By popular demand, we are going to do an examination of the October 1997 three-way trade where the Sonics sent their star power forward Shawn Kemp to Cleveland and received back Vin Baker (the Bucks, acting as an intermediary, received Terrell Brandon and Tyrone Hill from Cleveland). This trade portended imminent decline for both the Sonics and Kemp.
The story, in brief, is that Kemp was angry about his contract and forced a trade. When the trade happened, Kemp and Baker both struggled with substance abuse and both declined quickly thereafter. This is largely true but there are some details that clarify the situation and raise more issues we can address further. Did Seattle really have to trade Kemp? Did they get the best return they could have? Who won the trade? To answer these questions, and a few other related questions, let’s take a deep dive on the trade, and see what reveals itself….
Background on the Trade
Let’s start with the context in which the trade arose. After the 1995-96 season, Seattle looked like they’d be the best team in the Western Conference for the remainder of the decade. They had gone 64-18 with a good offense (8th) and a great defense (2nd). In the playoffs, they swept the defending champ Rockets, took out the Stockton-Malone Jazz in a tough WCF, and had been competitive against the 72-win Michael Jordan Bulls in the Finals. Seattle was deep and their two stars, Gary Payton (age 27) and Kemp (age 26) were in their absolute primes. Though the West was loaded, the Sonics were still the presumptive favorite going forward.
The Sonics had about $25.8 million in payroll, with Kemp making $3 million. He was fourth on the team in salary, behind Detlef Schrempf ($5 million), Sam Perkins ($4 million), and Frank Brickowski ($3.25 million)(Payton was making $2.8 million). Seattle was slightly above the $23 million salary cap. In July 1996, Payton signed a 7-year $85 million extension, and signed 24-year old shot blocker Jim McIlvaine to a seven-year, $35 million deal.
Though his contract was large, McIlvaine was not expected to be much more than a role guy. Coach George Karl envisioned him replacing shot blocker Ervin Johnson, who played about 18 mpg against big bodies, with Sam Perkins usually closing: “Ervin didn’t play a physical game. With Jim, you’ll see more of a body-to-body game.” McIlvaine also saw his role realistically and said so at his introductory press conference: “[b]asically, I’m a defender. That’s what I’m known for. I block shots. Right now, Seattle has enough offensive weapons and they need a defensive center.”
For the 1996-97 season, GP was suddenly making $10.2 million, three times as much as Schrempf and Kemp (who were both making about $3.3 million). McIlvaine was next at $3 million. At this point, Kemp was getting antsy about his contract status and entered the 1996-97 season officially disgruntled.
What was Kemp’s contract status?
On the surface, Seattle had been pretty generous contractually with Kemp through the years. When Kemp was drafted 17th in 1989, the Sonics gave him a six-year $3.5 million contract. In 1994, the Sonics gave Kemp an early extension that went about nine years and $45 million. Glenn Nelson reported the details of the extension negotiations: “[new Sonics GM Wally] Walker said he inherited ‘expectations’ on the part of Kemp that some alterations would be made to a seven-year, $25.4 million extension that won’t even go into effect until next year. ‘Based on those expectations, we decided to try working something out,’ Walker said, ‘because that was the fair thing to do.’”
Walker gave a detailed rationale for the decision: “[i]nstead of becoming doctrinaire about the situation, Walker chose to ‘make a case-by-case decision on what’s right.’ In this case, Walker heeded several factors:
— Kemp had some justification for his expectations.
— Kemp is arguably the best player on the team.
— Walker and Kemp’s representatives began talks as long ago as July.
— An agreement in principle was reached Thursday, before camp began.
The last point is a key one. While Kemp was a no-show at the Sonics’ first six sessions, Walker and his agents were hammering out the fine details. Walker and the Sonics can say that the new deal technically was not a response to the holdout.”
Yes, Kemp held out but Walker did not overreact: “Philosophically, a guy was under contract; he should have been playing. But all the heavy lifting was done before camp, and we were in the homestretch of a contract negotiation.”
