Revisiting The Mavericks’ Three Js (Kidd, Jackson & Mashburn)

In November 1994, roughly 30 years ago, the Mavericks debuted the famous “Three Js” lineup consisting of smooth scoring shooting guard Jimmy Jackson, shot happy small forward Jamal Mashburn, and exciting rookie point guard Jason Kidd.  The trio with the flashy nickname and flashy games captured the imagination of fans before quickly flaming out due to a variety of factors, most notably personality clashes between the three stars that may or may not have involved a love triangle with singer Toni Braxton.

Enough time has passed that I thought now would be interesting to revisit the rise-and-fall of The Three Js and what more we can learn with a little distance from the controversy.  Let’s run through the Three Js, FAQ style….

A Little Context: Dallas before The Three Js

The Mavericks were the model of how an expansion franchise builds intelligently.  After a rough 15-67 debut in 1980-81, Dallas steadily improved by hitting on most of its draft picks, culminating in 55 wins in 1986-87 and 53 wins in 1987-88 before the team began to decline due to an aging core and the addiction issues of franchise superstar Roy Tarpley. 

 The tipping point came in 1990-91.  The talented Tarpley had been suspended twice for failing drug tests and a third failed test would necessitate a three-year ban (which, at the time, was considered to be ostensibly a lifetime suspension).  The Mavs started out 4-1 and the 26-year old Tarpley was dominant: 34.2 mpg, 20.4 ppg, .544 FG%. 11.0 rpg, 2.4 apg, 1.8 bpg, 23.6 PER, .165 WS48, 3.6 BPM.  Alas, Tarpley injured his knee dunking in that fifth game and was ruled out for the season.  The Mavs finished up the 27-53 without Tarpley but were left hoping, with his return in 1991-92, they could plausibly contend.  Things went sideways from there.

While rehabbing his knee, Tarpley had other issues.   He was arrested for DWI again and suspended for another relapse.  Before the 1991-92 season, Tarpley, who had failed two prior tests, refused to take a mandatory drug test.  The NBA considered this a third failure and resulted in a ban from the NBA.

Without Tarpley, the Mavs fell to 22-60 in 1991-92 and it was clear a full rebuild was needed.  Dallas picked a pretty good year to tank.  The 1992 Draft was loaded with huge prospects: Shaq, Alonzo Mourning, Christian Laettner, and Jimmy Jackson.  Dallas had the third worst record in the NBA but fell to the fourth pick, when a 31-win Charlotte team had lottery luck and leapfrogged Dallas and Minnesota to get the second pick (the Wolves luck was worse, as they were the NBA’s worst team by far and still missed out on Shaq and Zo). Dallas tabbed Jackson with the fourth pick, getting its first J.

1992-93: Tanking & antagonizing Jackson for no good reason

The 1992-93 Mavs were a tank machine on par with The Process 76ers.  Dallas clearly did not intend to compete in 1992. Of the 19 players that played on the team that year, 17 were young fringe players.  A few of those players would end up having decent NBA careers (Sean Rooks, Terry Davis, and Tim Legler) but they were role players and the rest of the roster would be out of the NBA shortly after the season.  That left two bona fide NBA players: Jackson and veteran point guard Derek Harper.

To make matters worse, JJ had a serious contract dispute that led him to hold out for much of the season.  According to The Seattle Times, the crux of the dispute was that Jackson wanted a six-year deal and the team was only offering a four-year deal.  By mid-December an angry Jackson released a statement saying that he’d never play for the Mavs: “I do not feel that the Dallas Mavericks have dealt with me in the same way other top NBA picks were dealt with.  I now feel it is necessary to publicly stop all speculation that I might at some time be willing to sign with Dallas. I will not under any circumstances, or at any time, play basketball with the Dallas Mavericks.”

Perhaps because he was perfectly happy to tank the year away, Dallas GM Norm Sonju was not particularly intimidated: “If we were able to get them talking on a six-year model, no matter what words have been said, things could change.  Maybe I’m naive, but I’m hoping good things can still happen.  We’re not holding it against him. He was sincere and polite in the way he said it. He meant every word of it and I don’t blame him for being frustrated.”

In retrospect, it’s a bit funny that contract length was the sticking point.  As we soon learned, young players who hit the free agent market earlier would command huge extensions.  Still, it did seem that, with the benefit of hindsight, Dallas was in the wrong in the negotiations.  Years later, in 2014, Jackson clarified that the value of the deal offered was more of an issue than length:

“I’m the fourth pick, and at the time, it was a market set. So you got Shaquille O’Neal goes No. 1, Alonzo Mourning as No 2, and Christian Laettner as No. 3. So the market is already set. So here’s my window—at six years, I signed a $21 million deal, so Christian was at like 25 or 24 [million], so my market was between 21 and 25 [million]. That’s where it was at. So when I got drafted, and they tried to offer me a deal that was about what the eighth pick got. So Donald Carter came to Columbus in the big plane, and picked me up, and we were flying over Columbus, and he says, ‘Well Jimmy, I don’t think we should pay a guard this much money, because Randy White and Doug Smith didn’t really work out.’

“And I said, ‘Mr. Carter, no disrespect,’ I said, ‘But that’s not my fault that they didn’t work out.’ I said, ‘Now, I’m the fourth pick. I’m not going to ask for anything more, but I’m not going to take less than what my market value is,’ and I said, ‘So if you don’t want to pay me what the fourth pick is, I understand. Trade the pick, but if not, I’m not coming in for anything less than that….”

Jackson brought an antitrust lawsuit against the Mavs and the NBA alleging collusion (there were no pre-determined salary slots for rookies at that time but it was understood that the top pick set the market and each successive pick would descend correspondingly and Dallas was bucking that paradigm for unknown reasons).  The lawsuit prompted the Mavs to give in and sign Jackson in March 1993 to the six-year deal for about $21 million, exactly what he asked for initially.  While Jackson was gone, the Mavs had gone an execrable 4-50.  The Mavs ended up ticking off Jackson for no reason other than to try to upset the well-established salary slots for draftees. (I realize there is an argument that Dallas benefitted by losing while JJ was out but: (a) the would’ve still been horrible with Jackson and (b) the costs of antagonizing your only good young player clearly outweigh any benefit of “super tanking”).

Jackson played the final 28 games and was quite raw (33.5 mpg, .451 TS%, 16 ppg, 4.4 rpg, 4.7 apg, 11.0 PER, -.081 WS48, -4.5 BPM).  While those numbers sound bad, he had ability to score that made a defense worry (the shooting guard position had been manned mostly by CBAers Walter Bond and the NBA Jam legend Mike Iuzzolino).  Even though he was raw and totally inefficient, Jackson seemed to help and the Mavs closed a relatively hot 7-21 after he joined the team.

1993-94: Enter Mashburn & everyone hates Quinn

The Mavs’ lottery luck in 1993 literally couldn’t have been worse.  The 1992-93 were decisively bad.  They finished with the worst record in the NBA by eight games and had the league’s worst offense AND the worst defense.  Despite having the best odds to land somewhere in the top three picks, the Mavs didn’t get any such pick.  Instead, a 41-41 Orlando team with the worst odds (1 in 66) got the top pick.  In fact, Orlando GM Pat Williams had said before the lottery that the Magic winning “would be tantamount to World War III breaking out, with Switzerland winning.”  To add to the insult from Dallas’ perspective, a 34-48 Golden State also passed them by and got the third pick.  So, Dallas was set to pick fourth, their worst possible (and least probable) outcome.

Dallas missed out on consensus number one pick Chris Webber but drafted Jamal Mashburn, who was widely considered the second-best prospect (Philadelphia took project Shawn Bradley second, and Penny Hardaway went third).  Mashburn fit well as a small forward because the backcourt was the only place where Dallas had any talent.

The other big move of that off-season was the hiring of Quinn Buckner as coach.  Buckner was a no-nonsense disciple of Bobby Knight, his old hard ass college coach.  He got a five-year contract, which imparted Buckner with two goals: (a) impart iron-fisted control of the organization and (b) run the Triangle Offense.  At his introductory press conference, Buckner said he was “not somebody who’s going to be patient.  There’s a task at hand and we’ve got to approach it with a sense of urgency.  We can’t afford to be complacent.”  

Many coaches go with the tough guy approach but it only works if people, on some level, like and/or respect you.  The players hated Buckner and hated the Triangle Offense.  As early as November 26, 1993, articles were dropping that reported that Buckner had worn out his welcome.  Jackson and Mashburn were scoring pretty well but the team looked worse than ever, starting out a miserable 2-39.

On December 20, 1993, Sports Illustrated wrote a derisive piece about the Dallas situation: “Before the season was even a month old, the Mavs were rebelling against what one player called Buckner’s ‘reign of terror.’ The three most important Mavericks—rookie forward Jamal Mashburn and guards Jimmy Jackson, who is in his second season, and 11-year veteran Derek Harper—were the most demonstrative in their criticism, lashing out publicly at Buckner for everything from his erratic substitution patterns and his structured half-court offense to what they considered his harsh treatment of the players.” 

Buckner’s two young stars were particularly irked: “After a game against the Utah Jazz on Nov. 13, Jackson angrily yelled at Buckner about substitution patterns, and when Mashburn was yanked early in the first quarter from a game against the Trail Blazers on Nov. 21, he fumed. ‘I asked him why [I was coming out],’ Mashburn says, ‘and he didn’t say much. If he’s trying to send me a message, he’s got to tell me. Let me in on it too.’”

Buckner also antagonized his only vet in Harper by benching him in the pre-season for Fat Lever, who had played 35 games in the last three seasons due to knee issues. Things got worse during the season: “Harper started the season opener, but hostilities resumed when Buckner yanked him against the New York Knicks on Nov. 16 only 3:47 into the contest. During a timeout moments later, a steaming Harper sat in open defiance of Buckner at the end of the bench while the rest of the team huddled around the coach. When Buckner reinserted him three minutes later, Harper cursed audibly as he passed the scorer’s table and kicked a resin bottle onto the floor. ‘There’s too many games being played with me, man,’ Harper said later.”

The Mavs were horrible and the environment was totally toxic.  The Mavs would sort of rally to finish 13-69.  The Mavs were, once again, the worst offensive team in the NBA, though the defense improved marginally to 24th (out of 27 teams).  Putting aside Buckner’s interpersonal skills, his offensive scheme failings were notable.  A team with two good young scorers in Jackson and Mashburn shouldn’t be the worst team in the NBA.  This was enough to get Dallas to fire Buckner after the season and eat the remaining four years of his deal.  The Mavs rehired Dick Motta, their original coach from the 1980s, who had been working as a consultant for the team.

In the larger scheme of things, the bad season had two bright spots: Jackson and Mashburn got a lot of playing time to develop and the Mavs were in line for a high pick in a pretty good draft.  In terms of development, here’s what the first 2 Js did in 1993-94:

Jackson: age 23, 37.4 mpg, 19.2 ppg, .445 FG%, .283 3FG%, 4.7 rpg, 4.6 apg, 14.4 PER, .009 WS48, -1.7 BPM

Mashburn: age 21, 36.7 mpg, 19.2 ppg, .406 FG%, .284 3FG%, 4.5 rpg, 3.4 apg, 13.2 PER, .014 WS48, -2.4 BPM

Both players showed an ability to create shots but, like with most very young players, efficiency was not there.  At the time, Mash’s rookie usage rating of 26.6% was the eighth highest of any rookie since the three-point shot was instituted in 1979-80.  His adjusted shooting numbers were ghastly (.480 TS% which was boosted only by the fact that he drew 5.5 free throw attempts per game). 

Despite the efficiency issues, the consensus was that both players had bright futures.  For example, The 1995 Complete Handbook of Pro Basketball was bullish on both players. Jackson had shown clear improvement and was called a “big-time player in the making…[his] strength gives a lot of guards trouble inside on defense.”  As for Mash, Joe Dumars stated “he’s the most well-rounded rookie I’ve seen this year…at the time of the draft, I thought Jamal had the most potential.” 

Even better news was the shift in draft luck.  Dallas landed the second pick in a three-player draft of Glenn Robinson, Jason Kidd, and Grant Hill.  Robinson was the biggest star and Grant Hill was the most polished but Dallas had Mashburn and didn’t need a scoring small forward.  They drafted Kidd to fill the point guard hole (Harper had been dealt to the Knicks at mid-season in 1993-94).

Kidd had some off-the-court baggage but he was an even bigger prospect than both Jackson and Mashburn and his college stats jumped off the page:

1993-94: Age 20, 35.1 mpg, 16.7 ppg, .472 FG%, .362 3FG%, 6.9 rpg, 9.1 apg, 3.1 spg

In short, Kidd’s college stats made him look like a mini-Magic Johnson. Adding this kind of all-around player to Jackson and Mashburn was truly an exciting prospect and The Three Js were truly born.

