20 years, and Dominique has been the biggest star athletically in those 20 years.”

Wilkins, for his part, was pissed about the deal.  In a Seattle Times article, Wilkins was quoted as saying: “[t]he disappointment still hasn’t left me. The Hawks have a chance to win a title and I wanted to be a part of that.  I still don’t understand it. It’s the most senseless trade I can imagine. Nothing against Danny, but I’m still a little sour.”  Wilkins refused calls from Hawks management and the article noted that “[t]alk of the trade comes up at every stop the Clippers make. When it does, Wilkins’ mood is likely to turn dark and hasten his departure from the locker room.”

Side Note on the Clippers’ Motivations

We won’t touch on this too long but why the hell did the Clippers want to make this trade?  They were a bad team, with little chance of making the playoffs and were about to lose most of their core to free agency?  The Hawks side of the trade was understandable (if debatable) but the Clipps seemed to be just churning.  The Clippers were likely to lose Manning at the end of the year because Donald Sterling never paid any big contracts.  But rebuilding with a 34-year old Wilkins was a worse option.  The Clipps went 8-17 with Nique and he did pretty well scoring 29 ppg and putting up a 2.2 BPM.  In the end, Sterling knew he wasn’t re-signing either player and was happy to get a late first-rounder for Manning as well as the thrill of having a big name star for two months.

Trade Results: Disappointment in Atlanta           

Manning’s style of play was quite different from Nique’s in Atlanta.  Atlanta finished up at 19-7 with Manning, which was enough to get the top seed in the East.  Manning’s stats were less gaudy:

-26 gms, 35.6 mpg, 15.7 ppg, .501 TS%, 6.5 rpg, 3.3 apg, 13.8 PER, .066 WS48, -0.5 BPM, 0.4 VORP

While the Hawks won at a slightly higher rate without Wilkins, Manning was decidedly subpar during that run.  Manning did get his sea legs in the playoffs (20 ppg, 7.0 rpg, 3.4 apg, 4.2 BPM), where he was the team’s second best player behind Blaylock.

Alas, irony was strong with the Hawks.  Despite getting the top seed, Atlanta’s path to the Finals was not smooth.  First, they struggled with a solid Heat team in the first round.  Then, they lost 4-2 in the second round to a Pacers team was actually as good as the Knicks (and better than the Bulls).  The Pacers could defend with Atlanta and had a couple of reliable scoring options (Reggie Miller and Rik Smits) and the Hawks didn’t have many such options (they averaged only 85 ppg in the series).  One can only wonder if having Dominique’s scoring would’ve changed things.

Postscript: Stuff Happens

A.            Manning Bolts Atlanta

Despite going out earlier from the playoffs than expected, the Hawks looked like they had a pretty good shot to keep Manning.  They could pay Manning, as a returning player, over the salary cap to keep him.  But it was not meant to be.  Sports Illustrated noted in April 1994 that Manning “seems determined to test the market, but Atlanta’s chances of retaining him may be increasing…. But it’s far from a done deal; Manning has only a three-month lease on his Atlanta apartment.”

It sure seemed like Manning wanted no part of the Hawks.  Atlanta offered him a $25 million deal to stay in town (other reports had the deal as seven years and $35 million).  Manning rejected that offer for a one-year $1 million deal from the Suns (who expected to contend with Charles Barkley, Dan Majerle, and Kevin Johnson).  Either Manning was taking a big gamble to win or the Suns had a wink deal to overpay him once he was a free agent again.

In a recent interview with Adam Ryan’s excellent podcast, Manning said that he seriously considered the Hawks and even the Clippers again (that seems shocking like shocking revelation given Donald Sterling’s MO) and insisted that the Suns made no explicit promises to re-sign him.  Manning ended up blowing out his knee halfway through the 1994-95 season.  The Suns still gave Manning a six-year $40 million deal that summer, ultimately massively exceeding what the Hawks had offered.  Manning missed most of 1995-96 but was a solid reserve from 1996-1999 before getting traded as an older player.

Manning also told Adam Ryan that he was scared that the Suns would not sign him again after 1995.  I have a feeling that that fear was slightly exaggerated.  Either his agent had a new deal in place or the Suns thought they could impress other free agents with their loyalty to Manning.  I assume the former is more likely because that new deal was exceedingly generous under any other circumstance (David Aldridge concurs).

Atlanta Regroups without Manning

Without Manning or Wilkins, the Hawks were a slightly above .500 team in 1994-95 (42-40) and 1995-96 (they went 46-36 but upset the Pacers in the first round of the playoffs).  In the summer of 1996, they used their cap space to get Dikembe Mutombo and were restored to a fringe contender for the rest of the decade (they went 137-77, .640% over that time). 

It was a weird road to get there but Atlanta ended up better off without Manning.  We can’t be sure Manning would’ve hurt his knee in Atlanta but, considering, Manning’s knee issues, it is a fair assumption.  At the very least, Mutombo was better than a healthy Manning anyway.

Nique Becomes a Nomad

Wilkins ended up signing with the rebuilding Celtics, which made about as much sense as the Clippers re-signing him.  Wilkins came pretty cheap (three years, $11 million).  Wilkins could still score a bit on Boston but his numbers were way down from 1993-94:

-Wilkins 1994-95: 77 gms, 31.5 mpg, 17.8 ppg, .519 TS%, 5.2 rpg, 2.2 apg, 16.3 PER, .076 WS48, 0.1 BPM, 1.3 VORP

Boston allowed Wilkins to break his contract to play in Greece for 1995-96.  Wilkins returned to the NBA for 1996-97 at age-37 for the Spurs and his stats were virtually identical to what he did in 1994-95 with Boston (some inefficient scoring and not much else).  He went to Italy for 1997-98 before signing with Orlando as a back bench guy in 1998-99 and then retired (it was all very similar to post-New York Carmelo Anthony).

Conclusions

Having reviewed the facts, where does this leave us 27 years later?  Let’s give our conclusions:

-The Hawks made a bold trade where they thought that they would be better in the short term by replacing the scoring Wilkins with the younger more balanced Manning.  They also thought that long term they could re-sign the younger Manning.  These were reasonable things to believe.

-The difference between Manning and Wilkins in 1993-94 was slight but Wilkins was the better player at the time.  Manning played pretty badly after the trade but it did not prevent the Hawks from getting a top seed.  In the playoffs, Manning played pretty well and it is doubtful that Wilkins would’ve made the difference against the Pacers (or the Knicks and Rockets if the Hawks somehow got past the Pacers).  Nevertheless, there was always an outside chance that Nique would’ve gone on an unstoppable scoring streak that few players could duplicate and, maybe, they could’ve beaten the Pacers.

-The trade was justified from Atlanta’s perspective based upon the elevated chance to re-sign Manning and the fact that it appeared that Lenny Wilkens just didn’t like Dominique’s game very much.  With the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, the Hawks probably should not have made the trade. Manning did not play better than Wilkins and Atlanta had no shot of re-signing (Atlanta did not know this at the time and it’s not clear if they should’ve known).  Atlanta could’ve re-signed Wilkins relatively cheaply as the market for a 35-year old scorer was unsurprisingly tepid (he probably would’ve taken less than Boston gave him to stay with his only team).  Wilkins would’ve fit as a scorer off-the-bench and they could’ve kept a franchise icon in town.  This isn’t a super important but is definitely better than letting him walk for nothing.  Wilkins was understandably angry at the time but I think he’s over it now.

In the end, the Hawks were ready to move on from Wilkins but doing the right thing for a franchise icon probably would’ve yielded the best result. 