Seattle had seemingly given Kemp whatever he requested in these prior negotiations. The explosion of revenue in the NBA, however, created conflict. As with Scottie Pippen and several other stars who signed long-term contracts in the early 1990s, Kemp’s deal was quickly below market because of the rising revenues that also caused the salary cap to go up exponentially. The salary cap was about $16 million in 1994-95 and jumped to $23 million in 1995-96 (it rose to $34 million by the end of the decade). In addition to Payton’s huge deal, Juwan Howard signed a big deal and was making about $10 million per year.
Kemp was not pleased. He spread word that he was unhappy with the team giving McIlvaine a big deal and held out of training camp. Kemp did not mention Payton’s deal but that also had to be even more troubling that Kemp made 30% of GP’s new salary. Kemp was realizing that he had locked in his prime years in 1994 NBA value when revenues were only going up. Kemp wanted a deal in line with the new economic conditions.
The problem: Seattle was prohibited under the CBA from renegotiating a deal for three years after signing (which wasn’t until October 1997). It wasn’t clear what Kemp hoped to accomplish but he held out of a camp and told the press in a statement that “this is not about money.” Later in that same statement, however, he wrote: “[t]he new collective bargaining agreement still does not allow for a free marketplace where veteran players such as myself can be compensated at this time for what we’re worth.” Basically, Kemp was mad at the circumstances that were beyond Seattle’s control and needed the world to know. He returned to camp after 22 days, but the vibes only got worse from there.
1996-97: The Year of the Angry Kemp
Kemp spent the year angry at the world. He was habitually late and generally made it clear he did not want to be on the team. Here’s a ticker of reported incidents:
-1/29/97: Kemp is removed from the starting lineup for being late to practice
-2/8/97: It is reported that Kemp was out late drinking excessively the night before a noon game against the Jordan Bulls. Kemp had 16 points on 5-11 shooting and 8 boards but had 6 turnovers. The Sonics lost 91-84 (though Kemp was +4 for the game)
-2/11/97: Kemp is removed from the starting line up again for another late practice arrival
-3/30-4/3/97: Kemp is brought off the bench for three games after missing a team flight and another practice
-4/14/97: NBC reports that Kemp confessed to teammates that he had a drinking problem. Kemp vehemently denies this report
Through all the turmoil, the Sonics were still pretty good. They went 57-25 with essentially the same point-differential as the 1995-96 squad. Kemp’s overall stats were down but not by as much as one would expect considering his listless behavior:
1995-96: 33.3 mpg, 19.6 ppg, .631 TS%, 11.4 rpg, 2.2 apg, 1.2 spg, 1.6 bpg, 4.0 topg, 22.6 PER, .205 WS48, 2.8 BPM
1996-97: 34.0 mpg, 18.7 ppg, .583 TS%, 10.0 rpg, 1.9 apg, 1.5 spg, 1.0 bpg, 3.5 topg, 20.7 PER, .174 WS48, 0.8 BPM
The aggregate numbers don’t quite capture Kemp’s downward slide. In fact, when you look at Kemp’s numbers by month, you can see that he wasn’t the same player after January:
| Month | G | MPG | PPG | FG% | TS% | RPG | APG |
| November | 17 | 35.6 | 23.5 | 0.541 | 0.615 | 11.6 | 1.9 |
| December | 15 | 36.2 | 20.1 | 0.524 | 0.581 | 11.3 | 1.7 |
| January | 13 | 35.3 | 20.1 | 0.485 | 0.594 | 10.5 | 1.5 |
| February | 10 | 33.3 | 15.4 | 0.519 | 0.595 | 7.5 | 1.6 |
| March | 16 | 33.3 | 15.6 | 0.493 | 0.534 | 8.8 | 3.4 |
| April | 10 | 28.1 | 15.1 | 0.469 | 0.564 | 8.9 | 0.9 |
Given this steep decline, it was an open question how much Kemp would have left for the playoffs. Kemp woke up and played quite well against Phoenix and Houston in two series that went to the brink (Seattle lost to Houston in a tough seven-game series). His 1996-97 playoff numbers were about equal to what he did during his awesome 1995-96 playoff numbers:
1995-96 Playoffs: 36.0 mpg, 20.9 ppg, .640 TS%, 10.4 rpg, 1.5 apg, 1.2 spg, 2.0 bpg, 4.0 topg, 23.6 PER, .198 WS48, 4.8 BPM
1996-97 Playoffs: 36.8 mpg, 21.6 ppg, .585 TS%, 12.3 rpg, 3.0 apg, 1.2 spg, 1.3 bpg, 3.9 topg, 23.0 PER, .181 WS48, 3.3 BPM
Kemp had done enough to preserve a bulk of his trade value but questions remained. On June 5, 1997, shortly after the end of the Houston series, Kemp told David Aldridge that he wanted a trade: “[w]hen that last game was over, I knew it was my last game in that uniform. There is no positive outlook about Shawn Kemp in Seattle. When that name is mentioned, it brings nothing but negativity. There’s no basis for a relationship to be built on. The relationship is over.”