1994-95: The Three Js [briefly] play together

For the first time since early 1990-91, there was optimism in Dallas.  In addition to the coaching change and drafting Kidd, Tarpley was reinstated and was still only 30-years old.  If he could stay clean, the Mavs finally had the depth of a normal NBA roster.  Vegas had pegged Dallas for 26 wins, which sounds bad but would’ve been a big improvement over the two prior dumpster fire seasons.  Having three young potential stars, unshackled from Buckner’s version of the Triangle, figured to be explosive. 

On November 5, 1994, the new Mavs won their opener against the Nets and the component parts did great. Jackon had 37 (and went to the line 17 times), Mash had 30, and Kidd had a near triple-double (10 points, 9 rebounds, 11 assists, and 3 steals to boot).  This marked the first time since November 20, 1990 that the Mavs were over the .500 mark.

Dallas continued playing competitively and reached a high mark of 12-8.  From there, the Mavs struggled a bit, going 4-17, and were 16-25 overall.  On February 23, 1995, the Mavs were 20-30 and were set to play (coincidentally) the Nets again.  At the time, here were the stats of the Three Js:

Kidd: 34.9 mpg, 9.4 ppg, .370 FG%, .207 3FG%, 5.6 rpg, 7.4 apg, 2.1 spg

Jackson: 38.9 mpg, 25.7 ppg, .472 FG%, .318 3FG%, 5.1 rpg, 3.7 apg

Mashburn: 38.1 mpg, 23.9 ppg, .436 FG%, .341 3FG%, 4.1 rpg, 3.4 apg

The Mavs were not great but were respectable and both JJ and Mashburn were getting more efficient in their scoring.  Kidd couldn’t shoot at all but was still a positive value player because he did literally everything else on the floor.  In that second Nets game, Jackson severely sprained his ankle and went down for the rest of the season.  We didn’t know it at the time, but this was essentially the last time the Three Js would play together regularly.

Without Jackson, Dallas played pretty well.  The Mavs finished up 16-16, shattering the Vegas odds with a 36-46 record (a  23-game improvement from prior year). Here are the stats for Kidd and Mash after Jackson’s injury:

Kidd: 32.2 mpg, 15.0 ppg, .400 FG%, .331 3FG%, 5.2 rpg, 8.1 apg, 1.6 spg

Mashburn: 35.9 mpg, 24.4 ppg, .436 FG%, .308 3FG%, 4.2 rpg, 4.3 apg

Mashburn scored a little more but Kidd’s improvement was marked.  He picked up scoring and efficiency at the same time. 

Digging deeper into the stats, for the season, Dallas jumped to 15th on offense and improved to 21st on defense.  The offense was driven by the offensive boards.  Though they were 26th in FG%, Dallas led the NBA in shot attempts, offensive rebounds, and total rebounds (they were 7th in defensive rebounds).  So, the big scorers had to give some credit to the unheralded front court that got them so many extra shots. 

Tarpley had been the best scorer in the frontcourt and was still a pretty good player (12.6 ppg, 8.2 rpg in only 24.6 mpg).  The starting power forward was 24-year old Popeye Jones, who was developing into a nice solid player and a boarding machine (10.3 ppg, 10.6 rpg but only shot .443 FG% and led the team in offensive rebounding with a 14.1% rate).  Center was manned by undersized hustler Lorenzo Williams, who played 29 mpg and rebounded on offense nearly as well as Popeye.  On offense, though, Williams made Ben Simmons look like Nikola Jokic.  Williams put up only 3.7 shots per game and scored 4 ppg with a comically low 7.9 usage rate.  Williams’ usage rate that year was the fifth lowest of the Three-Point Era for players who logged over 2,300 minutes.

As always, Tarpley was an issue.  He had played well off-the-bench but the threat of relapse loomed.  In addition, he wasn’t a peach to deal with.  According to the 1995-96 Sports Illustrated preview, Tarpley “squabbled with Motta because he didn’t start.  Though Dallas tried to deal him, Tarpley is back, and his unhappiness could be the biggest threat to what Motta calls ‘a sort of magic developing here.’”

So, the Mavs had to hedge against another Tarpley implosion.  Moreover, replacing Williams with a starter with a modicum of offensive skills seemed to be a way to improve quickly.  There was every reason to believe that the Mavs, with the right off-season moves, could take the next step to the playoffs with the Three Js in 1995-96.

1995-96: Unbreak my heart

The only avenue for improvement for the Mavs in the summer of 1995 was the NBA Draft, where they had the 12th pick and the 24th pick (from the Knicks for giving them Rolando Blackman in 1992).  Dallas was set to draft two big men to replace Williams and, possibly, Tarpley.  At the 12th pick, the Mavs took Duke C Cherokee Parks and, at the 24th pick, they took Iowa State C Loren Meyer.  On paper, both had more skill than Williams but Motta still stuck with Williams as the starter.  This was a bad sign for the new draftees.  Parks and Meyer ended up being bench fodder and were both traded within the next year. With perfect hindsight, we can see that Dallas missed on a few helpful players at those spots.  While the best player available was Michael Finley, Dallas had no need at that spot with Jackson ensconced at the position.  Limiting the options to other frontcourt players, Theo Ratliff (drafted 18th by Detroit) would’ve fit in well as a supercharged version of Williams.  The other bad decision was taking Meyer over fellow Big 8 center Greg Ostertag (who fell to Utah at 28).  It’s hard to knock Dallas for not drafting the perfect pick in these slots but they got almost no value from either pick (Parks would go on to have a decent career as a backup big and Meyer was out of the NBA shortly).

To make matters worse, Tarpley failed a drug screening when he tested positive for alcohol early in the 1995-96 season.  Tarpley claimed that the positive test resulted from taking NyQuil.  He was suspended and never played another game in the NBA after the 1994-95 season.  (He did end up suing the NBA years later, you can read about that in detail here if you are interested).

Despite the frontcourt issues, things started nicely.  Dallas opened with an impressive win at San Antonio, where Kidd and Mashburn each scored 27 points and the undersized bigs held David Robinson to 6-18 shooting.  The Mavs won their next three games at home to go to 4-0.  Then the bottom fell out.  Mashburn began shooting horribly (.478 TS%, which was worse than his rookie season) and injured his knee on December 9, 1995, ending his season. Dallas began losing a lot.  They went 2-12 after the 4-0 start until Mashburn’s injury.  The losing continued after Mash’s injury and the Mavs bottomed out at 8-22 (or 4-22 after the hot start). 

It was at this point, that rumors of a rift between The Three Js surfaced.  Sports Illustrated summarized the situation in November 1996: “Kidd and Jackson, previously close, were
quarreling, with Kidd upset with what he saw as Jackson’s selfishness on the court.  Jackson had been the Mavericks’ brilliant new star before Mashburn arrived–but then Kidd eclipsed them both…. That team went ‘in the tank’–Kidd’s words–by the end of December. Kidd’s disenchantment snowballed as his grievances against Jackson, which he aired publicly, piled up. And during a
Feb. 15 game in Utah, Kidd says, he hit his breaking point: ‘We were winning by something like 20 points at halftime [actually, 12], but there was almost a fight in the locker room. Jimmy and
[backup point guard] Scotty Brooks were going to fight because Scotty didn’t throw him the ball. Then we went out and lost. I was fed up.’”

Sports Illustrated also gave voice to the rumor that Kidd and Jackson, who were not speaking, were fighting over the attention of singer Toni Braxton.  I remember the rumor from those heady pre-modern internet days but this article was kind enough to give concrete details:

“Oblique but persistent published reports said the two guards’ squabble was partly over a ‘mystery woman’ later identified as pop singer Toni Braxton. Shaking his head now, Jackson says, ‘People actually come up to me now and ask, ‘What’s she like?  What’s Toni like?’ And I say, ‘Brother, I don’t know. I don’t even know the woman.’

Kidd says, ‘I was supposed to meet her last [Dec. 4 and 5] when we were in New York. She was in the studio, recording. But I didn’t go.’ Nevertheless, a Dallas Morning News columnist, citing unnamed team sources, wrote that Braxton called Kidd after they missed each other in New York and said she was sorry he wasn’t feeling well–but it was nice of him to send Jackson in his stead. When Braxton was reached for corroboration, she coyly said, ‘A girl will never kiss and tell, you know that.’  The columnist reported that Jackson was unavailable for comment.  Soon the unrefuted story was picked up by publications from Vibe magazine to the National Enquirer.”

Regardless of what was true, it was clear that Kidd and Mashburn detested Jackson at the time.  The team finished a miserable 26-56 and Motta was fired.  After the season, in late June 1996, Kidd went public with a demand that either he or Jackson be traded and Mashburn also stated that “I told [ownership] some of the same things, that there’s a lot selfishness on the part of Jim.”  Management refused to agree to a trade and Kidd retracted the ultimatum a few days later but was still discontented, blowing off a meeting with new coach Jim Cleamons.

Sports Illustrated reported that at the start of the 1996-97 season, “the Mavs’ three young stars
were promising to be ‘professional’; Jackson and Kidd, along with [the recently reacquired] Harper, were elected co-captains by their teammates. Kidd and Jackson talked several times during camp, and each expressed some regrets.”

Turning to the stats, the 1995-96 Mavs fell a little bit on offense from 15th to 19th and regressed even more on defense from 21st to 25th.  Dallas still led the NBA in offensive rebounds and shot attempts but after shooting about league average in 1994-95, they shot below league average and stopped getting to the free throw line.  It was a lost season for Mashburn’s development.  Kidd and Jackson played full seasons, which showed improvement from Kidd and regression from Jackson:

Kidd 1995-96: 37.5 mpg, 16.6 ppg, .381 FG%, .336 3FG%, .468 TS%, 6.8 rpg, 9.7 apg, 2.2 spg, 17.8 PER, .068 WS48, 2.0 BPM

Jackson 1995-96: 34.4 mpg, 19.6 ppg, .435 FG%, .363 3FG%, .538 TS%, 5.0 rpg, 2.9 apg, 16.6 PER, .092 WS48, -0.3 BPM

The Mavs were willing to keep the core together and see where it took them for 1996-97.  At this point, it was clear that Kidd was a star.  Mashburn was a question mark coming off of injury and Jackson (who noted that he hadn’t fully recovered from the ankle injury in 1994-95) played like a decent starter level player.

The Mavs completely screwed up the draft, trading their pick at six in one of the greatest drafts ever for Eric Montross and the ninth pick.  At nine, the Mavs took a decent back up in Samaki Walker while Boston used Dallas’ pick on Antoine Walker.   This exchange did not help Dallas add to its core.

1996-97: A swift end of The Three Js

The Mavs gave The Three Js a pretty short leash in 1996-97.  Actually, it seemed more like Kidd gave the Mavs a short leash.  The infighting among The Three Js calmed (or placed on hold) because the bigger nemesis was the return of the hated the Triangle Offense.  Cleamons, who had worked under Phil Jackson in Chicago, ran the same sets as Buckner and Kidd hated it.  After an 9-17 start, Kidd was traded to Phoenix on December 26, 1996 primarily for Michael Finley and Sam Casell. 

The SF Gate reported at the time that: “Kidd was feuding with Cleamons over offensive philosophy, had not noticeably patched up his differences with Jackson (whom he had derided for selfishness last year), and had refused to back off of a ‘trade him or trade me’ ultimatum he issued in the summer. He was only one of several Mavericks players who had griped from time to time during Cleamons’ brief reign, and was one of many players with whom Cleamons was unhappy with their commitment to winning….The past week or two had been filled with talk that Kidd, who felt shackled by Cleamons’ deliberate offensive schemes, was on the market.”

Jackson commented that the trade: “caught me off guard.”  Mashburn was quoted more directly as saying that that trade was “fucking stupid, man.”  Kidd took a shot at Cleamons’ lack of patience on the way out: “Look at the Utahs and Seattles, they’ve been together for years. We never had that opportunity, and now we can’t have that opportunity. We were never given a fair shot, but we have to go on.”

On February 7, 1997, the Mavs hired Don Nelson to run the organization.  His first order of business was to clean house.  He traded Mashburn to Miami for flotsam and jetsam on February 14, 1997.  At the time of his trade, Mashburn summed his assessment of The Three Js Era thusly: “Everybody considered The Three Js the problem, and that wasn’t the case. We were just three perimeter guys trying to put it together – and it didn’t work. We all wanted to win, but we had different perceptions of winning. We never really came together. Jason [Kidd] wanted to go this way, Jimmy [Jackson] wanted to go this way to win, and I thought it was another way to win. It was one of those things where we all have to take responsibilities for it.” (H/T to https://nbatrades.tumblr.com/)

Jackson was traded three days later in a massive nine-player deal with the Nets, where Nellie picked up the object of his affection in Shawn Bradley.  In the end, the Mavs turned The Three Js into Shawn Bradley and Michael Finley (also nominally Robert Pack, who was traded by the Nets for Cassell).  