Can LaMelo Win ROY?

LaMelo Ball’s recent wrist injury likely ends his season with 41 games played.  He has been the best rookie this season but does his abbreviated season disqualify him from contention?  Well, that really depends on how good the competition is.  In this particular case, most of the other rookies who have played have had dubious value.  Let’s run through the stats of all rookies with at least 1,000 minutes played so far:

-Ball, 41 gms, 1,174 mins, 15.9 ppg, .451 FG%, .528 eFG%, 5.9 rpg, 6.1 apg, 18.5 PER, .118 WS48, 2.7 BPM, 1.4 VORP

-Anthony Edwards, 45 gms, 1,367 mins, 16.8 ppg, .382 FG%, .448 eFG%, 4.3 rpg, 2.6 apg, 11.0 PER, -.030 WS48, -4.9 BPM, -1.0 VORP

-Isaac Okoro, 40 gms, 1,284 mins, 8.0 ppg, .420 FG%, .481 eFG%, 2.8 rpg, 1.8 apg, 6.8 PER, .015 WS48, -4.8 BPM, -0.9 VORP

-Patrick Williams, 42 gms, 1,193 mins, 9.6 ppg, .467 FG%, .521 eFG%, 4.9 rpg, 1.2 apg, 9.9 PER, .052 WS48, -3.5 BPM, -0.4 VORP

-Tyrese Haliburton, 39 gms, 1,172 mins, 13.1 ppg, .486 FG%, .597 eFG%, 3.4 rpg, 5.0 apg, 17.1 PER, .108 WS48, 1.9 BPM, 1.2 VORP

-Saddiq Bey, 42 gms, 1,032 mins, 10.7 ppg, .411 FG%, .547 eFG%, 4.1 rpg, 1.2 apg, 12.8 PER, .094 WS48, -0.5 BPM, 0.4 VORP

-Theo Maledon, 38 gms, 1,014 mins, 8.2 ppg, .384 FG%, .488 eFG%, 3.1 rpg, 3.4 apg, 7.7 PER, .007 WS48, -5.1 BPM, -0.8 VORP

-Immanuel Quickley, 40 gms, 799 mins, 12.8 ppg, .395 FG%, .490 eFG%, 2.3 rpg, 2.3 apg, 17.4 PER, .138 WS48, 1.5 BPM, 0.7 VORP

We added Quickley to the list because, though he hasn’t played as much, he is clearly the third-best rookie so far.  The stats tell us that Ball is way better than all his competition (most of which have accrued negative value).  The only real competitor is Haliburton.  His advanced stats aren’t too far off and he should catch LaMelo in VORP with 17 games left to play this season. 

On paper, if Haliburton stays at the same pace, his VORP should be about 2.0 versus 1.4 that Ball has put up.  BPM (which is not affected by quantity because it is a rate state) shows Ball to be significantly better (as do the raw average stats).  We have a quantity versus quality argument blooming here. 

What about Ball winning ROY with 41 games played?  Have other rookies won the ROY award with so few games/minutes played.  If he wins, Ball would have the fewest games played by a ROY since the legendary Paul Hoffman in 1947-48 for the old Baltimore Bullets of the BAA.  Hoffman’s 37 games played was not that bad, though, since the team played only 48 games.  As a fun aside, the Bullets won the title and behind player-coach Buddy Jeanette and stars like Kleggie Hermsen.  Hoffman missed the entire next season in a salary dispute where he worked as a salesman before returning to play for a few more years and later becoming a GM.  

Putting aside the ancient times, the ROY winners to play the fewest games in an 82-game season are:

-1985-86, Patrick Ewing, 50 games

-2011-12, Kyrie Irving, 51 games

-1962-63, Terry Dischinger, 57 games (80-game season)

-2006-07, Brandon Roy, 57 games

(Vince Carter won ROY in 1998-99, playing 50 games in a 50-game lockout season, so we won’t count him).  On a percentage basis, LaMelo’s playing 41 games out of 72 games this year (57%) is the lowest percentage of team games played, slightly fewer than current “leader” Ewing in 1985-86 (61%).  The next interesting question is what sort competition each of these other abbreviated rookies had.  Did they overcome players who had quantity arguments like Haliburton may have?  Let’s briefly run through each of these ROYs and their competition:

1985-86 ROY: Ewing versus the tall and the small

Ewing was the top pick and a superstar in the making at the time coming out of Georgetown.  Alas, Ewing’s knees were bad and he had to shut down his season early.  Ewing didn’t have much competition that year.  Ewing had the best BPM of any rookie with more than 1,500 minutes.  Interestingly, his strongest competition came from role players with extreme heights:

 -Patrick Ewing: 1,771 mins, 20.0 ppg, .474 eFG%, 9.0 rpg, 2.0 apg, 17.4 PER, .084 WS48, 1.1 BPM, 1.4 VORP

-Spud Webb:  1,229 mins, 7.8 ppg, .485 eFG%, 1.6 rpg, 4.3 apg, 18.5 PER, .137 WS48, 2.9 BPM, 1.5 VORP

-Manute Bol: 2,090 mins, 3.7 ppg, .460 eFG%, 6.0 rpg, 0.3 apg, 5.0 bpg,  .089 WS48, 0.9 BPM, 1.5 VORP

Ewing was a relatively easy choice.  Webb was great but played only 15 minutes a night.  Manute was interesting as a guy who could only block shots but was not really as good as Ewing and didn’t play that many more minutes anyway. 

2011-12 ROY: Kyrie’s best competition played less than he did

Kyrie sure has always missed a lot of time.  He barely played in college and his rookie year also got shut down early as well.  The weird thing is his choice was pretty clear.  There was no quantity option to compete with Kyrie.  He led all rookies in BPM with 4.1 and the only players near his ballpark played fewer minutes (Kawhi Leonard had 3.4 BPM in 24 fewer minutes).  Kyrie also led the entire rookie class in VORP with 2.4 (Kawhi was second with 2.1).  The only rookie who broke 2,000 minutes played that year was Brandon Knight with 2,129 but his season was decidedly negative (-0.3 VORP).  So, Kyrie’s lack of games played was not really an issue.

1962-63: Dischinger racked up minutes with a crappy team

There were fewer stats available when Dischinger won ROY with the expansion Chicago Packers so we can’t view his season through BPM or VORP.  Dischinger’s raw stats were pretty impressive (25.5 ppg, 8.0 rpg) for a terrible team (25-55) with few players who could play (it was Dischinger and Walt Bellamy).  Despite missing 23 games, Dischinger played a ton of minutes and was third of all rookies in minutes played.  So, Dischinger’s lack of games played wasn’t really an issue in terms of accruing value.  We do note that his choice was dubious.  The Packers had the worst defense in the NBA (though they were third in offense) and Len Chappell, John Havlicek, and Chet Walker had pretty good arguments to win ROY as more well-rounded players.

2006-07: Roy dominated the field in all respects

Like Kyrie, Brandon Roy had no real competition from a good player with more minutes played.  The only two rookies with more minutes played were non-factors.  Adam Morrison led the rooks in minutes played but had an execrable -5.1 BPM (yuck).  Rudy Gay was second in minutes and had a less bad -2.2 BPM.  Roy was the BPM star (2.0) and also led the group in VORP (also 2.0).  The only rookies with VORP in the ballpark were Jorge Garbajosa (a 29-year old Spanish vet) who had 1.1, and Renaldo Balkman and Paul Millsap (0.9).  Not bad but not nearly enough to get in the ROY conversations.