He further denied that money or that Payton’s big deal were factors in Kemp’s unhappiness: “I don’t have a problem with [the] fact that now the Sonics are considered Gary Payton’s team….The money is a very non-important factor to myself. Money means a lot of respect. It means a lot of accomplishment and a lot of hard work. I will be Shawn Kemp regardless of whether I have money or not. The only thing money does is show who you are.”
Did Seattle have to trade Kemp?
Seattle management and others in the industry initially wanted the Sonics to try to keep him:
-Walker tried to meet with Kemp but was rebuffed. He still was conciliatory, telling the Seattle Times that: “I certainly do not agree with some of the things Shawn said. But the only thing I can do is talk directly to him about it. I’d love to have a conversation with him so we can address things….I still think it’s a win-win scenario for Shawn to continue to play for Seattle. It doesn’t sound like he’s of that mind right now.”
-Clippers coach Bill Fitch thought Seattle shouldn’t trade Kemp: “I would try to make him as happy as possible, but I wouldn’t want to trade a guy like that…..If he looks around, it’s going to be hard for him to find a team that can win and where he can be happy. The problem is, with a guy like that, if he’s unhappy at one place, he’ll find a reason to be unhappy someplace else”
-Former Sonic assistant Bob Kloppenburg agreed: “It’s going to be hard to get his real value in return. He’s a premier player.”
Kemp did his best to make sure all bridges were burned. He ceased all contact with the management and withdrew from his teammates. Kemp had been scheduled to be in the wedding party for Gary Payton’s late July 1997 wedding but, days before, told Payton he would not attend because Kemp: “wanted to avoid awkward confrontations with Sonics management. Those attending included owner Barry Ackerley, team president Wally Walker, coach George Karl and vice president Billy McKinney.”
This all seemed irrational. The Sonics couldn’t legally redo his contract. Recently, Kemp explained himself on the podcast circuit. He said he was still angry that his 1994 extension was underwhelming and he wanted to be the first NBA player to get a $100 million contract: “In my mind, I wanted to break a 100 million. Nobody had a 100 million dollar contract yet. It wasn’t about SK making a 100 million. It was about breaking a barrier because I thought we should be making more money. In my heart, I kind of knew I was going to have to leave because they [Seattle] weren’t going to pay me 100 million dollars. I had six years left on my contract. I was the first athlete ever who got 100 million dollars and still had six or seven years on my contract.”
This doesn’t quite add up. In fact, Juwan Howard, Alonzo Mourning, and Shaq all got $100+ million deals in the summer of 1996. Nor is there any reporting from 1997 indicating that Kemp was demanding $100 million or that Seattle would not offer that amount on extension. Presumably, Kemp just assumed that the Sonics would offer him the same package they offered Payton. The Sonics did not give out a contract of that size until 2007, when Rashard Lewis got a six-year $118 million contract extension. Nevertheless, it does appear that Kemp very much wanted to break the $100 million barrier and that his motivation was not altruistic. It’s not bad that Kemp’s motivation was to maximize his contract but his recent statements seem like post hoc rationalizations.