Summing up The Three Js

We’ve gone a long way on our journey back to the time of Three Js.  Let’s summarize with what we’ve learned:

-Because of injuries and bad luck this team never got to gel.  Ultimately, all three players played together in only 111 games.  This was too short a time to really get a chance to prove themselves.  On the other hand, Jackson and Mashburn didn’t end up becoming big stars as anticipated, though Mash was pretty good.  If the Mavs could’ve gotten some competent frontcourt players (Antoine Walker was clearly available or could’ve been traded for a good vet), the team would’ve been playoff level but not good enough to challenge the real contenders.

-Objectively, the returns for The Three Js was less than what was traded away.  Here’s how the five major players in these trades did after the 1996-97 season:

Kidd: 1,176 games, 36.1 mpg, 12.5 ppg, .402 FG%, .353 3FG%, .513 TS%, 6.4 rpg, 8.7 apg, 1.9 spg, 18.1 PER, .143 WS48, 4.2 BPM, 66.5 VORP

Finley: 938 games, 34.1 mpg, 15.8 ppg, .441 FG%, .378 3FG%, .524 TS%, 4.3 rpg, 2.9 apg, 16.3 PER, .113 WS48, 1.2 BPM, 25.7 VORP

Jackson: 565 games, 30.8 mpg, 11.5 ppg, .416 FG%, .378 3FG%, .504 TS%, 4.5 rpg, 2.8 apg, 12.1 PER, .061 WS48, -1.1 BPM, 4.0 VORP

Bradley: 549 games, 20.3 mpg, 6.5 ppg, .472 FG%, .524 TS%, 5.6 rpg, 0.6 apg, 2.1 bpg, 16.7 PER, .139 WS48, 0.9 BPM, 8.2 VORP

Mashburn: 365 games, 38.5 mpg, 19.1 ppg, .423 FG%, .369 3FG%, .507 TS%, 6.0 rpg, 4.4 apg, 16.4 PER, .112 WS48, 1.1 BPM

Finley was a very good player and Bradley was a decent center.  Kidd was so good that the Mavs would’ve come out way ahead if they just kept him.  Jackson was a solid player but never played as well as he did in 1994-95 and it’s fair to wonder if that ankle was ever the same again.  Mashburn was about as valuable as Finley until a knee injury forced his early retirement in 2004.

Though the Mavs clearly lost the talent exchange on all three trades, they’d be fine because Nellie found Dirk Nowitzki and Steve Nash shortly after he cleaned house.  Sometimes, there is something to be said for resetting the board when your team is in a rut.

-Within a short time afterwards, The Three Js had basically gotten over the Dallas experience.  In April 2003, David Aldridge did a great feature on them.  Here’s how each saw the situation with a little hindsight:

Kidd: “We all got along, [but] different stories started to take a life of their own and they grew into something bigger than what really didn’t have no truth (to them). The three of us didn’t know how to handle it … I think the outside was really a big influence on the three of us and which sent us down the wrong road. And we kind of separated and started to take a stand against one another, which really wasn’t the case. And that really hurt us.”

Jackson: “[Kidd’s] agents were intimidated by me.… because I was all about business. I used to question Jason on a lot of things that were going on business-wise that they probably didn’t agree with, but I didn’t care. Because my loyalty was to him and not to his people.”

Mashburn: “When you’re losing, it brings a lot of inconsistencies in your personality. It was real rough.”

On the Braxton story, Jackson denied it emphatically and at length:

“It’s funny, ’cause no matter how many times I say it or how many times Jason says it or no matter how many times she may say it, people are still going to believe what they’re going to believe, to be honest with you, I never met her. Jason may have met her, but what happened was we were in New York … I had a publicist who was going to set up the whole team to go over there and see her in the studio (in New York). So, I’m sitting in my room, I’m chillin’, it’s about 7:30, 8 o’clock, and I’m waiting for people to call me, and nobody calls me. So, I’m like dang they must have left me, so I went to a sponsorship meeting with Scotty Brooks. Hung out that night with some sponsors from Coke and AT&T. 

Jason was supposed to go, but he didn’t go. I came back to the room at 12 o’clock, 12:30 to get ready for the New York game. A few days later I heard that I left the team and went to the studio (to allegedly meet Braxton). And my biggest disappointment was if you want to know where I was at, just ask me. Didn’t nobody ask me about this until late June when we had a meeting with the new coach, Jim Cleamons. And (rumors) were spread because someone said I was on my way, which was true, but I was on my way with the team because I had already set up that there was going to be seven or eight of us going to the studio, but I never got a call that night. So, they all went out and did their separate things without telling me, so I got stuck.

So, now the label is that it happened in Atlanta, and a car was downstairs and I went downstairs and said that Jason was sick, which is a lie because Jason, Jamal, all of us were all together in Atlanta that night because a friend of mine had a party, so it never happened in Atlanta. So, it all goes back to communication. And that’s what I said to Jason was this. I said, ‘Jason, I’m not mad at you, but I’m disappointed because as a man, how close we were — if you ever had a problem you could have sat down and talked with me.’ Whether I agreed with you or not, that’s not the point — it was a matter of respect. I can always respect a man, whether I agree with you or not. And that was my biggest problem.”

In other words, Kidd definitely thought it was true at the time and was pissed off.  Mashburn essentially confirmed this in 2015: “She definitely cost me relationships with Jimmy Jackson and Jason Kidd.  “I necessarily wouldn’t even put it on here. I think at that time Jimmy and Jason were going through their own particular issues. From my understanding, being in the locker room, there was no truth to the Toni Braxton part. She played a part in it from the standpoint that she had an album out at the time, or was about to release it, called ‘Secrets.’ She went on the Dallas airwaves and said she doesn’t kiss and tell.”

As Mashburn noted, had they been a bit more secure and/or mature, none of the chatter would’ve bothered them but they were too young and immature and the rumor it was just another spark to add to the controversy fire that was already brewing. 

-Lastly, a special shoutout to the Triangle Offense, which was part of the vexing Quinn Buckner mess in 1993-94 and then returned to annoy Kidd in 1996-97.  It just seemed like the wrong offense to take advantage of Kidd’s skillset and was the last straw in his demanding a trade. 

A Closer Look At The Cavs Hot Start

The biggest positive story of the new season is Cleveland’s 15-0 start, which puts the Cavs in pretty elite company.  Much has been written about this great start but I thought we could take another look, FAQ style, and see if we can squeeze a few more interesting nuggets…

How is Cleveland doing this?

In simplest terms, the offense has exploded.  The Cavs were a defense-first team last season (6th in defensive rating) that had to eke out offense (18th in offensive rating) by running most key plays through Donovan Mitchell and asking him to create points.   This year, things are different.  Cleveland has maintained the same defensive rating but is also first overall in offensive rating. 

Last season, the Cavs were mid-pack in two-point field goal percentage (.479%, 12th in NBA) and three-point field goal percentage (.367%, 15th in NBA).  Kenny Atkinson has implemented a much quicker paced offense (7th in the NBA in pace versus 22nd last season), which is paying dividends.  Interestingly, the big names of Mitchell and Evan Mobley aren’t really playing any better statistically.  Mitchell hasn’t been any better or shot less (his usage is the same 31%) but Atkinson has reduced his minutes load by four minutes per game, which should be helpful later in the season when they really need him.

Putting coaching aside, the biggest improvement has come from Darius Garland, who tried to play through a broken jaw last season.  A healthy Garland has been incredible.  He has gone from average starter last season to a clear All-Star:

Garland 2023-24: 33.4 MPG, 18.0 ppg, .446 FG%, .371 3FG%, 2.7 rpg, 6.5 apg, 14.5 PER, .067 WS48, -1.0 BPM

Garland 2024-25: 30.1 MPG, 21.1 ppg, .531 FG%, .458 3FG%, 2.2 rpg, 6.6 apg, 22.6 PER, .210 WS48, 4.0 BPM

On the surface, this uptick in shooting feels a little flukey.  He has never shot nearly this well from three-point land (career mark is 38%).  In fact, few players have ever shot this well from three on the volume that Garland is taking them (7 three attempts per game).  The only player to shoot over 45% from three on that volume of shots is peak Steph Curry (2012-13 and 2015-16).  If you reduce the attempt threshold to 6 threes per game, you get a few great shooting role players as well:

Kyle Korver 2014-15: .492% on 6.0 3PA/G

Joe Harris 2020-21: .475% on 6.4 3PA/G

Steph Curry 2015-16: .454% on 11.2 3PA/G

JJ Redick 2019-20: .453% on 6.6 3PA/G

Steph Curry 2012-13: .453% on 7.7 3PA/G

Joe Ingles 2020-21: .451 on 6.1 3PA/G

This is not to say that Garland can’t continue to shoot threes well (there are 27 players who made 42-45% of their threes on this rate) but Garland is unlikely to continue shooting threes like peak Curry.

In addition, Garland’s two-point mark (.595%) is 100 points above his career mark (49%).  The shooting chart shows that he has improved his shooting percentage by taking more shots at the rim (20% versus 17% the prior two seasons) and converting those layups at a 68% clip (versus 59% for his career).  He’s also shooting 61% from mid-range, which is about 15 points above his career norms.  Garland is a great player but regression to the shooting mean is probable from all distances.  Still, if he can retain even half of these gains, he will still be excellent.

The even bigger shooting fluke comes from Caris LeVert, who is shooting 60% from two (versus 50% for his career) and 49% from three (versus 34% for his career).  Granted, LeVert’s volume is low (4 threes per game) but not that low to explain that rate of makes.  This shooting has powered LeVert to a mind boggling .681% TS% and a 6.1 BPM.  It is possible that Atkinson’s more fluid offensive system will sustain higher shooting rates for Garland and LeVert but the current rates seem unsustainable.  Even if the offense regresses a bit, Cleveland is still a very good team and a real threat to the Celtics. 

Have historically great streaks to start a season translated to titles?

No really.  Of the five other teams to start 14-0 or better, only one squad, the 1993-94 Rockets, ended up winning the title.  The rest of the teams to do so were all pretty close to a title.   Here’s the rundown on each of these team’s season after the initial winning streak:

Golden State Warriors 2015-16, 24-0: Started out 24-0 and ended up 73-9 before losing to the Cavs under an insane set of happenings (Draymond suspension, Bogut injury, LeBron playing the best ball of his career, Kyrie outshooting Curry, and Kevin Love somehow forcing Curry to miss in isolation) that would be difficult to duplicate.  In my mind, it still feels like the Warriors won that title but LeBron and Andre Iguodala remind me otherwise.

Houston Rockets 1993-94, 15-0: The Rockets won a title but had a strange regular season.  They started out 15-0 before losing to Atlanta on December 3, 1993.  Houston then ripped off seven more wins in a row, bringing them to a 22-1 record.  From there, malaise set in.  The Rockets were a more tepid 36-23 and they even tried to trade Robert Horry to add some energy to the team.  The Rockets still ended up 58-24, which was good for the two-seed but they weren’t exactly roaring into the playoffs.  Powered by Hakeem Olajuwon, they did win the title after two epic seven-game series (beating Barkley and Phoenix after dropping the first two games in Houston and winning the Finals against Ewing and the Knicks in a grueling battle of attrition).

Washington Capitols 1948-49, 15-0: This defunct franchise was coached by good old Red Auerbach and led by prehistoric stars like Bob Feerick and Bones McKinney.  The Caps were a .500 after their great start (23-22 the rest of the way).  Washington made the Finals but they were dispatched 4-2 by George Mikan and the Lakers.

Boston Celtics 1957-58, 14-0: In Bill Russell’s second season, Boston started out 14-0 and ended up with the top seed at 49-23.  While the 35-23 finish sounds less impressive, it was fairly good, because the teams in that smaller league clustered around .500.  The Celtics ended up losing 4-2 in the Finals to the Hawks because Russ missed two games with an ankle injury and was hobbled when he returned.  Even with an injured Russell, the Hawks still needed Bob Pettit to score 50 points in Game 6 to clinch the series.   

Incidentally Russell’s Celtics started almost every season of his career with a winning streak.  Here’s the year-by-year breakdown:

1956-57: Russell was playing in the Olympics to start the season

1957-58: Started 14-0

1958-59: Lost opener in OT to the Knicks

1959-60: Started 6-0

1960-61: Started 2-0

1961-62: Started 4-0

1962-63: Started 3-0

1963-64: Started 7-0

1964-65: Started 11-0

1965-66: Started 2-0

1966-67: Started 4-0

1967-68: Started 6-0

1968-69: Started 4-0

How impressive is this?  By way of comparison, Wilt did it 7 times but never was better than 7-0.  In more modern times, Larry Bird only streaked to start a season 6 times and was never better than 6-0.  Magic Johnson and Michael Jordan only streaked to start a season 5 times (though MJ started 12-0 to start 1996-97).  Finally, LeBron has streaked only 5 times to start a season (most recently 3-0 this year) but never was better than 6-0.  So, Russ’ season opening streaks look pretty impressive in this context.