Ball’s situation is definitely new

These past results show how unique Ball’s ROY campaign is.  Ewing, Kyrie, Dischinger, and Roy had no competition that could plausibly argue they had added more value by playing more minutes.  Ball has played a lower percentage of games than any of these other ROYs, fewer minutes, and, more importantly, has a more bona fide competitor in Haliburton who is relatively close in value and better than any of the second place options for Ewing, Roy, or Kyrie (Dischinger is a totally different scenario). 

What does this all tell us?  The short answers are as follows:

-Only three rookies this year have been very helpful: Ball, Haliburton, and Quickley (Bey is also in the conversation but he is more replacement-level at this point).

-It’s hard for rookies to have positive value.  Williams has looked good at times, as has Edwards, but the efficiency is just not there yet.  There have been plenty of good players with crappy rookie stats but early returns are pessimistic.

-Ball has been just good enough to have the award locked in unless Haliburton takes his stats to a higher level the next month or so. I’m still inclined to pick Ball as my ROY but his challenge in winning the award is definitely unprecedented.  

Revisiting DJ for Robey: How Did It Happen?

Nearly 38 years ago, the Celtics made one of the great trades in the history of the franchise when they got Dennis Johnson a strong starting point guard from Phoenix for Rick Robey, who was a solid backup center, but nothing more.  Boston would go on to make the next four NBA Finals, winning two, while Robey was out of the NBA by 1986. 

After the runaway success of the Celtics, the trade was widely seen as an obvious fleecing by Red Auerbach of Jerry Colangelo and the Suns. This view is undoubtedly correct.  I wondered if the conditions around the trade were at least slightly more complicated than this view and whether there was any reasonable basis for Phoenix to do this deal.  Let’s dive back to 1983 and see…

State of the Boston Celtics in the Summer 1983

Boston was a great team but the dynasty was not yet assured.  Boston had Larry Bird for four years (and Kevin McHale and Robert Parish for three) and had been quite competitive but they were only one of many good teams in the East at the time. Here’s a quick review of the results in Boston since Bird had gotten to town:

1979-80: 61-21, 1st in Atlantic, 7.37 SRS (1st in NBA), lost 4-1 to 76ers in Conference Finals

1980-81: 62-20, 1st in Atlantic, 6.05 SRS (3rd in NBA behind 76ers and Bucks), won title

1981-82: 63-19, 1st in Atlantic, 6.35 SRS (1st in NBA), lost 4-3 to 76ers in Conference Finals

1982-83: 56-26 2nd in Atlantic, 5.34 SRS (2nd in NBA behind 76ers), lost 4-0 to Bucks in Semifinals

The broad numbers show that Boston was as good as its rivals, Milwaukee and Philly, but not clearly better.  On top of that, they were decisively beaten by Milwaukee in 1983, which added a little more weight to the inkling that the team needed help.

To color in the details, Boston was viewed as struggling at the end of the 1982-83 season.  Anthony Cotton wrote in Sports Illustrated on May 2, 1983 that: “[b]y the end of January [1983] it was obvious that Boston wouldn’t catch the 76ers and also that Central Division-leading Milwaukee wouldn’t be able to bump the Celtics out of the second-best record in the Eastern Conference. As a result Boston became, according to Center-Forward Kevin McHale, ‘an average team. If we won five games in a row it didn’t matter; if we lost five in a row it didn’t matter. So what was the point?’”  Cotton further wrote that there were reports that the team was “bickering incessantly with each other” and that the team was sick of coach Bill Fitch.

After a tough first rounder mini-series versus Atlanta, Boston was then swept by the Bucks in convincing fashion.  The Bucks outscored Boston by nearly 12 points per game (the closest game was Game 2, which Bird actually sat out with flu).  The whooping was reported widely.  David Dupree wrote in the Washington Post that Milwaukee “left the once proud and mighty Celtics in a crumbled, embarrassed heap.”  Bird told Dupree that “I’ve never been this embarrassed in my entire career, and this is going to hurt for a long time because we didn’t play to our potential. When we were backed against the wall and challenged, we were supposed to come through like the champions I thought we were, and we didn’t. We embarrassed ourselves and I’ll live with that the rest of my life.”  To pour salt on that open wound, Sidney Moncrief said that “I know a lot of Boston fans are wondering what happened to their Celtics, but they just got beaten by a better team at the time.”

Losing a tough playoff series in the NBA has always meant the sky was falling for the losing team.  Boston left that series definitely feeling that they were behind Philly (who would beat Milwaukee and win the title), as well as the Bucks.  From a stats perspective, the Boston big men had played well but guards had struggled.  Danny Ainge and Gerald Henderson were okay offensively but Moncrief had torn them up and looked like the best player on either team (23.3 ppg, .547 TS%, 6.5 rpg, 4.0 apg).  The point guard situation was bad both offensively and defensively for the Celts.  Tiny Archibald shot .311% and Quinn Buckner had shot .333%.  Putting aside the failure versus Milwaukee, here are the stats of the Boston guards for the 82-83 season:

-Tiny Archibald, age 34: 27.4 mpg, 10.5 ppg, .425 FG%, 1.4 rpg, 6.2 apg, 12.3 PER, .077 WS/48, -2.0 BPM, 0.0 VORP

-Danny Ainge, age 23: 25.6 mpg, 9.9 ppg, .496 FG%, 2.7 rpg, 3.1 apg, 13.2 PER, .121 WS/48, 0.2 BPM, 1.2 VORP

-Quinn Buckner, age 28: 21.7 mpg, 7.9 ppg, .442 FG%, 2.6 rpg, 3.8 apg, 11.5 PER, .048 WS/48, -1.4 BPM, 0.2 VORP

-Gerald Henderson, age 27: 18.9 mpg, 8.2 ppg, .463 FG%, 1.5 rpg, 2.4 apg, 12.1 PER, .073 WS/48, -1.5 BPM, 0.2 VORP

Not good. Ainge was young and average-ish.  The rest of the crew was below replacement level and not particularly young (or pretty old in the case of Tiny).  Fitch ended up quitting after the season to take the Houston job (which took some heat off of the players) but a point guard was desperately needed and a better shooting guard wouldn’t have hurt either.

Phoenix and DJ

By 1983, Dennis Johnson had been a perennial All-Star.  He made the All-Star team four straight years but the streak was snapped in 1982-83 when it was perceived that his numbers had dipped a bit.  Check out the differences:

-Johnson 78-82, ages 24-27: 35.0 mpg, 18.3 ppg, .440 FG%, 4.9 rpg, 4.0 apg, 16.1 PER, .130 WS/48, 1.5 BPM, 2.5 VORP

-Johnson 82-83, age 28: 33.1 mpg, 14.2 ppg, .462 FG%, 4.4 rpg, 5.0 apg, 14.8 PER, .125 WS/48, 0.9 BPM, 1.9 VORP

He really wasn’t that far off of his peak but the big drop in scoring is noticeable.  Still, he was pretty good.  The numbers, however, weren’t put up in a vacuum.  DJ had a reputation as a bit of a pain in Seattle and later in Phoenix.  Here’s a quick rundown of his past:

-Pre-NBA:  One of 16 kids from a large family in Compton, California, DJ didn’t really play much high school ball.  He began working after high school and grew from 5’9 to about 6’4 and made a junior college team.  From there, he went to Pepperdine for two years and was an underdog second-round pick for Seattle.

