Let’s explore a few thoughts on the Trae Young deal, FAQ style:
Is this trade a big deal?
Yes and no. Trae has been a charismatic star and the face of the Hawks franchise since 2018. On the other hand, the return (Corey Kispert and a 34-year-old CJ McCollum) shows that, objectively, this isn’t truly an impactful deal. It’s fair to say that the Hawks made the determination that they were a better team without Young, even if the return is basically bench fodder.
Young’s obviously a unique fit: a ball dominant smaller player, who is a defensive liability. Young’s main feature is that a Trae-centered offense is usually quite good but gives something back on defense. Here are the Hawks’ rankings since Trae emerged as a star:
2019-20: 20-47, 26th on Offense, 27th on Defense (Trae’s OBPM, 6.2)
2020-21: 41-31, 8th on Offense, 21st on Defense (Trae’s OBPM, 5.3)
2021-22: 43-39, 2nd on Offense, 26th on Defense (Trae’s OBPM, 7.1)
2022-23: 41-41, 7th on Offense, 22nd on Defense (Trae’s OBPM, 5.3)
2023-24: 36-46, 12th on Offense, 27th on Defense (Trae’s OBPM, 4.9)
2024-25: 40-42, 18th on Offense, 19th on Defense (Trae’s OBPM, 3.3)
2025-26: 19-21, 19th on Offense, 15th on Defense (Trae’s OBPM, 3.3)
As can be seen above, Trae’s efficiency has dropped from his peak and this is reflected in the Hawks’ offense, which has also dropped steadily as well. In addition, Young’s usage has dropped yet his turnover percentage has risen. Finally, the recent small sample size of Trae’s play has been pretty bad. The Hawks are 1-8 in games where Trae has played for more than 8 minutes (he didn’t cover himself in glory at the end of the recent game against the Knicks, where he was stripped twice in overtime).
In terms of contract status, Trae has a $49 million player-option for next year that he is almost certain to exercise, unless he negotiates a long-term deal at a lower annual number. McCollum is on an expiring deal and Kispert is making about $14 million per year through 2027-28 (with a team option in 2028-29).
Put it all together, the Hawks have determined that they are better off trying to accelerate the next version of the team then having Trae around through the season (or trying to trade him this summer when he exercises his option). It’s hard to disagree with this decision when there is such a documented record of what Trae brings to the table.
Yes, the trade makes sense, but should the Hawks have traded Trae a year or two ago when he had much more value?
In hindsight, definitely yes. The question is when they reasonably could have come to this conclusion. In real time, it was a little harder to realize that a trade had to be made. Here is a brief history of the Trae trade rumor mill:
-Late December 2022: There are rumors that Trae might request a trade with the team struggling around .500. Per Bleacher Report: “Trae Young could be the next player on a rookie max extension to request a trade if the team doesn’t make inroads come postseason time…This week, Atlanta ownership reassigned president Travis Schlenk—who drafted Young—to an adviser role. How the Hawks shape the roster around Young under general manager Landry Fields, the newly appointed front-office chief, will be monitored closely….Fields has the green light from ownership to do what’s necessary to acquire upgrades, but the hard part is executing.”
The Hawks were 16-16 and finished 41-41 before losing to the Celtics in the first round of the playoffs.
-In April 2023, Kevin O’Connor reported that the Hawks were potentially considering trading Trae but that they would likely give a shot for new coach Quinn Snyder to coach Trae for a full season: “The odds are always against a superstar trade unless the player makes enough of a racket to leave the franchise with no other choice. Consequently, Atlanta will most likely use this summer to reshape its roster around Young and [Dejounte] Murray, whether it’s with a wing-heavy roster or a Cavs-like double-big frontcourt.”
-It was reasonable to give Snyder a full season but things did not improve and, by February 2024, Howard Beck reported that the Hawks were actively trying to trade Young. Beck quoted an anonymous GM as saying: “He’s available. I think they would love to trade Trae.” In April 2024, Marc Stein reported that Atlanta was going to probably trade Young or Murray to rebalance the point position. Murray was traded and Trae remained. In September 2024, Tim McMahon commented that Trae would’ve already been traded “if there was a real market [for him].”
So there you have it….Young’s trade value had slowly evaporated three years ago and Atlanta’s window to get a substantive return for him was likely gone by 2023, unless they could’ve found a desperate franchise who valued Trae higher than conventional wisdom. A trade after the 2021-22 season might have worked but Atlanta acted rationally in trying to make it work when it was only one year removed from its best playoff run in years. Therefore, it’s hard to criticize Atlanta too much for keeping Trae while his trade value was cratering.
What does Washinton get out of this?
Washington has the cap space to pay Trae and there is a chance he finds his groove, which could make this deal a very nice high upside play. Washington’s defense is horrible already, but it does have some young and long prospects (Alex Sarr, Bilal Coulibaly) who might slot in well on defense to cover for Trae.
This is not a riskless transaction for the Wiz. The risk, however, is subtle. If Trae continues to decline, the decision is easy for Washington to cut ties. No, the true risk is that Young is just okay and earns a big extension. Under this scenario, Trae compiles stats and makes the Wiz a border line play-in team but stagnates development of younger players and sabotages attempts to tank for better picks.
This is not the worst risk but is significant enough that I would not have made the same deal if I were in the Wiz’s shoes. Again, the trade has sound logic, just not my cup of tea.