Dallas Mavericks 2002-03, 14-0: One of the best Don Nelson teams, this squad featured the Steve Nash-Dirk Nowitzki duo plus a deep roster with Michael Finley, Nick Van Exel, and a ton of other pretty good players.  They finished up 60-22 for the season and were first in offense and ninth in defense.  The Mavs did not get the top seed or even win their division.  The Tim Duncan Spurs started out slowly (10-7) but rallied to 60-22 and won the tie breaker for the top seed.  The teams would meet in the Western Conference Finals but Dirk missed most of the series with injuries, robbing us of a proper match up.  The Spurs won 4-2 and then took out the Nets to win the title.

A Historical Look At NBA Pre-Season Odds

With another season fast approaching, we are reminded that most teams enter the season with optimism about their chances to have a successful season, if not necessarily win a title.  Sometimes the optimism comes from good planning and other times from pipe dreams.   I was wondering what was the most objectively optimistic time for each franchise entering a season. 

To that end, I thought a nice objective measure of legitimate optimism would be pre-season odds to win a title.  SportsOddsHistory has kept track of pre-season title odds since 1984-85.  Here are each franchise’s best pre-season odds during that time:

Boston 1986-87 (+160): Coming off, arguably, the best season in franchise history, Boston was the heavy favorite to repeat.  They nearly did so, even though they had a grueling gauntlet in the Eastern Conference playoffs.  After squeaking by Milwaukee and Detroit, Boston ran out of steam and lost to the Lakers in the Finals 4-2.

New York 1993-94 (+200): New York looked like they had a clear path to a title with Michael Jordan’s abrupt retirement.  The Knicks came very close to that title but lost a tight seven-game series to the Rockets in the Finals.

Brooklyn 2021-22 (+240):  Man, 2021 training camp feels like 100 years ago in Brooklyn.  We won’t rehash that debacle again but suffice it to say things were messy and the Nets ended up getting swept in the First Round by Boston.

Philadelphia 1984-85 (+250):  Despite getting upset by the Nets in 1983-84, the 76ers were held in high esteem by Vegas.  The team was still filled with established stars (Julius Erving, Andrew Toney, Maurice Cheeks, Bobby Jones, and Moses Malone) and was adding a rookie Charles Barkley.  They were really good  in the regular season (58-24) and made the Eastern Conference Finals but were dispatched easily by Boston 4-1.

Washington 1986-87 (+1300):  What passes for optimism in DC is different. Here, Vegas gave moderately long odds for a title to a team that had gone 39-43 and replaced Jeff Ruland with a near-peak Moses Malone.  Mo’s presence improved the team to 42-40 and they were swept by Detroit in the First Round.

Orlando 1995-96 (+400):  This was the theoretical peak of the Penny-Shaq Magic that had just eliminated the MJ Bulls.  Vegas still had the Bulls a slight favorite (+350) over Orlando.  The Magic did win 60 games but were swept in the Eastern Conference Finals by the Bulls.

Miami 2010-11 (+175):  Yes, we all remember LeBron James promising to win four straight titles at his opening press conference after signing with Miami in 2010.  Vegas was pretty optimistic as well.  We also all remember, however, that Dirk and the Mavs spoiled the plan by beating Miami in the Finals that season.

Atlanta 1987-88 (+500):  There were many who thought that Atlanta, and not Detroit, would ultimately knock off the Larry Bird Celtics.  Atlanta was pretty good (50-32) and lost an epic seven-game series in the Second Round against the Celtics.

Charlotte 1994-95 (+1000):  The hopes in Charlotte have been really dim for the past 20 years or so but there were good vibes around the team built around young Larry Johnson and Alonzo Mourning.  Charlotte went 50-32 and had the best SRS in franchise history.  They had the misfortune of drawing the Bulls right after Jordan had unretired.  The Bulls won the series 3-1 and Zo forced a trade a few months later.

Chicago 1996-97 (+100):  They had just won 72 games and dominated the playoffs, so they were naturally heavy favorites to repeat, which they did without much difficulty.

Cleveland 2014-15 (+275):  LeBron had just returned to Cleveland to deliver the title he had promised the local fans.  They did make the NBA Finals but lost to the recently emergent Splash Brothers Warriors.

Detroit 1989-90 (+300):  The Bad Boy Pistons had won a title in 1988-89 and looked like strong favorites to repeat, which they did.

Indiana 1998-99 (+450):  The Pacers seemed like the best team in the East (they nearly upset the Bulls the prior season) but crapped out against the Knicks in the Eastern Conference Finals, in part due that questionable four-point play by LJ.

Milwaukee 2019-20 & 2020-21 (+550):  The peak Giannis Bucks probably would’ve won a title in 2019-20 had Covid not popped up and changed everything.  Instead, they were upset by Miami in the Second Round of the surreal Bubble playoffs.  They probably should’ve lost to the Nets in the 2020-21 playoffs but, their luck swung the other way, and they just beat an injured Nets team and won a title a few weeks later.

Toronto 2001-02 (+1500):  The Raptors’ best odds followed Vince Carter’s peak year in 2000-01.  VC struggled with injury and the Raps were a low seed in 2001-02, where they lost in the First Round to Detroit.  In case you are wondering, the 2018-19 title team had odds of +1850 because Vegas was so sure the Warriors would repeat again.

Dallas 2005-06 (+400):  Sometimes we forget just how consistently good the Dirk Nowitzki Mavs were in the 2000s.  The 2005-06 team knocked off a 49-win Grizzlies team in the First Round, the Duncan Spurs in the Second Round, and the Nash/Stoudemire Suns in the Conference Finals before losing to the Heat in the Finals.

Denver 2023-24 (+450): This one isn’t too hard to recall, as it was just a few months ago that Denver coughed up a 20-point lead in Game 7 against the Wolves to lose in the Second Round.

Houston 1986-87 (+350):  Even though, the Rockets have won two titles and been serious contenders several times over the last 40 years, the best odds were allotted to the Hakeem/Sampson Twin Towers team that had just lost to Boston in the 1985-86 Finals.  The team fell apart and went only 42-40 in 1986-87.  The Rockets did upset Portland before losing to Seattle in the Second Round.

Memphis 2004-05 (+900):  Hubie Brown had turned the Grizz into a 50-win team in 2003-04 with Pau Gasol and a deep rotation.  Hubie ended up resigning early in the 2004-05 season due to health issues and the team slumped to 5-11 but finished strong under Mike Fratello (40-26).  They ended up getting swept by Phoenix in the First Round.

Minnesota 2004-05 (+500):  From optimism of a 58-24 record in 2003-04 to misery in 2004-05.  The Wolves looked great on paper but struggled with injuries and age-related regressions.  Though Kevin Garnett was still awesome, Minnesota went 44-38 and missed the playoffs.

New Orleans 2008-09 (+900):  Chris Paul was near his peak and the 56-26 Hornets nearly knocked off the Spurs in the 2007-08 playoffs.  The Hornets didn’t quite play as well but were still pretty good (49-33) and were knocked off in the First Round by the Nuggets.

San Antonio 2005-06 (+250):  You can pretty much pick any Spurs team from 2000 through 2014 but this squad was slightly better in the odds scale.  The Spurs lost a tough seven-game series to the Mavs that is referenced above.

Utah 1998-99 (+350):  Like the Pacers, the Jazz looked to have a clear path to the Finals without Jordan in the way.  Utah went 37-13 but lost to a younger and more athletic Blazers team in the Second Round.

Warriors 2017-18 (-187):  This Curry/KD Warriors had the best odds of winning a title as any team since 1984-85.  They weren’t quite as good as the other iterations in the regular season (they were “only” 58-24) but delivered a title anyway.

L.A. Clippers 2019-20 (+425):  Remember when Kawhi and Paul George were healthy and playing together regularly?  They went up 3-1 against the Nuggets in the Second Round before losing three straight.  Man, that Bubble was crazy.

L.A. Lakers 1987-88 (+120): The Showtime Lakers were favorites to repeat and they did, even though Detroit fans will note that a late foul in Game 7 of the Finals on Laimbeer was a bit ticky tacky

Phoenix 1993-94 (+300):  The Barkley/Kevin Johnson famously lost a tough seven-game series to eventual champs Rockets in the Second Round. 

Portland 1992-93 & 1999-00 (+350):  The 1992-93 Blazers were the end stages of the Clyde Drexler squads.  After three straight deep playoff runs, the Blazers were still good (51-31) but were injured and were dispatched by the Spurs in the First Round. 

The 1999-00 squad was one quarter away from beating Shaq and Kobe in the Western Conference Finals.  Had Portland held on, they would’ve likely been favored over the Pacers in the Finals (Portland was 2-0 against the Pacers that year and +5 ppg).

Sacramento 2002-03 (+300):  This was a really fun Kings team.  They went 59-23 and were able to avoid the side of the playoff bracket where their nemeses, the Lakers were.  The West was so deep, however, that they drew a deep Mavs team in the Second Round.  Sacramento won Game 1 on the road but Chris Webber blew out his knee in Game 2 and missed the rest of the series.  Sacramento still took the series to seven games but lost and Webber was never the same player again.

Seattle 1994-95 and Oklahoma City 2012-13 (+450):  The Payton/Kemp Sonics won 55+ games each season from 1992-93 to 1997-98.  The 1994-95 team was 57-25 but ended up having the least playoff success, losing to a young Lakers team 3-1 (Nick Van Exel had 25 ppg and really outplayed Payton). 

The KD/Westbrook Thunder had a similar great five-year run and 2012-13  was the best year on paper (60-22, 9.15 SRS).  OKC got screwed when Westbrook tore his knee in the First Round on a very questionable defensive play by Pat Beverley.  OKC still beat the Rockets but were defeated by Memphis 4-1 in the Second Round and we were deprived of a Thunder/Spurs matchup (the Spurs swept Memphis 4-0) and, potentially, a KD/LeBron Finals rematch. 

The DC/Petro/Kenny Nets

From time to time, we like to do deep dives on interesting teams of the past, like the Penny/Shaq Magic or the Barkley Rockets, that came close to the threshold only to fall apart.  Today, we are going to look at a team that never really came close to winning but was always interesting to me, the Derrick Coleman/Kenny Anderson Nets of the early 1990s.  This duo was billed as the Stockton/Malone of the 1990s.  Alas, DC and Kenny were deemed to be the ultimate Generation X slackers, who failed to pull together a sustained run because of a lack of maturity.  The blame was so palpable that, in 1995, Sports Illustrated made DC the literal cover photo for the selfish modern NBA player.  The photo depicted a frowning and open-mouthed DC with the following understated header: “Waaaaaah!! Petulant Prima Donnas Like Derrick Coleman Are Bad News For the NBA.”

How fair was his characterization?  I was an actual Nets fan at the time and closely watched that team and, while DC had his flaws, the situation wasn’t that simple.  With the benefit of 30 years of hindsight, I thought we could take another look at the DC/Kenny Nets and see if we learn anything new about that group, why they failed to contend, and what they might have done differently.

The Nets Circa 1990

The Nets have had some down times in their history, but the most depressing time might have been the 1986-1990 period.  Sure, the 12-70  Nets in 2009-10 and the current rebuild have been bad moments but the late 1980s Nets offered a distinct lack of hope and directionless malaise that the other bad stretches did not.  In 1985-86, the Nets lost their star point guard Micheal Ray Richardson to a drug relapse, which effectively got him banned from the NBA permanently.  The Nets cratered afterwards, losing a ton and bleeding attendance:

1986-87: 24-58, 16th in attendance

1987-88: 19-63, 15th in attendance

1988-89: 26-56, 21st in attendance

1989-90: 17-65, 25th in attendance

While the Nets didn’t trade away their high draft picks during this stretch, the picks could’ve been better:

1986: Pearl Washington (13th overall)

1987: Dennis Hopson (3rd overall)

1988: Chris Morris (4th overall)

1989: Mookie Blaylock (12th overall)

Pearl was a total bust.  Hopson could shoot a bit but he was drafted over several future All-Stars and Hall of Famers.  Morris was a great athlete and a decent pro but didn’t make good decisions and was taken over two much better players in Mitch Richmond and Hersey Hawkins.  Mookie ended up being very good but we’ll discuss more on that later.  In short, the Nets were a hopeless team with little star power, playing in a swamp.  The Nets tanked quite well in 1989-90, finishing the season a hideous 5-34 and earning the top pick, finally giving the Nets a little excitement after a half decade of boring futility.