-Seattle: Johnson quickly became a starter in Seattle and helped bring a balanced squad to two straight NBA finals in 1978 and 1979.  They won the 1979 Finals and DJ was the MVP.  DJ became unhappy with his contract and was traded to Phoenix after the 1979-80 season (despite the fact that Seattle gave him the contract he wanted).  Seattle coach Lenny Wilkens blamed DJ for locker room issues and called him a “cancer” on the team.  The reason for the beef wasn’t clear but a 1985 Los Angeles Times article reported that “It has been said that Johnson didn’t like Wilkens’ laid-back approach to the game in Seattle. There also were problems because Johnson sought a contract renegotiation after the SuperSonics had won the NBA title.”  Whatever the reason, DJ was traded for Paul Westphal, another All-Star guard.

-Phoenix: The Suns were pretty good with Johnson but playoff success was a big issue.  They went 57-25 in 1980-81 but were upset in the semifinals by the Kansas City Kings.  Johnson shot pretty well and led the team in scoring and minutes played.  In 1981-82, the Suns were 46-36 but were swept away by the better Showtime Lakers.  Finally, in 1982-83, they improved to 53-29 but, this time, they lost the “mini-series” to Denver 2-1.  DJ has a good series (18.0 ppg, 7.7 rpg, 5.7 apg, 1.7 spg, 0.7 bpg) but the sense was the team was going sideways.

On top of that, DJ was feuding with coach John MacLeod.  Again, the source of the problem was not clear but, that same L.A. Time article noted that: “Johnson reportedly didn’t warm up to MacLeod’s practice rituals, which included aerobics and wind sprints.”  The 1984 Complete Handbook of Pro Basketball reflected his lower stock in its bio saying that Johnson “claims to be misunderstood…but he never seems to stay in one place for long before making people dissatisfied…Was blamed for the fact that the Suns have come up short in the playoffs that last three years…Seems basically insecure and always talks big.”

In a May 26, 1986 Sports Illustrated article, Suns teammate Rich Kelley said that: “Dennis had more problems with [coach John] MacLeod and the front office than with the players. He’d constantly try to get MacLeod’s goat, but it was all little things, practice stuff.”  As Bob Ryan told SI: “Once or twice every year that will happen [with DJ on the Celtics].  It’s as if he’s reminding us that it’s D.J. out there and not some Stepford Guard. But whatever’s bugging him is gone by the next game. You never know why, and you can’t ever know. You can open door after door after door, but you’ll never get at the real D.J.” 

In 1996, Peter May addressed DJ’s moods in “The Last Banner,” quoting Ainge about Johnson: “In those early years, DJ had a spat with everybody.  We even got into it a couple times in five years.  But there was always an apology the next day.  That’s the way he was.”  Johnson told May in the same book that that DJ had been too stubborn in Seattle and there were no real major issues in Phoenix. 

The upshot was that DJ could definitely be a pain in the ass at times and you had to accept that as part of the package.  Phoenix was apparently sick of it and ready to move on.  Not a crazy idea but the concept is one thing…the real question was what would the return be?

The Trade

Boston was clearly in the market for a veteran guard and Phoenix could offer DJ.  Objectively, DJ’s value was lower than it should’ve been due to the low-level turmoil with MacLeod and Phoenix’s playoff frustrations.  Still, there were very few good guards on the market.  The only other guards traded in the summer/fall 1983 were Norm Nixon, also a very good player but one whom the Lakers would never trade to Boston.  Lesser options were lukewarm players like Billy McKinney, Kelvin Ransey, or Billy Knight.  Nixon fetched a high draft pick (rookie Byron Scott) but the others were traded for filler.

Even a devalued DJ should’ve been able to return more than McKinney, Ransey, or Knight.  Yet, the Johnson trade looks even weirder when you dig into the parts:

Boston traded: Rickey Robey and two second-round picks (28th overall pick Rod Foster, who lasted three seasons as a PG and Paul Williams, the 45th pick, who didn’t make the team).

Phoenix traded: Dennis Johnson, a first-round pick (21st pick, ended up being Greg Kite) and a third-round pick (ended up being Winfred King, who never made the NBA)

(Ironically, Doc Rivers was available at 31 and would’ve been pretty good for Boston too).

Basically, the implication of the trade was that DJ was worth less than Robey, so they had to throw in a higher pick to even things up.  Robey’s numbers don’t support that finding.  Here are his 82-83 numbers:

-Robey, age 27: 14.5 mpg, 4.2 ppg, .467 FG%, 3.7 rpg, 8.6 PER, .049 WS/48, -3.5 BPM, -0.3 VORP

And before you argue that maybe Robey has some hidden value to Boston that the stats don’t see, the guy played 29 total minutes in five1983 playoff games (and racked up DNPs in the other two) and shot 0-4 for the playoffs with 2 total points.  He was as replaceable as any player on the team.

So, this trade makes no objective sense on any level.  Robey was pretty worthless to Boston and, even a little DJ was a real actual starter.  What gives? The only plausible explanations:

-Money: We don’t have contract data from that prehistoric time before the salary cap but it’s fair to assume Johnson was making more.  The 1986 SI article quoted John Johnson as saying that Seattle gave him a deal worth $800,000 per year in 1979, which was big money in the early 1980s when the NBA was struggling (Peter May said DJ was making $400,000 at the time, which was still big money).

-Off-the-court-stuff: We know DJ didn’t get along with MacLeod and there was some innuendo of other issues but this was totally unconfirmed.

-Management Stupidity: Jerry Colangelo was usually pretty shrewd.  It’s hard to believe he would give up talent for so little unless something else was at play.

Without any inside knowledge, and incomplete facts, the fair conclusion on this deal was that DJ was a salary dump.  MacLeod didn’t like him and he made a lot of cash.  Boston was willing to pay him and, therefore, they got him (and a first-rounder!) to clear Phoenix’s payroll.  Credit to Red for getting his ownership to foot the bill but this was more big business investment than Auerbach using voodoo magic on the Suns.  Either way, Boston ain’t complaining.

The Most Random All-Stars: Dana Barros and Tyrone Hill

The 1995 All-Star game led to two of the oddest picks, in retrospect, in All-Star history, Dana Barros and Tyrone Hill.  Barros was a 27-year old 5’11 three-point specialist.  Hill was a generic starting power forward.  How did two average(ish) role player become All-Stars and did they have any argument to make the team?  The cases for Hill and Barros were separate and distinct but the overarching theme arises from the weird Generation X kerfuffle that enveloped the NBA at the time.

In 1995, the NBA had quasi-crisis over the perception that the Generation X stars couldn’t be marketed because they lacked the gravitas of the prior mega stars Michael Jordan (who was retired at the time but would return shortly), Magic Johnson, or Larry Bird.  How did we get to that moment in time?  There were some incidents that bothered the mainstream press as follows:

The 1994 FIBA Games:  Dream Team 2 is not as well-remembered as the original squad but this group was nearly as dominant as the original MJ/Bird/Magic squad.  The difference was the new team had many younger players who were a bit more inclined to talk smack to hapless opponents.  In particular, Shawn Kemp, Derrick Coleman, Larry Johnson, and Shaquille O’Neal seemed talk a little trash (and/or let out primal screams after big dunks) while wiping out other teams.  As a consequence, the team left some with a bad aftertaste about the young stars.