Trae in ATL considered historically
Now that Trae is leaving Atlanta, let’s try to put that time into context…
Is Trae Young the best Hawks player since Dominique Wilkins? He has a pretty good argument. Since 1979-80, Trae is Atlanta’s best passer (9.8 apg) and second best scorer (25.2 ppg). It’s hard to compare Young with the other older Hawk competition because of the different styles of play and roles these players filled. Let’s give it a shot though:
With these cross-era comparisons, sometimes making an All-NBA team can guide us to the relative value of the player to the era. Since 1979-80, the only non-Nique All-NBA players:
Second Team
Dan Roundfield, 1979-80
Third Team
Trae Young, 2021-22
Al Horford, 2010-11
Joe Johnson, 2009-10
Dikembe Mutombo, 1997-98
Kevin Willis, 1991-92
Not a ton of All-NBA love for the Hawks, though Trae received as much as anyone else besides Wilkins. Let’s also look at Hawks MVP vote shares in that time period:
Dan Roundfield, 1979-80, 2 points
Dan Roundfield, 1981-82, 14 points
Dan Roundfield, 1982-83, 2 points
Moses Malone, 1988-89, 3 points
Mookie Blaylock, 1993-94, 1 point
Kevin Willis, 1993-94, 1 point
Dikembe Mutombo, 1996-97, 4 points
Steve Smith, 1996-97, 1 point
Steve Smith, 1998-99, 1 point
Joe Johnson, 2009-10, 1 point
Trae does not have a single MVP vote and the Hawks have not gotten an MVP vote in over 15 years. That doesn’t mean Trae is worse than the players who did get votes, but it suggests to me that they were closer to Trae in terms of relative impact to their teams.
In terms of raw stats, Trae’s 25 ppg, 10 apg definitely lap the field when stripped of context. Still, BPM actually prefers Mookie (4.8) and Doc Rivers (3.7) to Young (2.6) (the BPM list can be found here: https://www.sports-reference.com/stathead/tiny/7w3Ew). Trae’s playoff stats are also near the top of the list but slightly below Mutombo, Rivers, and Mookie.
Ultimately, I am somewhat agnostic about the arguments over the non-Wilkins Hawk stars. I see the argument for Young but, if forced to choose, I put him a little below Mutombo (Deke anchored a great defensive team with sustained success over several years) and in a tier with Mookie, Paul Millsap, Steve Smith, and Joe Johnson. Your mileage may vary.
Trae Trade and The Bullets Michael Adams Gambit
As a final exercise, I like to try to put modern trades in context by comparing them with past trades that are similar. The past trade may not be exactly on point, but it is interesting to see how that trade turned out and what we can learn from it.
The Trae trade is fairly unique. Here are the factors:
-Undersized, ball dominant point guard with gaudy stats
-Still near his prime
-Traded for scraps, even though there are no personal issues or injury concerns.
There is no perfect parallel but the closest I could come up with is the trade of Michael Adams from the Nuggets to the Bullets in the 1991 offseason.
Adams was not a big draft prospect like Trae but had a similar short stature (5’10, 165 pounds) and wreaked havoc on defenses, albeit with a weird one-handed jumper. Adams was drafted 66th in 1985 out of Boston College and bounced around for a few years before establishing himself as a small shoot-first point guard for Denver in 1987-88. Doug Moe gave Adams the green light to shoot threes and he led the NBA in attempts in each of his first three years with Denver.
In that span, Adams put up 16 ppg, shot .363% from three (on 5.4 attempts per game), 6.3 apg, and 1.9 spg. In summer 1990, Moe was replaced with the immortal Paul Westhead, who was even more high-octane in his offensive schemes.
Before the season, Adams, who was turning 28, signed his first big contract extension of five years and $5 million. Shortly afterwards, the Nuggets signed draft pick Chris Jackson (now Mahmoud Abdul-Rauf) to a four-year, $10 million deal. He and Adams played the same position and Adams was quite angry to make half of what the rookie was getting.
Adams ended up getting the starting job when Abdul-Rauf was not ready to play big minutes. Adams put up a crazy stat line in the Westhead offense (26.5 ppg, shot 8.5 threes per game at .296%, 10.5 apg, and 2.2 apg). The big stats didn’t ease Adams’ anger. In April 1991, The Washington Post reported that “if the club doesn’t pay him more money he will take his services elsewhere…. Asked if he will be back without a raise, Adams said Tuesday, ‘I would hope to say not.’”
Two months later, Adams was traded to the Bullets. Despite his seeming April trade demand, in June, Adams wasn’t sure he’d be traded but said: “I hoped that if they did trade me, that it was to a East Coast team.” Even though he had huge raw stats for Denver, the return wasn’t great but was better than what Atlanta received for Trae. The Bullets sent the eighth pick in the 1991 draft but also got back the 19th pick from Denver, effectively dropping 11 slots for the right to acquire Adams. Denver ended up taking Mark Macon and Washington drafted LaBradford Smith, neither of whom lasted long as NBA regulars.
Adams was his usual pre-Westhead self in 1991-92 (18.1 ppg, 7.6 apg) and even made the All-Star team when Larry Bird was not physically able to play. Adams, however, did not juice the Bullets’ offense, which ranked 24th in the NBA (the same ranking as in 1990-91) and the Bullets went 25-57. Adams lasted two more years as a starter but was incrementally less effective each season.
In all, the trade ended up being inconsequential. The Bullets got a little value from Adams (one above-average season and two replacement level seasons) and took Smith when a decent player was available (Rick Fox). Denver blew their draft pick too (Denver wanted a defense-first guard and Stacey Augmon went with the next pick). We shall see if Trae’s trade is more significant.