DC and the 1990 Draft

Coleman was a four-year starter at power forward at Syracuse and the consensus top pick in 1990.  He was big and strong (he led the Big East in rebounding three seasons in a row) and had the handle and shot of a smaller player.  He mostly improved in stats over his four years, and even showed three-point range as a senior (15-41, .366%).  The one quasi-warning sign came in his blocks, where he had 127 as junior and only 67 as a senior.  This drop might’ve shown he was giving a little less effort but he was still getting 2.0 bpg and the junior year spike in blocks looked anomalous as compared to DC’s early career.  At the time, Utah GM Scott Layden compared DC to a young Karl Malone.

A June 23, 1990 UPI preview of the draft didn’t consider DC to be a high end number one pick.  The article quotes Timberwolves assistant GM Billy McKinney as stating that: “[t]his year’s draft does not feature a marquee-type player like a Danny Manning, David Robinson or Patrick Ewing, but it is deep with many talented pro prospects.”  The article also reports that the Nets “are said to be willing to trade the pick for some established veterans. They reportedly have told the other 26 teams they will listen to all reasonable offers.”  In case you are wondering, the article reported the following potential offers: “[o]ne rumor coming out of the draft combine in Chicago was the Lakers offering Byron Scott and A.C. Green to the Nets for their top pick. Another had Detroit trading John Salley and Mark Aguirre for the Nets’ No. 1.”

Do either of these hauls sound fair?  Not to me but let’s at least check the numbers.  Here are the actual player stats at the time so we can truly capture the snapshot of value as if was offered.  Let’s start with the Lakers:

Byron Scott 1989-90: age 28, 33.7 mpg, 15.5 ppg, .546 TS%, 3.1 rpg, 3.6 apg, 14.3 PER, .111 WS48, 0.6 BPM

AC Green 1989-90: age 26, 33 mpg, 12.9 ppg, .548 TS%, 8.7 rpg, 1.1 apg, 14.7 PER, .137 WS48, -0.6 BPM

Scott wasn’t particularly young and had declined markedly from his peak in 1987-88.  He’d have two more years as a solid starter before transitioning to a valuable reserve.  Green was a little younger but was also a solid starter.  In terms of salary, the players were not really that cheap either.  Scott was slated to make $1.1 million and Green $1.75 million, which sounds low today, but made up a good chunk of L.A.’s $12.1 million payroll (fourth highest in the NBA).  So, the talent wasn’t great and the value wasn’t either.  This is not the type of package that is worth trading a top pick for, particularly when you have a 17-win team that needs young talent. 

Now, let’s look at the Detroit offer:

Mark Aguirre 1989-90: age 30, 25.7 mpg, 14.1 ppg, .544 TS%, 3.9 rpg, 1.9 apg, .136 WS48, 1.0 BPM

John Salley 1989-90: age 25, 23.3 mpg, 7.2 ppg, .575 TS%, 5.4 rpg, 0.8 apg, 1.9 bpg,.152 WS48, 1.5 BPM

This package also seems weak.  Aguirre was turning 31 and was set to make $1.1 million.  While he could still score, he had very little re-trade value due to his age and reputation as a malcontent in Dallas.  It’s hard to see how he helps a young rebuilding team.  Salley was more intriguing.  He was pretty young and cheap ($575,000) and had a unique defensive profile.  Still, Salley was a niche defender for a good team and was not a scorer (the Nets already had two such players in Sam Bowie and Chris Dudley).  Ultimately, Salley just did not profile as enough value for the first pick overall.  The Nets obviously agreed and ended up drafting DC.

1990-91: Some Moderate Improvement

The Nets entered 1990-91 with the goals of developing Coleman and their other young players (Mookie Blaylock and Chris Morris) and being quasi-respectable as a team.  The Nets accomplished most of the goals:

-They improved to 26-56 and had the point differential of a 29-53 team.

-DC put up 18.4 ppg and 10.3 rpg and won Rookie of the Year by a wide margin.

-Mookie improved quite a bit, jacking up his TS% from a truly awful .415% as a rookie to .455% (not great but at least closer to acceptable).

-New GM Willis Reed made a great trade where he picked up Drazen Petrovic and rookie Terry Mills for Greg Anderson (who was filler) and a first-round pick (ended up being the 13th pick in 1992, Bryant Stith).  Petro was a great shooter but was buried behind Terry Porter, Clyde Drexler, and Danny Ainge on a title contending team.  He would go on to have two great years in Jersey but the Nets kept him on a short leash in 1990-91. Petrovic played 20 mpg and did not start a single game.  His bench stats were pretty good though: He shot .500% from the field and .373% from three-point range on 3.2 attempts per game.  He was clearly set up to be a starter in 1991-92.

Despite a mostly positive season, there were some rumblings that Coleman might be a tough personality to deal with.  Back in the days before the rookie salary cap (pre-1995), draftees had tremendous leverage and DC wielded it before signing with the Nets for five years and $15 million after a protracted hold out.  Coleman then declared (not incorrectly), that “I am the franchise,” which certainly irked some when he was instantly making more money than most of the vets.

In January 1991, Jack McCallum wrote a column about DC that suggested some issues: “Coleman has drawn mixed reviews. While Cleveland Cavalier coach Lenny Wilkens said of him, ‘I like his personality for the game,’ another coach, speaking anonymously, declared, ‘He’s a great talent but a funny kid.’ And he wasn’t referring to Coleman’s one-liners.”

The same article indicated that DC and coach Bill Fitch were having some discord: “Predictably, Coleman and his coach, Bill Fitch, will not be exchanging Valentine’s Day cards next month. ‘Yeah, Derrick’s mad at me right now,’ Fitch said last week, ‘because I’ve been talking about what horrible shape he’s in.’ Coleman denies he is out of condition, but he has missed five games this season because of those nagging injuries.”

The 1992 Complete Handbook of Pro Basketball DC profile was mostly effusive but pointed out a few issues.  Specifically, DC needed a “dose of modesty.  Of David Robinson, he noted, ‘He reminds me a lot of myself.’”  The bio also cryptically stated that the “[q]uiet rap from some teammates: needs to think TEAM more, but not so much on court.”

The 1991 Draft: Kenny or Someone Else?

The Nets nabbed the second pick of the 1991 draft and were faced with a difficult decision.  The Nets were seemingly set at shooting guard and power forward but had more potential need at  the other three positions.  Here are the 1990-91 stats for the likely pre-draft starters:

PG, Mookie Blaylock: Age 23, 35.9 mpg, 14.1 ppg, .455 TS%, 3.5 rpg, 6.1 apg, 2.3 spg, 13.1 PER, .040 WS48, -0.7 BPM

SG, Drazen Petrovic: Age 26, 20.5 mpg, 12.6 ppg, .574 TS%, 2.1 rpg, 1.5 apg, 16.8 PER, .123 WS48, -0.4 BPM

SF, Chris Morris: Age 25, 32.3 mpg, 13.2 ppg, .487 TS%, 6.6 rpg, 2.8 apg, 14.7 PER, .085 WS48, 1.0 BPM

PF, Derrick Coleman: Age 23, 35.2 mpg, .527 TS%, 18.4 ppg, 10.3 rpg, 2.2 apg, 17.6 PER, .108 WS48, 0.4 BPM

C, Sam Bowie: Age 29, 30.9 mpg, 12.9 ppg, .486%, 7.7 rpg, 2.4 apg, 14.1 PER, .066 WS48, -0.8 BPM

Mookie, Morris, and Bowie all were solid but had the same weaknesses: terrible shooting. To that point, the Nets were 25th on offense and the 13th on defense.  Also, Bowie was much older than the other two and clearly was a short-term solution.  Ultimately, the best player in the draft was arguably 11th pick Terrell Brandon but consensus top four prospects at the time were at four different positions: Larry Johnson, Dikembe Mutombo, Kenny Anderson, and Billy Owens.  LJ was taken first and the Nets had a prospect option at all three of their weaker starting positions.  This was a tough choice because there was no apparent second choice.  Here are their 1990-91 college stats:

Mutombo: Age 24, 34.1 mpg, 15.2 ppg, .626 TS%, 12.2 rpg, 1.6 apg, 0.6 spg, 4.7 bpg

Owens: Age 21, 38 mpg, 23.3 ppg, .560 TS%, .397 3FG%, 11.6 rpg, 3.5 apg, 2.4 spg, 1.2 bpg

Anderson: Age 20, 38.9 mpg, 25.9 ppg, .535 TS%, .351 3FG%, 5.7 rpg, 5.6 apg, 3.0 spg, 0.1 bpg

Filling in the gaps that the numbers leave out, Brady Moretensen did a detailed preview of each of the prospects at the time:

On Mutombo: “His great size and long arms made him one of the best shotblockers in collegiate basketball history. Limited offensively, the 7-foot-2 Hoya needs to improve his array of post moves…’ He’s better than two-thirds of the NBA centers playing,’ said Miami Heat Director of Player Personnel Stu Inman….’He’ll be a man from Day One,” Inman said. “Emotionally, he’s a little older and will make a quicker adjustment than most rookies.’…. Mutombo, a native of Zaire, is already 25 years old, though. That may worry some teams.”

On Owens: “{P]layed all five positions but is most comfortable as a 3-man. He can either take a big man outside and shoot over him or dribble around him. Smaller foes have trouble with his exceptional post-up abilities.”

On Anderson: “[V]ery quick with the ball, makes directional changes faster than any guard in college, and is an exceptional rebounder for his size. His weak point is his shooting, which suddenly went AWOL several times during the past season. Streaky is an appropriate adjective when describing his shot.”

There were good arguments for and against drafting all three players.  Apparently, Reed and Fitch wanted Owens, who was more reliable than the mercurial Morris, but were overruled by ownership who liked Anderson and felt he had the most potential star power.  Anderson had a nice career but, with the benefit of hindsight, we know that Mookie Blaylock was also developing into an All-Star and the Nets would soon have a gaping hole at center that Dikembe would’ve filled perfectly.  Owens would start out strong but wear down with the injuries quickly.

1991-92: Progress but Everyone Hates Fitch

Fitch was a hard ass old school coach, who did not mince words or make friends easily.  He resigned from Boston in 1983, after a disappointing playoff loss to Milwaukee and with the Celtics in some disarray.  Though Larry Bird always liked Fitch, most of his players felt differently.  Robert Parish felt that Fitch “was lacking in the people skills.”  Peter May wrote in “The Last Banner” that Fitch was “abrasive” and described how Fitch treated the low-key assistant coach KC Jones so rudely that Jones jumped Fitch in a fit of rage. 

Later, when Fitch was fired by the Rockets in 1988, many members of the teams criticized his methods as well.  Hakeem Olajuwon said at the time that: “[a]ll I know is that the players say they are afraid to make a mistake.  If they make a mistake, he takes them out. Nobody knows their role on this team. I don’t know my role either.”  The pattern was clear.  Fitch made his teams better but would have a limited shelf life because his management style was incredibly annoying.  So, you can imagine that if the legendary Celtics of the1980s and Hakeem had issues with Fitch, there were going to be similar problems with young Gen Xers like Coleman and Anderson.

Fitch did not disappoint.  Anderson’s contract negotiations were protracted, and he didn’t sign until November 9, 1991, three games into the season.  At the press conference announcing the signing of Anderson, Fitch threw a fit because the Nets had to renounce the rights to hustling deep bench guys, Jud Buechler and Dave Feitl, to fit Anderson under the salary cap.  Fitch lashed out in oddly frank terms: “[o]ur ownership made a horrible decision.  I’m ticked. I want to win. You can’t win if you’re not going to be able to control your own basketball team.”  The New York Times reported that Fitch considered Buechler “the perfect bench player” but the subtext seemed to be that Fitch never wanted to draft Anderson and was annoyed at ownership.  Not a great start for Anderson who told the press: “I’m not the one who said to [cut Buechler], I’m an innocent man. I’m just here to play and be Kenny Anderson.”

With that great tone setting press conference, the Nets started off an execrable 2-11 in their first 13 games.   Things were starting to go haywire.  On December 7, 1991, Coleman, who was nursing a sprained ankle, blasted Fitch for holding DC out of a game until late in the third quarter: “[y]ou let a player sit on the bench for three quarters, then you expect him to come out and turn it on?  I felt good. I told him that.  You call that coaching?”  DC definitely had a point.

On December 18, 1991, UPI reported that Fitch was going to be fired and replaced by former North Carolina State coach Jim Valvano and summarized the vibes thusly: “management had…been angered by Anderson’s lack of playing time since his signing and the team’s deteriorating attitude towards its head coach. One such example was that of star forward Derrick Coleman, who showed his disdain for his coach by stepping to the foul line to shoot technicals when Fitch wanted someone else to shoot.“  The Valvano deal apparently fell through and Fitch remained coach (the Nets’ first choice was Rick Pitino but he was not ready to leave Kentucky). 