-Money!:  As we’ve written about before, NBA revenues were growing and these young (and more publicly brash) players were the first group to taste big contracts, as the older players were still bound to contracts based upon the much lower revenue numbers.  So, rookies were making much more money than established stars, particularly LJ’s then-record $84 million deal in 1993

-Generation X Generally:  I don’t want to shock you but the established generation tends to clash with the new adults from younger generations (no doubt there is an article out there somewhere where Joe Fulks criticized the flash young George Mikan).  While generational complaints go back as far back as time itself, the split between the 1980s writers with some Generation X players seemed more acute.  The trash talking and lack of deference to established stars (combined with the money factor noted above) was particularly irksome to some.

In the beginning of the season, Chris Webber demanded a trade during a contract dispute and coach Don Nelson depicted Webber as overly sensitive and entitled.  Webber eventually got the trade he wanted but at great cost to his image at the time (we recently re-reviewed the Webber trade and concluded that Webber’s whining was overstated and it was just a contract disputed handled terribly by the Warriors owner Chris Cohan). 

Coleman became the literal posterchild for Generation X in a January 1994 Sports Illustrated article.  The cover showed DC frowning, with his mouth agape, with the caption: “Waaaaah!!! Petulant Prima Donnas Like New Jersey’s Derrick Coleman Are Bad News For the NBA.”  DC was known for his pouty body language, missing practices, and the “whoop-de-damn-do” diatribe about missing practice.  There were clearly some legitimate complaints about DC’s dedication.  He certainly tried on the court but there was a sense he could be so much better.

In the SI article, Phil Taylor wrote: “[a] form of insanity is spreading through the NBA like a virus, threatening to infect every team in the league. Alarmingly, its carriers, pouting prima donnas who commit the most outrageous acts of rebellion, include some of the league’s younger stars. There is a new outbreak nearly every week, with yet another player skipping practice, refusing his coach’s orders to go into a game, demanding a trade or finding some new and creative way to act unprofessionally.”  Taylor went on to detail offenders Webber, DC, Latrell Sprewell, J.R. Rider, Kenny Anderson, as well as a few other egregious stories (like Chris Morris refusing to tie his shoes during practice).

The article seemed overly alarmist to me.  There were some difficult players but players miss practice and can be dicks.  Both those things happened before 1995 and after.  Nevertheless, the story cast a large pall over the NBA.

Gen X and the 1995 All-Star Game

In this environment, David Stern was peppered with questions about the state of the league and whether “petulant” players would bring it down.  Stern told the press before the 1995 All-Star game that “[t]here are 350 or so players in the NBA and, on balance, they make a consummate effort to play the game as well as it ever has been played, and as hard as it has ever been played.”  Stern acknowledged that there were some hiccups in the NBA but, as the Hartford Courant reported: “Stern lumped such incidents together and said the league was going through ‘a phase.’ He added that whenever the league has gone through a phase, it has reacted in kind and subsequently survived, even thrived.”

Stern was right.  Most of the problem players listed did fine overall in the NBA:

-Webber struggled with injuries but became a star eventually. 

-Anderson got a big deal from Portland.  He never got much better than he was as a young player but he was a respected pro.

-DC got a big contract from Charlotte.  He was never a great hustler but he was a respected veteran in Philly and Charlotte.

-Sprewell was a problem but was good enough to overcome his bad decisions most of the time.

-Rider’s bad decisions likely shortened his career prematurely but he would also get a big deal and was considered a star through 2000.

In any event, this Generation X problem was obviously more hype than substance.  Concerns about petulant players were laughable compared with drug issues of the mid-1980s and the careers that never developed as a result.  DC might’ve been a slight disappointment but do we really think that his career arc was a bigger issue than William Bedford, Chris Washburn, or Len Bias? 

The problems with Gen X were exaggerated but not totally unfounded.  Despite this fact, in this controversial time, the NBA was not going to pick any All-Stars in 1995 who might embarrass the league.  Thus we got Hill, the solid but boring PF for a solid and boring Cleveland team and Barros, who was the only scorer for a terrible Philly team.  Neither Hill nor Barros had any record of discipline issues and each was liked by his coaching staff.  So, that’s how they became All-Stars in 1995. 

With that preamble, how crazy were these two picks?  Let’s look at their stats compared with other players who were not chosen for the East team. First let’s look at the plausible forward contenders and Hill:

-Tyrone Hill: 34.2 mpg, 13.8 ppg, .504 FG%, 10.9 rpg, 0.8 apg, 16.8 PER,  .138 WS/48, -1.3 BPM, 0.4 VORP

-Derrick Coleman: 37.6 mpg, 20.5 ppg, .424 FG%, 10.6 rpg, 3.3 apg, 19.0 PER, .117 WS/48, 1.5 BPM, 1.8 VORP

-Horace Grant: 36.4 mpg, 12.8 ppg, .567 FG%, 9.7 rpg, 2.3 apg, 16.9 PER, .169 WS/48, 2.0 BPM, 2.7 VORP

-Toni Kukoc: 31.9 mpg, 15.7 ppg, .504 FG%, 5.4 rpg, 4.6 apg, 19.8 PER, .185 WS/48, 4.3 BPM, 4.1 VORP

-Derrick McKey: 34.6 mpg, 13.3 ppg, .493 FG%, 4.9 rpg, 3.4 apg, 15.0 BPM, .127 WS/48, 2.2 BPM, 3.0 VORP

-Glen Rice:  36.8 mpg, 22.3 ppg, .475 FG%, 4.6 rpg, 2.3 apg, 19.7 PER, .159 WS/48, 3.3 BPM, 4.0 VORP

-Dale Davis: 31.7 mpg, 10.6 ppg, .563 FG%, 9.4 apg, 0.8 apg, 16.1 PER, .140 WS/48, 0.9 BPM, 1.7 VORP

-Anthony Mason: 32.4 mpg, 9.9 ppg, .566 FG%, 8.3 rpg, 3.1 apg, 14.9 PER, .166 WS/48, 1.9 BPM, 2.5 VORP

-Hot Rod Williams: 35.7 mpg, 12.6 ppg, .452 FG%, 6.9 rpg, 2.6 apg, 14.6 PER, .096 WS/48, 0.8 BPM, 1.9 VORP

Webber is left out because he missed most of the first half with an injury (not that he would’ve made it anyway for the bad PR he was suffering that was noted above).  Even without Webber, Hill’s candidacy is very weak.  He’s the only player of the group with a negative BPM and he has the lowest VORP of this large group.  The two best candidates are clearly the two small forwards, Rice and Kukoc (that Kukoc never made an All-Star team is a bit surprising actually).  Kukoc has a slight edge but either choice was defensible and both are vastly superior to Hill.  It’s not clear what rationale got Hill over either of them other than the fact that Hill’s team had more wins at the time (the Bulls were very mediocre until MJ returned shortly thereafter).

Let’s assume that the NBA wanted Hill because he was a big forward who could rebound and eliminate Rice and Kukoc.  Even then, the Hill pick makes no sense and he  suffers in comparison to the other PFs. For all his crap, DC was having a pretty good year.  Like Webber, Coleman had no shot of making the team but he wasn’t the best choice anyway.  Grant, McKey, and Mason all were having better years (we can eliminate Mase because he was also not PR friendly for different reasons).  In the end, Grant seemed like the best choice, as a star PF for the best team in the East.

Finally, we listed William’s stats because he was Hill’s teammate.  Neither were All-Star worthy but Hot Rod’s stats give a perspective that Hill wasn’t even the best Cav front court player.