Fitch had all sorts of drama the rest of the way.  He buried Anderson much of the season in favor of Blaylock, which wasn’t crazy since Anderson was so raw.  The problem was that Fitch appeared to have no regard for Anderson’s future at all.  Fitch also had run ins with Morris and Petrovic.  DC, however, was his real nemesis.  Coleman was rightly peeved about Fitch’s decision to bench him until the fourth quarter of the December 7, 1991 game but the antipathy continued and they bickered all season.  In late season games, DC and Morris refused to re-enter games and it wasn’t pretty.  The New York Times gave the details:

“Tuesday in Miami, power forward Coleman told Fitch to ‘get out of my face’ when ordered back into the game, which the Nets went on to win.  Thursday, en route to a 119-113 loss to Indiana in the Meadowlands, the refusal came from Morris, upset because Fitch had removed him with 2 minutes 41 seconds to play and the score tied at 107-107 after he missed two free throws. Fitch tried to send Morris back in after Chuck Person’s shot put the Pacers up by 4 points with 25.8 seconds to play. 

‘I don’t know why he took me out,’ Morris said after finishing with 16 points, 6 rebounds, 4 assists, 2 blocked shots in 38 minutes of play, and 8 points in the Nets’ 43-27 third quarter. ‘I was busting my butt. So after he took me out I refused to go back. That’s all. I’d do it again if he took me out like that again.’

Fitch wasn’t backing down yesterday. ‘I’m going to do exactly what I’ve been doing,’ he said. Fitch doesn’t think fines will work with rebellious players. ‘If it’s money that has to drive them, chances are they’ve all got so much of it that they’re not going to get there.  Did I take Chris Morris out because he missed two free throws? Hell, no.  I took him out because he hadn’t had a rest and from my experience missing free throws by a 70 percent free-throw shooter is the first sign of being tired.  I wanted to put him back in because I thought that was about the time we could use a 5-point play.’”

Yikes does that sound like a toxic environment.  The players detested Fitch and were now acting wholly unprofessional and immature.  Despite this, perhaps unified in hatred of Fitch, the Nets rallied to finish up the season 38-31 and make the playoffs.  Drazen scored 20.6 ppg and shot .444% from three-point range and DC also showed improvement (19.8 ppg, 9.5 rpg).  The Nets were outmanned by a strong Cavs team in the playoffs but Coleman dominated and the Nets were able to win a game at home and be competitive in a Game 4 loss. 

Fitch resigned after the season, having left another team better off than he had gotten it but also wreaking some havoc along the way.   In the end, Fitch got improvement from Mookie, Petro, and DC that boosted The Nets’ offense up to 18th in the NBA, while maintaining the same solid defense (14th).  But the only avenues for a jump up to serious playoff success lay with improvement from DC and Anderson, whose relationships with Fitch were untenable.  Fitch would go on to improve a talent bereft Clippers team in the mid-1990s before getting fired and stiffed by Donald Sterling and having to sue him to collect.  

1992-93: Peak DC Nets?

DC got rid of Fitch but Coleman’s reputation took a hit as well.  The 1993 Complete Handbook of Pro Basketball summed up DC as follows: “He’s great.  And knows it….Potential knucklehead who will be [new coach] Chuck Daly’s prime chore.”  Yes, the Nets hired the anti-Fitch, Daly, who juggled huge characters in Detroit (Isiah, Rodman, Laimbeer, Aguirre) and with the 1992 U.S. Olympic Dream Team, to harmonize this talented bunch.  DC was quite happy with the change: “[t]o me he acts more like one of the players than the coach.  He’s kind of laid back. He cracks jokes and he’s pretty loose. He’s a relaxed kind of person.”  Daly, on his end, seemed to recognize the Nets would rise and fall based on Coleman: “he has the talent to probably be in the top seven or eight players in the league.  There isn’t anything he can’t do. He can run the floor, he handles the ball like a guard, he can shoot . . . But he’s got to play enough games to obtain star status. He’s got to play a lot of games successfully to get that kind of respect from players and the media during the course of the year.”

This left the Nets with the usual crew of DC, Petrovic, Bowie, and Morris and a big question as what Daly would do at point guard between the steadily (but slowly) improving Blaylock and Anderson, who the Nets had invested quite heavily in but had an up-and-down rookie season.  Daly described the point guard decision to Sports Illustrated: “I didn’t hand Kenny the job. I just told him that everyone was starting with a clean slate, that I didn’t even want to know the whys and wherefores of what went on the year before. Everyone was going to earn his playing time in training camp.” 

The Nets hastily traded an angry Blaylock “days before the start of the regular season in order to make it clear that this was Anderson’s team to run.”  Choosing Anderson over Mookie was reasonable but the return, guard Rumeal Robinson, was not a great choice.  Robinson was another young guard, who was stretched at a point guard.  Here is how the two players stacked up in 1991-92:

Rumeal Robinson 1991-92: Age 25, 27.4 mpg, 13.0 ppg, .503 TS%, 2.7 rpg, 5.5 apg, 1.3 spg, 14.9 PER, .053 WS48, -0.3 BPM

Mookie Blaylock 1991-92: Age 24, 35.4 mpg, 13.8 ppg, .465 TS%, 3.7 rpg, 6.8 apg, 2.4 spg, 15.2 PER, .092 WS48, 1.0 BPM

The raw stats are pretty close but Mookie has a distinct advantage as a passer and defender, which is reflected in BPM as well.  The parties seemed to acknowledge this fact because the Nets also slipped in the contract of Roy Hinson, which had $3.8 million and three years left even though his career effectively ended with a 1989 knee injury.  The Nets saved money but left tons of on-court value on the table.  Robinson had a few good moments in 1992-93 but was jettisoned early in 1993-94.  Mookie quickly turned into an All-Star with the Hawks and put up these robust stats from 1992 to 1999: 518 games, 37.1 mpg, 18.4 ppg, .509 TS%, 4.6 rpg, 7.3 apg, 2.6 spg, 18.4 PER, .146 WS48, 4.8 BPM. The Nets were in a tough spot with an unhappy player but, trading Blaylock for Robinson was a missed opportunity to improve the team.

Regardless, the Nets had a pretty good team.  They started out 4-7 and then kicked it into gear, rallying to 30-24 and went out and absolutely spanked the peak Pat Riley Knicks 102-76 at MSG.  Unfortunately, the Knicks were not the nicest of teams and John Starks flagrantly fouled Anderson, causing Kenny to break his wrist and ended his season.  Anderson had put up 17 ppg and 8.2 apg and was a huge loss but the Nets didn’t fold they rallied to 9-2 after the injury because Robinson briefly played out of his mind (16 ppg, .483 FG%, 8.3 apg).  They even torched the peak Charles Barkley Suns in Phoenix by 31 points.

By March 24, 1993, the Nets were 39-26 and had outscored opponents by 3 points per game.  They were on pace for about 50 wins at that time, which would be good for a four seed.  Then more injuries hit.  Petrovic sprained his knee and missed a month and the center position was so worn down that they had to resort to starting deep bencher Dwayne Schintzius.  The Nets closed the year 4-12 and were the six seed, drawing that tough Cavs team again.

The Nets were heavy underdogs but took the series five games, thanks mostly to DC who put up incredible numbers: 45 mpg, 26.8 ppg, .532 FG%, .417 3FG%, 13.4 rpg, 4.6 apg, 1.2 spg, 2.6 bpg.  He dominated a huge Cavs’ front court and, but for random bad injury luck, the Nets’ might’ve had won the series (round two would’ve been against the MJ Bulls, who swept the Cavs, so don’t get too excited). 

Summer 1993: RIP Petro

Here was the state of the Nets’ starters as of the end of the 1992-93 season:

Kenny Anderson, age 22: 36.5 mpg, 16.9 ppg, 4.1 rpg, 8.2 apg, 16.6 PER, .106 WS48, 1.6 BPM

Drazen Petrovic, age 28: 38.0 mpg, 22.3 ppg, 2.7 rpg, 3.5 apg, 17.3 PER, .152 WS48, 1.8 BPM (pending free agent)

Chris Morris, age 27: 29.9 mpg, 14.1 ppg, 5.9 rpg, 1.4 apg, 17.8 PER, .151 WS48, 3.1 BPM

Derrick Coleman, age 25: 36.3 mpg, 20.7 ppg, 11.2 rpg, 3.6 apg, 21.2 PER, .165 WS48, 4.3 BPM

Sam Bowie, age 31: 26.5 mpg, 9.1 ppg, 7.0 rpg, 1.6 apg, 13.2 PER, .098 WS48, -0.4 BPM

The Nets had a borderline All-Star level backcourt and Coleman, whose advanced stats rated him at about a top 10 player in the NBA (he was 12th in BPM and 11th in VORP0 .  While the Nets weren’t quite serious contenders, this line up was well-balanced and was a viable 50-win team if they navigated the transactions (they had two key free agents in Petro and Bowie) and player development challenges (Kenny and DC). 

Petrovic was the real key free agent.  His overall stats were good (not great) but his shooting gave the Nets spacing to let the offensive initiators work.  His return to the Nets was far from certain.  Petro wanted an extension before the end of the season and the Nets didn’t get that done.  As early as December 1992, the New York Times was reporting that Drazen was upset that Jersey was taking a hard stance in contract negotiations and was considering leaving after the season.

 A 2015  book called “Years of the Dragon,” reported that “Drazen had decided to return to Europe and his first choice was Panathinaikos, even if he had many more offers. He wanted to stay for one or two seasons in Greece and then return to the NBA in order to sign with the Celtics. It’s been said that he had a soft spot for teams which had the shamrock as their emblem, like Panathinaikos, Notre Dame and the Celtics.”   Sadly, Petro died in early June 1993 car crash on the Autobahn in Germany.  We can never know for sure but it is safe to assume, had he avoided tragedy, Drazen probably was not returning to the Nets.

GM Willis Reed then had to fill a big hole at shooting guard and improve the team in other areas.  First, Reed traded the hustling Bowie (and a 1998 second rounder) to the Lakers for Benoit Benjamin, who was younger and healthier but was not a favorite of his coaches due to his effort or lack thereof.  As for the shooting guard issue, Reed drafted Kansas shooter Rex Walters with the 16th pick in the draft and signed journeyman Kevin Edwards to start at shooting guard.  Edwards was a solid all-around player but didn’t excel in any area.  He had scored 13.9 ppg for Miami in 1992-93 but was benched for nearly the entire second half behind Harold Miner, which Edwards blamed on ownership “politics.”

So, the Nets took a flier on a shooting specialist and two replacement level starters.  Hardly inspiring moves but the free agent market in those days was really thin (the only other starting level free agent two guard was Craig Ehlo) and the trade market was also quite thin.  There did appear to be other options available.  The Hornets traded disgruntled young star guard Kendall Gill but the Nets likely didn’t have the assets to land him.  At center, Andrew Lang was available in free agency and was clearly a better option than Benjamin but the difference in value was not great.  In short, Reed had limited options and the hope of a 50-win breakthrough seemed gone.

1993-94: The Nets Were Actually Pretty Good

The Nets seemed like major regression candidates without Drazen.  Vegas set their over-under at 40.5 wins.  Daly told reporters in the preseason that he didn’t know how he was going to build the team: “I can’t tell you who I’m going to start right now.  Everything’s up in the air. I’m going to have to sleep on it.”  He further noted that Petro’s loss was massive: “you don’t replace him.   You just try to go on with your life…. Kevin Edwards is a different kind of ballplayer than Drazen, who basically liked to come off picks and catch and shoot.  Kevin Edwards can put the ball on the floor and drive to the basket. He can also pull up and shoot the jumper.”

The Nets started off terribly, bottoming out at 4-10, after losing all four games of a West Coast trip.  From there, the Nets slowly rallied towards .500, hitting 24-24 on February 17, 1994 and finishing  out the season 21-13 for 45-37 record overall.  Anderson had his best season as a pro (18.2 PER, 2.4 BPM) while DC maintained his same high level of play (21.4 PER, 4.3 BPM).  Edwards, in keeping with his neutral skill set, had a BPM of exactly 0.0 but defended well.  The Nets’ other shooting guard option, Ehlo, actually had a strong season for Atlanta (15.0 PER, 2.2 BPM).

The Nets drew the second seed Knicks in the playoffs and there was some outside hope that Jersey could beat the 57-win Patrick Ewing-led team because the Nets went 4-1 against the Knicks in the regular season.  The Nets dropped the first two games in New York before winning Game 3 on last second free throws by Chris Morris.  Jersey was eliminated when they dropped a close Game 4, where DC shot 5-15 but was 21-25 from the line.  The Nets hung tough in a blistering defensive series but just couldn’t score enough to win (.378 eFG% as a team with an offensive rating of 95.9, compared to 107.2 in the regular season). 