Now, let’s turn to Barros and point guard competition…

-Dana Barros: 40.5 mpg, 20.6 ppg, .490 FG%, 3.3 rpg, 7.5 apg, 20.9 PER, .183 WS/48, 5.0 BPM, 5.8 VORP

-Kenny Anderson: 37.3 mpg, 17.6 ppg, .399 FG%, 3.5 rpg, 9.4 apg, 18.0 PER, .122 WS/48, 2.2 BPM, 2.8 VORP

-Mookie Blaylock: 38.4 mpg, 17.2 ppg, .425 FG% 4.9 rpg, 7.7 apg, 19.2 PER, .147 WS/48, 5.1 BPM, 5.4 VORP

Wow.  Barros’ team stunk but he was playing like prime Allen Iverson.  It may be one of the great fluke seasons ever but Barros’ stats merited an All-Star pick.  Mookie was actually better (if you factor in defense), played on a better team, and had more of a past track record to support his stats.  In a binary world, Mookie would be the better choice but Barros was quite defensible a pick.  The real issue is that they both deserved to make the team.

As we wrote last month, Joe Dumars made the squad, despite having one of the worst seasons of his career.  Mookie (or Nick Anderson) deserved that slot.  Still, Joe D’s class and professionalism, put him over the top in a world where Stern was under fire for the Generation X stuff.  I guess karma was on Dumars’ side, as he ended up having a nice All-Star game.  He shot 5-8 and had 11 points and 6 assists.

Epilogue: In the end, the East was destroyed by 27 points (139-112).  Hill played only 6 minutes and had 2 points and 4 boards.  Barros played 11 minutes and had 5 points and three assists.

25 years later we can look back and see that Hill was a slightly below average power forward, who had better years than 1994-95 (1996-97 was his best season).  Hill played until 2004 as a backup big man and his one All-Star pick could not be justified then or now.

Barros parlayed his star year into a big contract from Boston, who promptly turned him into a role player again.  Barros didn’t start for Boston and his usage dropped from 21.2% with Philly to a then-career low 18.3% for Boston.  Very weird that Boston paid him and never gave him the opportunity to be a star. 

Chris Finch, David Vanterpool and NBA Coach Hiring Trends

When Minnesota fired Ryan Saunders last week, they immediately hired Chris Finch, an assistant coach with the Raptors.  The move caused some controversy because the T-Wolves passed over Saunders’ associate head coach David Vanterpool, who is Black, for Finch, who is white.  Several players expressed disappointment that Vanterpool wasn’t even considered for the job.  Marc J. Spears wrote an article for The Undefeated where he explored the frustration of many Black assistant coaches, with one coach telling Spears that: “[t]hey use your skill set during the difficult times, but when it’s time to reward you with an opportunity, they always seem to find a reason to not, and then expect you to continue to be the good soldier.”

In this particular case, the move was not that surprising.  The T-Wolves were 7-24 and the worst team in the league.  In these situations, the top assistant does sometimes get the interim job with an outside shot of getting the permanent job long-term if the interim can turn things around.  On the other hand, when a staff has prolonged losing seasons, management can look externally for a total reset.  In fact, this is precisely how Saunders got the full-time job in Minnesota.  It is a little odd (or perhaps awkward), that Finch will be using the same coaching staff that Saunders used, including Vanterpool, for now.

All these details aside, the frustration of Black coaches is also understandable.  As Spears wrote: “[t]here are currently seven Black NBA head coaches among 30 teams in a league where about 75% of the players are African American.”  (Diversity is even less prevalent in GM chair).  For these potential coaches, they see the macro picture and are quite frustrated that Vanterpool didn’t even get an interview.  Obviously, cause-and-effect in this area are hotly debated, with some scholars concluding that hiring discrimination against African Americans, generally, remaining at the same levels for the past 25 years.

I don’t intend to make any conclusions about why NBA coach hiring decisions happen but, instead, I thought we could look generally at each team’s hiring decisions over the last decade to see what patterns emerge.  Before looking at each team, we have to establish broad categories from which we can label most coaching hires.  There are only a finite number of hiring types and we see the candidate categories thusly:

Internal Assistant: Sometimes the local assistant makes good on the head coaching job by impressing on an interim basis (Jeff Van Gundy did this in New York years ago) or by getting a promotion when someone retires or is canned (Erik Spoelstra and Nick Nurse).

External Assistant:  like Chris Finch, a long-time assistant can get the job the hard way by placing with another team after years of putting in time.

Retreads: Those head coaches that are okay but never really great but range from bad to solid but can get a new job by virtue of their past resume.  Think Kevin Loughery in the old days.  More recently, coaches like Scotty Brooks or Alvin Gentry fit the category.  Tom Thibodeau was a star after he left Chicago but is now a solid retread.

College Guys: The star college coaches who want to take a shot in the pros like Brad Stevens or, at one point, Billy Donovan.

Star Coaches:  There aren’t too many of these but the top coaches are the no-brainers to hire.  Easy examples are Pat Riley, Phil Jackson and Chuck Daly.  Today, Steve Kerr, Rick Carlise, Erik Spoelstra, and Doc Rivers fit this bill (though they aren’t quite the level of the former coaches yet).

Star Newbies:  Star players (and announcers who were just good players) sometimes can skip the grueling assistant jobs and get head coaching jobs right away.  Doc Rivers, Mark Jackson, Jason Kidd, Steve Kerr, and Steve Nash all did this.  For our purposes, even Derek Fisher is considered a star newbie because he was able to jump to head coaching by virtue of his position as a decent (and well-known) player.

The above definitions shift for each coach over time.  For example, Donovan was once the college guy and is now a decent retread, while Spoelstra is a star now and Kidd would be a retread if he gets another head coaching job.  Some groupings are a bit subjective too.  A coach with prior head coaching experience could be a retread or an internal assistant at the same time.  We will make the best calls we can on those hybrid situations to pick the category that fits best. 

Also, there are a few Hispanic/Asian coaches (three to be precise) and we will count them in the non-white categories for our purposes.  We will categorize each coach by hiring group and race to see what trends, if any emerge.  We will not count any interim coach who only coached but a few games.

Having said all that, the NBA has had 124 regular or significant interim coaches since the start of the 2010-11 season.  Here’s a breakdown of the data:

-In total, 71 hires were white and 53 were Black.

-4 coaches came directly from the college ranks, all of whom were white (this may be a whole other conversation).

-23 hires were assistants who came from another organization, 14 white and 9 were Black.

-2 anomalies: Greg Popovich was GM and made himself coach in San Antonio and David Blatt came directly from Europe. 

-5 coaches came directly from playing, broadcasting, or front offices.  3 were Black, 2 were white.

-7 coaches were “star” hires.  5 were white and 2 were Black (both Doc Rivers).

-45 coaches were “retreads” of varying degrees of proficiency.  29 of the retreads were white and 16 were Black.

-The internal assistant promotions were particularly interesting to me because that is the scenario that is the origin of the current Finch/Vanterpool controversy.  Internal assistant promotions were definitely a different data point and one category where there were more Black candidates than white.  Of the 39, 23 were Black and 16 were white.

-In addition, 29 of these internal promotions were on an interim basis and 14 of the 29 got the full-time job.  Of that group, 17 interims were Black and 12 were white.  Digging further: 8 of the 17 Black coaches got the full-time gig.  6 of the 12 white coaches also got the full-time job. 

-One more anomaly, Paul Silas is the only coach to get an interim gig while not being an assistant coach beforehand (in Charlotte).  He also got the full-time job briefly.

-Age! On top of race, front offices seem to want to find young bodies and lock them in if they are any good.  Sometimes, you get Spoelstra.  Other times, Ryan Saunders.  In either case, the market gets tighter as the coaches age too.  Is this fair?  Probably not.  This is also a discussion for another day.

Before making too many conclusions, though, remember that we are only looking at the finished data and not accounting for individual hiring situations and who may have been considered in those cases.  Still, this broad data does tell us the life of an assistant is rough.

Assistant coaches, particularly Black assistants, have their best path to a full-time gig through this interim label.  The data shows that interims usually have about a 50% chance getting the job.  The numbers are actually probably a little higher because we did not filter out a few scenarios where it was clear the interim coach was clearly not going to be retained under any circumstance.    

Assistant coaches are also a different group than stars.  An African American star player can skip the line while someone like Vanterpool can grind it out in the video room for years.  It’s not totally fair but it has worked at times.  Doc Rivers is a great coach but he made the jump straight from broadcasting. (I didn’t specifically study this end but it also felt like ex-player assistants got more opportunities from the assistant ranks than those that played no or little NBA ball).

Putting it all together, the picture is bleak for assistants who dream of becoming head coaches.  There are tons of factors working against them and African American assistants appear to have a particularly hard path to a full-time job.  Given the data, you can understand why so many were disappointed that Vanterpool missed his best route to a job. 

Full coach hiring data is below:

Atlanta

-Larry Drew, internal assistant (AA)

-Mike Budenholzer, external assistant (W)

-Lloyd Pierce, external assistant (AA)

Boston

-Doc Rivers, retread (AA)

-Brad Stevens, college guy (W)

Brooklyn

-Avery Johnson, retread (AA)

-P.J. Carlesimo, internal assistant (W)(interim, didn’t get full-time job)

-Jason Kidd, star newbie (AA)

-Lionel Hollins, retread (AA)

-Kenny Atkinson, external assistant (W)

-Jacque Vaughn, internal assistant (AA)(interim, didn’t get full-time job)

-Steve Nash, star newbie (W)

Charlotte

-Larry Brown, retread (W)

-Paul Silas, retread (AA)(interim hire, got full-time job)

-Mike Dunlap, college guy (W)

-Steve Clifford, external assistant (W)

-James Borrego, external assistant (H)

Cleveland

-Mike Brown, external assistant (AA)

-Byron Scott, retread (AA)

-David Blatt, European coach (W)

-Ty Lue, internal assistant (AA)(interim hire, got full-time job)

-Larry Drew, internal assistant (AA)(interim hire, didn’t get full-time job)

-John Beilein, college guy (W)

-J.B. Bickerstaff, internal assistant (AA)(interim hire, got full-time job)

Dallas

-Rick Carlisle, retread (W)

Denver

-George Karl, star coach (W)

-Brian Shaw, external assistant (AA)

-Melvin Hunt, internal assistant (AA)(interim hire, didn’t get full-time job)

-Michael Malone, retread (W)

Detroit

-John Kuester, external assistant (W)

-Lawrence Frank, retread (W)

-Maurice Cheeks, retread (AA)

-John Loyer, internal assistant (W)(interim hire, didn’t get full-time job)

-Stan Van Gundy, retread (W)

-Dwane Casey, retread (AA)

Golden State

-Keith Smart, internal assistant (AA)

-Mark Jackson, star newbie (AA)

-Steve Kerr, star newbie (W)

Houston

-Rick Adelman, retread (W)

-Kevin McHale, retread (W)

-J.B. Bickerstaff, internal assistant (AA) (interim hire, didn’t get full-time job)

-Mike D’Antoni, retread (W)

-Stephen Silas, external assistant (AA)

Indiana

-Jim O’Brien, retread (W)

-Frank Vogel, internal assistant (W) (interim hire, got full-time job)

-Nate McMillan, internal assistant (AA)

-Nate Bjorkgren, external assistant (W)

Los Angeles Clippers

-Vinny Del Negro, retread (W)

-Doc Rivers, star coach (AA)

-Ty Lue, retread (AA)

Los Angeles Lakers

-Phil Jackson, star coach (W)

-Mike Brown, retread, (AA)

-Mike D’Antoni, retread (W)

-Byron Scott, retread (AA)

-Luke Walton, external assistant (W)

-Frank Vogel, retread (W)

Memphis

-Lionel Hollins, internal assistant (AA)

-Dave Joerger, internal assistant (W)

-Dave Fizdale, external assistant (AA)

-J.B. Bickerstaff, internal assistant (AA)(interim hire, got full-time job)

-Taylor Jenkins, external assistant (W)

Miami

-Erik Spoelstra, internal assistant (A)

Milwaukee

-Scott Skiles, retread (W)

-Jim Boylan, internal assistant (W) (interim hire, didn’t get full-time job)

-Larry Drew, retread (AA)

-Jason Kidd, retread (AA)

-Joe Prunty, internal assistant (W)(interim hire, didn’t get full-time job)

-Mike Budenholzer, retread (W)

Minnesota

-Kurt Rambis, external assistant (W)

-Rick Adelman, retread (W)

-Flip Saunders, retread (W)

-Sam Mitchell, internal assistant (AA)

-Tom Thibodeau, star coach (W)

-Ryan Saunders, internal assistant (W)(interim hire, got full-time job)

-Chris Finch, external assistant (W)

New Orleans

-Monty Williams, external assistant (AA)

-Alvin Gentry, retread (AA)

-Stan Van Gundy, retread (W)

New York

-Mike D’Antoni, star coach (W)

-Mike Woodson, internal assistant (AA)(interim hire, got full-time job)

-Derek Fisher, star newbie (AA)

-Kurt Rambis, internal assistant (W)(interim hire, didn’t get full-time job)

-Jeff Hornacek, retread (W)

-Dave Fizdale, retread (AA)

-Mike Miller, internal assistant (W)(interim hire, didn’t get full-time job)

-Tom Thibodeau, retread (W)

Oklahoma City

-Scott Brooks, internal assistant (W)(interim hire, got full-time job)

-Billy Donovan, college coach (W)

-Mark Daigneault, (W) internal assistant

Orlando Magic

-Stan Van Gundy, retread (W)

-Jacque Vaughn, external assistant (AA)

-James Borrego, internal assistant (H)(interim hire, didn’t get full-time job)

-Scott Skiles, retread (W)

-Frank Vogel, retread (W)

-Steve Clifford, retread (W)

Philadelphia

-Doug Collins, retread (W)

-Brent Brown, external assistant (W)

-Doc Rivers, star coach (AA)

Phoenix

-Alvin Gentry, internal assistant (AA)(interim hire, got full-time job)

-Lindsey Hunter, internal assistant (AA)(interim hire, didn’t get full-time job)

-Jeff Hornacek, external assistant (W)

-Earl Watson, internal assistant (AA)(interim hire, got full-time job)

-Jay Triano, internal assistant (W)(interim hire, didn’t get full-time job)

-Igor Kokoskov, external assistant (W)

-Monty Williams, retread (AA)

Portland

-Nate McMillan, retread (AA)

-Kaleb Canales, internal assistant (H)(interim hire, didn’t get full-time job)

-Terry Stotts, retread (W)

Sacramento

-Paul Westphal, retread (W)

-Keith Smart, internal assistant (AA)(interim hire, got full-time job)

-Mike Malone, external assistant (W)

-Tyrone Corbin, internal assistant (AA)(interim hire, didn’t get full-time job)

-George Karl, star coach (W)

-Dave Joerger, retread (W)

-Luke Walton, retread (W)

San Antonio

-Greg Poppovich, internal executive (W)

Toronto

-Jay Triano, internal assistant (W)(interim hire, got full-time job)

-Dwane Casey, external assistant (AA)