On paper, 1993-94 was the best season by the DC Nets.  This squad had their best record (45-37) and best SRS (2.11).  Yes, had the 1992-93 team not imploded with injuries, it would’ve have scored better.  Either way, the Nets were a solid enough team with two bookend potential stars in Coleman and Anderson and not much else.  The Nets shot poorly as a team (26th in FG% and 18th in 3FG%) but still were 13th in offense because they led the NBA in free throws made and attempted.  An optimist might think that if the Nets could just improve the outside shooting, they might be good in 1994-95.   Quickly, though, everything broke quite wrong.

First, Daly resigned as coach with a year left on his deal.  Daly was 63 at the time and told the press that: “The bottom line is that after [coaching] 1,475 games at every level, I finally made the decision that it is time to leave the bench.”    Daly didn’t complain about the roster or player discipline problems and attributed his decision solely to the coaching grind: “[c]learly it’s about me — nothing else.  I want to make that perfectly clear. I can’t tell you how much I’ve learned, how much I enjoyed, not only being with the Nets — particularly the Nets.”

Al Harvin of The New York Times did note that it was a tough season for Daly: “[t]his has been a difficult season for Daly. His star shooting guard, Drazen Petrovic, was killed in an auto accident last June. Center Chris Dudley signed with Portland as a free agent. Terry Mills, a backup forward, signed with the Pistons. Derrick Coleman went public with his demands for a new contract. And then the Nets were eliminated by the Knicks, their cross-river rivals, in four games.”

So, the Nets went into the 1994 off-season with two very good players in DC and Anderson (both of whom were coming up on contract extension negotiations), the professional but average Edwards at shooting guard, Morris at small forward, the apathetic Benoit Benjamin at center, and the void left by losing a Hall of Fame coach.  It was fair to say that Reed had a big summer ahead of him and he didn’t exactly nail it.

The Times had reported that Daly’s assistants, Brendan Suhr, Paul Silas, and Rick Carlisle would all be considered as his successor.  Suhr worked with Daly forever but was considered a career assistant-type.  Silas had head coaching experience and was highly regarded around the NBA.  Carlisle was only 34 and though he’d end up being a great coach, he would not get a head job until 2001. 

Silas seemed liked the natural choice, but Reed went off the grid and hired Butch Beard, who had no NBA head coaching experience (he had been an assistant with the Knicks and Nets from 1978 through 1989).  Beard had been coaching at Howard University where he hadn’t been lighting the world on fire (he had a 45-67 record in four years and finished up 1993-94 at 10-17). 

Harvey Araton summed up the risky hire of Beard: “You might say that Reed, criticized in recent years for being too much a company front man, is sticking his neck out, hiring an undistinguished college coach at a time when his team, and by extension his career, is at the crossroads.  Reed chose Beard over Paul Silas because he believes there exists inside Beard a spark, and that all Beard has needed is for someone to strike the right coaching match. A long time ago, when Reed and Beard formed a combustible couple with the Knicks, Reed saw Beard close up. He never forgot the sight of raw pride burning.” 

Beard’s raw burning pride wasn’t enough.  Reed didn’t exactly help Beard in the transactions department.  The Nets had the 14th pick in the draft and took raw big man Yinka Dare, when the team needed immediate help at shooting guard.  The draft wasn’t super deep at that level but there were a number of good shooters on the board (Eric Piatkowski, Aaron McKie, and Wesley Person).  None of the options would have saved the franchise but they all could’ve really helped, especially compared to the raw Dare.  Instead, Reed signed Sean Higgins, who had washed out of the NBA in the early 1990s but later shot well in Europe.  The Nets felt that Higgins would cover the lack of shooting and allow them to take a shot at a center with some theoretical upside.  The plan wasn’t crazy but for two things: (1) Higgins still couldn’t get his shot off in the NBA and (2) Yinka had no discernible offensive skills.  He only played three minutes as a rookie and took one shot, an airball, before a knee injury ended his season (and he wasn’t any better when healthy in 1995-96).

Reed didn’t make any major trades or signings and, instead, ran out the same line up, betting that Edwards and Morris would remain solid and Benjamin would continue to occupy space with his shear size. 

1994-95: A Painful Year

The Nets started the season poorly, going 1-5 but rallied to 6-7.  That was the closest they came to .500 the rest of the season.  The Nets were beset with injuries and controversy.  Sports Illustrated’s January 1995 article about Gen X immaturity in the NBA fingered the Nets as particularly problematic.  Here are some excerpts:

 DC: “The Nets’ 27-year-old, $7.5-million-a-year All-Star forward failed to show for a shootaround in December, citing car trouble, the NBA version of ‘the dog ate my homework.’ He also balked at the team’s new dress code requiring a player to wear a jacket and tie when traveling, and when the Nets threatened to fine him each time he violated the rule, Coleman smugly presented coach Butch Beard with a blank check…

“Coleman hasn’t minded being considered an attitude problem; in fact, he has seemed to revel in it, as when he defended teammate Anderson to a group of reporters after Anderson’s missed practice in December. A reporter suggested that as one of the Nets’ supposed leaders, Anderson had set a poor example, and Coleman replied, ‘Well, whoop-de-damn-do. I miss practice. Dwayne [Schintzius] misses practice. Chris [Morris] misses practice. It’s no big deal.’ We’re guessing that this is not the attitude the Nets had in mind when they named Coleman co-captain in November 1993. ‘My missing shootarounds and practices doesn’t make us lose games,’ he has said. ‘Some players are just practice players. They step on the court and don’t do ——. I come out and bust my butt every night.’ (On Sunday, though, Coleman did pledge a new commitment to his leadership role, ‘both on and off the court.’)”

Anderson: “Upset over being benched for the entire fourth quarter in a blowout loss to the New York Knicks the night before, Anderson, 24, didn’t show up for the Net practice on Dec. 28. The next day the $3.5-million-per-year All-Star guard blithely dismissed the incident as ‘water under the bridge.’”

Morris: “Perhaps the single most ridiculous act of defiance this season was perpetrated by Chris Morris. The seventh-year Net forward took the floor for a practice shoot-around one morning in December with his shoelaces undone. Then he refused Beard’s order to tie them. Morris’s explanation: ‘I wasn’t planning on doing much running.’ Beard fined him, not so much because he cared about the state of Morris’s shoelaces, but because it wasn’t the first time Morris had shown up with them untied, and Beard felt he had to remind his team that he was in charge. Morris, too, has asked to be traded, saying that Beard’s offense is too half-court-oriented. Perhaps Beard would have the Nets run more if he could be sure all his players had their shoelaces tied.”

Rex Walters summed up the state of the Nets: “Let’s see, we’ve got one millionaire who won’t tie a 10-cent pair of shoelaces when the coach tells him to, an even richer millionaire who complains because he doesn’t want to wear a tie on a plane, a couple of players who say they want to be traded every other day and a couple more who only seem to come to practice when they feel like it. If you’re writing about us, I hope your name is Sigmund Freud, because this is the craziest group of guys you’re going to find.”

The Nets sounded like they were in total chaos but was that the cause of all the problems?  Morris’ shoelace gambit was incredibly stupid, but he was correct that the offense had declined from 13th to 23rd and the slower pace (dropping from 11th to 18th) didn’t help.  Additionally, Edwards missed nearly the entire season and Walters and Higgins struggled to replace his modest contributions.  DC missed 26 games with injuries and, for the first time, his numbers regressed (19.0 PER, .117 WS48, 1.5 BPM) when he did play.  Anderson played to about the same level of effectiveness but did not improve.  The Nets finished 30-52 and missed a very attainable eighth seed (a bad Boston team locked in that right by going 35-47 with a decline phase Dominique Wilkins as its best player). 

In sum, Beard ran an offense that didn’t maximize opportunities and couldn’t corral his stars.  DC was injured and declined and Reed whiffed in the draft and at shooting guard.  While the ruckus around DC’s behavior may have been a bit overstated as the cause of the bad season, it’s fair to say there was plenty of blame to go around. 

1995-96: End of the DC/Kenny Era

This debacle of a season basically ended the DC Era in Jersey.  That summer, DC demanded a trade, because he didn’t believe management was committed to winning.  Sports Illustrated interviewed DC in October 1995 about the trade demand and noted that the demand gave “[a] lot of NBA fans…a good chuckle” as DC hadn’t shown himself to be the hardest worker.  DC’s interview had some interesting highlights:

On why he wanted a trade:

“It seems like everyone around us is getting better, but we’re not.  I don’t see us improving.  I just want to go somewhere and compete for a championship.”

“I was asked about draft picks…and I voiced my opinion.  But when it came down to making the draft pick, it was like, ‘Forget what Derrick says.’  Basically, I wasn’t involved in what was going on.”

On his effort level:

“I come to practice, but the only thing that gets me is when we play back-to-back games and I play 40 minutes each night.  There’s no way I can come to practice the next morning and put out.  I have to give my body time to regenerate.  I never had that problem when Chuck Daly was here, because he would tell me, ‘You played a lot of minutes.  Relax yourself.’”

On Whoop-dee-damn-do:

“I don’t wish I hadn’t said it but I probably should have phrased it a different way.”

On the dress code thing:

“That’s another thing that got blown all out of proportion.  I just couldn’t see putting on a suit and tie at two o’clock in the morning to go to a hotel.  Home games?  Fine.  No problem.  But if I’m going from an arena to a bus to a plane, or from a plane to a bus to a hotel every night, I don’t see it.  I just felt like I was speaking up for everyone.  No one wants to wear a suit and tie anymore, not flying late at night.”

His only regret about his behavior was refusing Fitch’s order to re-enter a game:

“That’s probably the one thing I would take back, because I let my team down that day.  I think at the time we were losing, got back in the game, and I was rolling.  I hit like five or six in a row.  I was in rhythm, playing good, and the game was on the line.  [Fitch] took me out and I was frustrated.  I lost my cool when he tried to send me back in.  It was more a rebellion against him, and I told my teammates I let them down.”

Coleman’s responses were mostly reasonable and thoughtful.  Management had done a very poor job improving the team in the summer of 1994 (DC seemed to imply that he was particularly unhappy about the Dare/Higgins plan that crapped out so badly).  Some of DC’s controversies regarding a dress code, practice, and needing rest were overblown or wouldn’t be an issue today.  The two facts that DC didn’t acknowledge were that he wasn’t always in game shape and that his effort set the tone for the team, something that Beard understood.  This was the precise reason Beard tried to get buy-in from DC to help create that atmosphere.  Coleman just wasn’t wired to be that kind of player.

DC reported to 1995 training camp way overweight and the team also found he had an irregular heartbeat.  He was put on the injury list with a plan to come off shortly.  Coleman’s trade value was tenuous, but Reed traded him a few weeks later to Philadelphia for Shawn Bradley.  Coleman missed virtually the entire season and came back as a good player but never the upper-tier player he was for Daly.  Here are his advanced stats for the Nets versus his post-Jersey career:

DC in NJ: 19.8 PER, .138 WS48, 2.6 BPM

DC post-NJ: 16.3 PER, .101 WS48, 0.3 BPM

Coleman’s reputation post-New Jersey was not as bad.  Larry Brown liked him in Philly enough to reacquire him twice more.  It definitely seemed that once DC wasn’t among the highest paid in the NBA, his persona became less of an issue to the press, with the notable exception of his last year in Charlotte in 2000-01.

As for Anderson, the Nets offered him a six-year $40 million extension in training camp and he refused it.  This guaranteed he’d be traded because the Nets couldn’t risk losing him without compensation after the season.  Kenny was traded for Kendall Gill, who gave the Nets several good years.  Anderson ended up getting a better offer in free agency that summer (seven years and $50 million from the Blazers).  Like DC, Anderson was pretty good after leaving the Nets but never quite All-Star level again:

Anderson in NJ: 17.6 PER, .115 WS48, 2.2 BPM

Anderson post-NJ: 15.5 PER, .117 WS48, 0.7 BPM

Without DC and Anderson, the Nets went 30-52 in 1995-96 (the Nets were 15-21 when they traded Kenny and finished up 15-31 without him).   The Nets fired Beard and ownership gave the keys to the entire kingdom to John Calipari for a rebuild but that’s a whole other story.

Summing Up The DC/Kenny Era

After revisiting the early 1990s in-depth, I was struck with the following conclusions:

-The Nets, if everything had worked out better (no major injuries at bad times and kept Petro), could’ve been a 50-win team with second round potential but the Bulls and Knicks were better and made a conference finals run pretty remote.  Making the second round a time or two isn’t earth shattering but would’ve been a nice run for a franchise that had only won a single series since coming to the NBA.

-Chuck Daly was an incredible coach.  He was able to hold together and win with a team that was always teetering under Fitch and Beard.  While Daly is known most for his years on Detroit and the Dream Team, it’s clear that his presence was vital to getting the consistent respect and effort of his stars.  By all accounts, Beard was a smart and tough guy, but he struggled getting anywhere near the results from the same players.   It is no coincidence that Anderson, DC, and even Morris, played their best ball for Chuck. 