-Nick Nurse, internal assistant (W)

Utah

-Jerry Sloan, internal assistant (W)(interim hire, got full-time job)

-Tyrone Corbin, internal assistant (AA)(interim hire, got full-time job)

-Quinn Snyder, external assistant (W)

Washington

-Flip Saunders, star coach, (W)

-Randy Wittman, internal assistant (W)(interim hire, got full-time job)

-Scott Brooks, retread (W)

NBA 2020-21 Awards So Far

As we approach the halfway point of the season, I thought this would be good time to do awards picks for the season that has been so far.  Granted a lot could change but let’s jump in and take a look:

MVP:  Before the season, LeBron James, Kawhi Leonard, and Giannis Antetokounmpo were the safe bets.  They were the best players for the three likely best teams.  They have all been very good so far but Nikola Jokic has been even better.  Jokic leads the NBA in most advanced stats and his lead is quite large:

PER: Joel Embiid 32.2, Jokic, 31.5

WS: Jokic 6.6, Embiid 4.8

WS/48:  Jokic .306, Embiid .294

BPM: Jokic 11.6, Embiid 9.0

VORP: Jokic 3.6, Luka Doncic 2.4

So, the advanced stats story tells us Jokic has been the best player in the NBA, with Embiid a close second.  The chances of Jokic winning the MVP on a 16-13 Denver team are not high but, like Kevin Garnett in 2004-05, there are strong indicators that he’s the best right now.  My choice would be Jokic.

If we are predicting who would win the MVP from the voters, the best bet is Embiid.  He has a pretty strong case too.  His numbers are in Jokic’s neighborhood and Philly has played well (though SRS says they are overrated).  Either way, Embiid’s stats and Philly’s record, when taken together, makes him a good fit for stats folk and more conventional voters.  LBJ, Giannis, and Kawhi (and Doncic) are defensible picks too but a notch below those two and their teams seem to be coasting a bit more.

What about the best team in the NBA?   As good as Utah has been, none of its individual parts merit serious MVP consideration.  Rudy Gobert has probably been there best player (with Mike Conley a close second) but neither can seriously be considered better than Jokic, Embiid, Giannis, LBJ, or Kawhi.  Instead, Utah’s strength has been its depth.

Sixth Man of the Year:  This is where Utah has been really good.  Jordan Clarkson has gotten kudos for his scoring (18.2 pg on .587 TS% in 26.2 mpg) and seems to be everyone’s favorite for this award.  He definitely fits the profile of that automatic scorer off-the-bench winning this award.  Indeed, there are several multiple Sixth Man winners in the past doing very similar things like Ricky Pierce, Lou Williams, or Jamal Crawford.  Clarkson’s advanced stats are also pretty good (3.0 BPM, 1.0 VORP).  A few bench players, however, rate out a little better:

-Joe Ingles, 3.8 BPM, 1.0 VORP

-Chris Boucher, 3.6 BPM, 1.0 VORP

-Jarrett Allen, 3.0 BPM, 1.0 VORP

Allen is likely to start the rest of the season going forward so we can count him out.  Boucher has also been really good as a multi-talented bench big (he even hits a few threes!).  As for Ingles, he’s hard to separate from Clarkson because they spend so much time on the floor together with similar offensive ratings.  They differ a bit in that Clarkson gets marked down a little for his soso defense while Ingles is considered a plus on that side of the floor.  Of the three candidates, I would probably go with Boucher, who has been a dynamic force off the bench but I could see an argument for Clarkson or Ingles.

2019-20 winner Montrezl Harrell has been as good as always but is clearly inferior to Boucher in the same role.  It should also be noted that Lou Williams has been below his usual standard this year and isn’t really in the conversation yet.

Rookie of the Year:  After a terrible debut game, LaMelo Ball has lapped the field.  He was viewed as a high risk player but, so far, he’s been great.  Kevin Pelton and John Hollinger, among others, have written about how unprecedented Ball’s stats have been as a 19-year old.  Ball has a 2.8 BPM and is only one of two rookies playing more than 20 minutes per game with a positive BPM.  Here are top five rookies in BPM with a minimum of 20 minutes played per game:

1. Ball, 2.8

2. Tyrese Haliburton, 2.1

3. Saddiq Bey, -0.3

4. Xavier Tillman, -0.4

5. Jae-Sean Tate, -1.0

Haliburton is not flashy but he still has an outside shot of catching Ball.  It would take a little luck but it is not unprecedented. In 1991-92, it looked like Dikembe Mutombo was a lock to win the award around the time of the All-Star break.  Deke made the All-Star team and his odds of winning the award must have been high.  Thereafter, Mutombo’s numbers slowed down markedly and then he missed the last month of the season after thumb surgery.  At the same time, Larry Johnson got really hot and won the award.  Here are their stats through February 6, 1992:

Mutombo, 11/1/91-2/6/92: 46 gms, 19.1 ppg, .504 FG%, 13.3 rpg

Johnson, 11/1/91-2/6/92: 47 gms, 17.8 ppg, .489 FG%, 11.6 rpg

Close but Mutombo had him beat in all the counting stats.  Now let’s see their stats for the home stretch:

Mutombo, 2/7/92-4/19/92: 25 gms, 12.0 ppg, .461 FG%, 10.3 rpg

Johnson, 2/7/92-4/19/92: 35 gms, 21.1 ppg, .490 FG%, 10.1 rpg

In the end, LJ won the award going away, with 90.5 votes out of 96 possible ballots.  So, beware LaMelo, you could get caught from behind, though it’s highly unlikely.

Defensive Player of the Year:  Giannis and Gobert have won the last three awards and Gobert looks like a good bet to get it again this year.  Utah has the second best defense and Gobert is obviously the key cog in their defense.  The advanced stats give more credit to some of his teammates and, in fact, Gobert is not quite in the top ten in DBPM (1.9).  The Lakers have the best defense in the NBA and Marc Gasol (who is tied with Ben Simmons) leads the NBA in this category at 2.5.  Gasol is always an effective defender but he has only played 20 minutes per game and he has two great defenders to help him (LBJ and Anthony Davis).

Simmons has a reasonable argument as well but Gobert seems like such a dominant defender on the eye test and the advanced stats that I would agree that he has earned the award so far.

Coach of the Year: The best surprise team award.  Quinn Snyder has this on lockdown this year unless the Lakers or Clippers catch Utah.  The backup pick is Doc Rivers so far.  If the Sixers give up the top seed to Brooklyn, Steve Nash may get the award.

Executive of the Year: Utah is having the best season but they didn’t do much differently with roster other than re-sign Donovan Mitchell and Rudy Gobert for $400 million.  Brooklyn is the team that made the big move in getting James Harden but is trading everything that wasn’t nailed down for a superstar really the type of innovative decision that merits this award?  Probably not but it will likely get Sean Marks the award anyway.

In short, there is really no satisfying answer to this award and I frankly find this award kind of silly anyway.  If forced to choose, I like James Jones in Phoenix as my pick for scooping up Chris Paul and Jae Crowder fairly cheaply.

Most Improved Player: I leave my least favorite award for last because the criteria for picking are usually very mushy.  In this case, however, the award is quite clear under any standard of review.  Jerami Grant has looked like a totally different player this year (23.5 ppg).  He has improved after many years of an established level of ability as a role player.  That is the perfect surprise choice.  Sure, Detroit has no scorers but Grant has exceeded even the wildest expectations this year.  His winning has nice symmetry as well since his father Harvey Grant almost won the award in 1990-91 (he came in second to Scott Skiles).