-Petro was not coming back in 1993.  The Nets screwed the pooch letting him get to free agency and, had he survived, it was clear he was irked enough to consider his options.

-Reed had a very mixed record as a GM.  He found a number of good players in the bargain bin: Petrovic, Terry Mills, Armen Gilliam, David Wesley, Chris Childs, and PJ Brown.  This is juxtaposed with some big misses on drafts/signings: Tate George, Sean Higgins, and Yinka Dare.  Reed also made a mistake betting on Beard, when it seemed the most important skill set a new coach needed was to get DC to try.  It’s not clear that Silas would be that guy, but he was more likely to be than Beard, who had no track record with Coleman.

-With hindsight being 20/20, the optimal moves would’ve been to keep Mookie and draft Mutombo.  That didn’t happen because Kenny was such an intriguing prospect but a core of Blaylock, Petro, Morris, DC, and Mutombo would’ve competed for the three seed for a few years, assuming Daly was involved as coach. 

-DC is still a complicated figure.  He was a top ten player for about two years and then never that good again.  In addition, Coleman consistently raised his game for the playoffs.  In the 2002 Basketball Prospectus, John Hollinger looked at players who performed better in the playoffs and found that DC improved by 5.9% in the playoffs, an atypically large increase considering most players are worse in the harder conditions.  Some of the press coverage around DC was silly. 

Most players don’t like practice and are cocky but it’s clear that DC wasn’t always in shape or giving best efforts after 1994.  But we finally got Daly’s perspective on DC several years later.  DC had signed a big contract with Charlotte in 1999.  He was solid his first two years but came into the 2000-01 season out-of-shape.    His coach Paul Silas (yes, the same guy we discussed above), benched DC in defiance of management because the team was playing so much better without him (Charlotte was 22-9 and then went 5-16 after his return).  Jeffrey Denberg of ESPN wrote about the situation and got this very revealing quote from Daly about DC: “[w]hat most people don’t understand is that Derrick doesn’t like to play basketball. He simply does not enjoy the game.”

 In other words, Coleman just didn’t have the consistent drive of mono-focused stars like Jordan, Kobe, and Garnett.  Denberg’s article framed this revelation as showing that DC was a bad person but that misses the point.  Coleman is perfectly decent human, he has dedicated himself to charity since retiring, but it is true that he didn’t get every ounce out of his talent.  Either way, I loved watching him play.

Quick Thoughts: Transactions

Now that the transactional stampede has slowed down, let’s pause to peek through some of what happened…

Nets trade Mikal Bridges to the Knicks for picks and salary slots to be determined

Nets trade the picks they own from the Suns to the Rockets for the remainder of the picks the Nets gave the Rockets in the 2020 James Harden deal

From the Nets perspective, these are good deals.  The choice was to pair Bridges with whatever star-ish level play they could get (Trae Young, Brandon Ingram, DeMar Derozan) and compete for the low-end playoff outcome while the picks Houston held ran off.  Evidently, Brooklyn must’ve told Houston that, unless the picks were returned, the Nets’ plan was sustained mediocrity.  This apparently convinced Houston that the Rockets would be better holding the high variance future Phoenix picks, rather than collecting Brooklyn’s middling picks the next few years.

As for Bridges, he had a real down year posting a career low in BPM (-0.4) and the eye test reflected his defense had slipped.  Bridges is turning 28 and it’s clear he’s stretched as a lead star and is a much better fit in an ensemble cast.  For the Knicks, the question was whether they should’ve spent the capital they had on Bridges or waited for a bigger fish that might become available.

This is a tough call.  We never know if a big star might become available and New York is a win now team.  On top of that, Bridges is a nice fit as another wing player who can play off Jalen Brunson’s primacy on offense.  It’s not clear to me how Tom Thibodeau will keep the players happy with playing time.  If Julius Randle loses minutes, there could be issues in the locker room (I’m assuming OG Anunoby is a lock for 35 mpg).  If the minutes come from Josh Hart or Donte DiVincenzo, adding Bridges may give nominal improvement because those two played so well last year.  In short, Bridges will clearly help but New York has a lot to figure out in how to implement this deep roster.  I would’ve probably held off for the bigger fish but the deal is definitely defensible and could help.

The Clippers negotiate weirdly with Paul George

Paul George came into the summer demanding a four year contract from the Clipps, who were adamant that they would only do three years at the max amount.  The Clippers stated rationale for their offer was that they feared the roster penalties that are incurred when a team payroll exceeds the Second Apron (draft picks are frozen and trades and signings are severely limited).

What many have pointed out, however, is that the offer that Los Angeles gave PG would put the Clipps in the Second Apron for three years anyway and that the fourth year is so far down the line, it’s not clear that the Clippers would be in that territory by then anyway.  This is a compelling point.  Something else had to be going on because the Clipps could’ve reduced their potential Apron exposure merely by declining to re-sign James Harden (he got a reported two years and $70 million) and paying PG.  George appears to have been acutely aware of the this fact when he recently said that the Harden trade hurt the team

Another odd fact was that L.A. was willing to give Kawhi Leonard a three-year contract, despite his long history of injuries, but drew the line at the healthier (but older) PG.  Let’s look at how Kawhi and PG have done since joining the Clipps:

Kawhi: 229 games, 33.6 mpg, 24.8 ppg, .614 TS%, 6.5 rpg, 4.4 apg, 24.9 PER, .209 ws48, 6.8 BPM, 17.2 VORP

PG: 263 games, 33.3 mpg, 23.0 ppg, .590 TS%, 6.0 rpg, 4.5 apg, 19.8 PER, .127 ws48, 3.6 BPM, 12.5 VORP

Yes, Kawhi is better but he has been unable to complete any of the last three playoff series he’s played in due to knee injuries.  If you are going to reinvest in Kawhi, why not continue to pair him with PG?  I can’t figure out an apparent reason for this menu of decisions but it’s clear they didn’t want George back.  Perhaps, they think they will be just as good with a bunch of role players and a cheaper second forward like DeRozan.  Given a binary choice between PG or Harden and DeRozan, however, I think PG is the better option. 

James Harden’s gambit recalculated

Now that Harden’s contract future is finally settled, it’s fair to say that he did a poor job of negotiating/leveraging his situation.  Let’s go back and see how much his tantrums cost him…

If you recall, in the summer of 2021, the Nets offered Harden three years and $161million to re-sign.  He declined the offer, ostensibly because if he played out the 2021-22 season, he would be eligible for a four-year $227 million deal afterwards and the Nets were likely to give it to him.  Things got weird and Harden forced a trade to Philly and did not terminate his contract and, instead, played out two more years of the existing contract, at a much lower number.  The speculation was that the 76ers had promised that supermax deal, at some point, because Harden was seemingly leaving a ton of cash on the table.

Whatever was agreed upon between the parties, Harden freaked out last summer and called Darryl Morey a liar, without really specifying the lies in detail.  Harden was able to force his way to L.A. but now we can tabulate roughly how much money he gave up with his shenanigans.

Here’s how much Harden could’ve made with the Nets’ offers approximately:

On the 3-year Deal

2022-23: $53.7 million

2023-24:  $53.7 million

2024-25: $53.7 million

2025-26: Would be a free agent but we can conservatively estimate he’d make the $35 million he got

Total: $196.1 million

On the 4-year Deal

2022-23: $56.75 million

2023-24:  $56.75 million

2024-25: $56.75 million

2025-26: $56.75 million

Total: $227 million

Actual

2022-23: $44.3 million

2023-24: $33 million

2024-25: $35 million

2025-26: $35 million

Total: $137.3 million

The decision to go to Philly and futz around cost Harden about $60 to $90 million.  Perhaps Harden valued happiness more than money and he was willing to accept the cost to get out of Brooklyn.  It’s not like he’s not going to be fine financially (he’s made $340 million so far as a player, without even considering endorsements.  Still, he probably should’ve exercised a little impulse control and locked in the Nets offer and figured out the details later.

Ranking The 2023-24 Celtics

How historically great were the 2023-24 Celtics?  It’s nearly impossible to compare teams from different eras on a head-to-head matchup basis because the rules and strategies have changed so much between generations.  It is not an apples-to-apples comparison when one wonders how the 1995-96 Bulls would play if they were magically teleported to the 2024 NBA.  There is also the thorny issue of whether the players are just better today, though I’m confident that the good players of the 1980s and 1990s would do just fine today.

I would love to see a magic world where the current Celtics could play the 1985-86 Bird Celtics team but, even if we could simulate this, the Bird team would have to totally change its offense just to keep up with the frequency of modern three-pointers.  I have no doubt that the Bird team could do this but it’s a fool’s errand to speculate how it would play out.  Instead, we are left with comparing how dominant the teams were against their peers and then, at the end, sprinkle in a little conjecture.  Let’s start with dominance…

Boston had a dominant team based on wins (64) and ratings (1st in offense and 3rd in defense).  The Celts’ SRS is fifth best ever (10.75) behind only true legends.  In fact, Boston is the first Celtic team with an SRS greater than 10 and only the eleventh team to ever post 10+.  Here’s the full list:

1. Milwaukee 1970-71, 119.92 (66-16)

2. Chicago 1995-96, 11.80 (72-10)

3. L.A. Lakers 1971-72, 11.65 (69-13)

4. Golden State 2016-17, 11.35 (67-15)

5. Boston 2023-24, 10.75 (64-18)

6. Milwaukee 1971-72, 10.70 (63-19)

    Chicago 1996-97, 10.70 (69-13)

8. Golden State 2015-16, 10.38 (73-9)

9. San Antonio 2015-16, 10.28 (67-15)

10. Chicago 1991-92, 10.07 (67-15)

11. Golden State 2014-15, 10.01 (67-15)

So, the Celts were dominant in the regular season, how about the playoffs?  It’s not their fault but Boston had a very easy playoffs schedule.  The Celtics went 16-3 and outscored opponents by 8.05 ppg, which ranks 15th of 70 title teams since 1954-55. Not quite as dominant as the regular season but still pretty high.  Here’s the full list of title teams with better playoff point per game margin:

1. Milwaukee 1970-71, +14.50 (12-2)

2. Golden State 2016-17, +13.53 (16-1)

3.  L.A. Lakers 2000-01, +12.75 (15-1)

4. Chicago 1990-91, +11.71 (15-2)

5. Boston 1960-61, +11.60 (8-2)

6. L.A. Lakers 1986-87, +11.39 (15-3)

7. Chicago 1995-96, +10.56 (15-3)

8. Boston 1985-86, +10.33 (15-3)

9. L.A. Lakers 1984-85, +10.16 (15-4)

10. Golden State 2017-18, +10.00 (16-5)

11. Philadelphia 1966-67, +9.33 (11-4)

12. San Antonio 2013-14, +9.30 (16-7)

13. Cleveland 2015-16, +8.62 (16-5)

14. Denver 2022-23, +8.30 (16-4)

15. Boston 2023-24, +8.05 (16-3)

The dominance review shows the current Boston team to be slightly below the best regular season teams and a solid tier below the best playoff teams (yes, the Celts’ 37-point loss to Dallas in Game 4 was anomalous but it still counts).

Now, for the last leg of the analysis, we do a slight bit of match up comparison.  Earlier, we wrote that it is silly to try compare teams from different eras, and this is largely true.   The one exception is top end talent comparison.  The NBA is a star driven league and the teams with the best players usually win.  The 2023-24 Celtics are deep team and their best player, Jayson Tatum, is great but doesn’t rate as quite other worldly compared to Michael Jordan, Larry Bird, and other inner circle Hall of Famers.  By way of comparison, here are the best BPMs of other legendary teams:

1985-86 Celtics: Larry Bird 8.7

1986-87 Lakers: Magic Johnson 8.8

1995-96 Bulls: Michael Jordan 10.5

2000-01 Lakers: Shaquille O’Neal 9.3

2007-08 Celtics: Kevin Garnett 8.2

2016-17 Warriors: Kevin Durant 8.9

2023-24 Celtics: Jayson Tatum 5.1

This year’s Celtics are super deep and BPM is hardly the only or best way to evaluate players but it provides a nice short hand for player dominance and Tatum, while a great player, doesn’t quite measure up to these guys.

We are aware that the implication here is that if teams from different era were to play each other, the other teams are more likely to get buckets in close games than the Tatum Celtics.  Again, this is a futile exercise but it is a minor factor to be considered when ranking the greats of the greats.

In all, the 2023-24 Celtics were a worthy title team and as good as any other team that has played.  Having said that, for teams of the Three-Point Era, I see them as a notch below the 1985-86 Celtics, the 1986-87 Lakers, the top Jordan Bulls teams, the 2000-01 Lakers, and the Curry Warriors.  There are other teams that have arguments over this current Celtic team but it’s safe to say that they rank in the 10 to 15 range of the best teams of the last 45 years.