Kemp’s trade value going into the 1997-98 season
Where did Kemp actually rank in the power forward list at the time? Kemp’s advanced stats have usually been below his perceived impact. Putting raw or advanced stats aside, Karl Malone was the consensus best power forward at the time and Kemp fit into the next tier with Charles Barkley and Chris Webber. In the NBA overall, Kemp had been a low-end MVP candidate (voted in the 8-10 range a few times). That’s a top 10-20 player and, normally, would be coveted throughout the NBA.
Kemp was hugely talented and near his theoretical prime but, as Fitch noted, Kemp had red flags based on his stormy 1996-97 season. On top of that, Kemp expected a fat new contract extension but could only be traded for matching salary or to a team under the cap that was willing to pay him. Finally, Seattle was a title contender and needed to get back a good power forward in return. These factors made the market thinner than one would expect for a player like Kemp.
Bob Sherman of the Spokesman-Review laid out potential suitors at the time:
-The hottest rumor was sending Kemp to the Wizards for Webber. Webber was much younger, but the salaries didn’t match and “[a]lthough [Wizards GM Wes] Unseld believes Kemp has had a better career than Webber, he feels Webber had a better season last year and probably will continue to improve.” Unseld was correct in his assessment but ended up trading C-Webb for even less value the next summer.
-The Raptors were possibly willing to trade for Kemp for young Marcus Camby, who had an up-and-down rookie year. The Raps were under the cap and could absorb Kemp’s extension and, theoretically, Kemp “would be a needed drawing card in Toronto.” The Raps, however, were a bad expansion team and getting prime Kemp didn’t really fit their timeline.
-Denver was offering Antonio McDyess, a stud young power forward, but he had only one year left on his deal and the Sonics didn’t want to give up the years of control they had on Kemp’s deal for this more uncertain situation. McDyess would end up getting traded to Phoenix and then spurning them in free agency to return to Denver.
-Golden State wanted to offer Joe Smith but he also had only one year left on his deal and was not nearly as good as McDyess in any event.
None of these options were good fits and rumors of a trade for Vin Baker started to bubble up. Baker was a bona fide scoring power forward who was two years younger than Kemp and was coming off a great season: 40.5 mpg, 21.0 ppg, .553 TS%, 10.3 rpg, 2.7 apg, 1.0 spg, 1.4 bpg, 20.1 PER, .127 WS48, 2.0 BPM.
Baker had six years left on his deal, with an option to become a restricted free agent after the 1998-99 season. Baker was not nearly as dynamic athletically as Kemp. Baker was also not a defensive presence. The team around him was not great but Baker’s Bucks were always well below average defensively and that fact suggested his defensive presence was, at best, neutral. Baker was a moderate downgrade from Kemp but Baker was good, younger, and the contract renegotiation issue was kicked down the road two years. The only other baggage Baker had was that he hinted that he was going to opt out of his contract because the Bucks had been so bad during his time there.
How did the Cavs deal get done?
It’s funny but there are at least four different reports as to what drove the deal to be executed the way it was.
On the Iconic Sonics podcast in 2025, Kemp said that the Sonics first tried to trade him straight to Milwaukee and then tried to trade him to the Pacers before settling on Cleveland: “They called me and told me they were trading me to Milwaukee. I said ‘that’s bullshit, I’m not going….twist that shit around….it’s cold as hell in Milwaukee. They called me back 45 minutes later and said ‘don’t worry about it, you’re going to Indiana and I said ‘bullshit, I’m not going to play at home [Kemp was from Indiana], that’s the worst thing you could ever do.’ They said ‘your last choice is Cleveland’ and I said ‘I’m going to Cleveland then.’”
Cleveland’s then-GM Wayne Embry had a different version of events. In his biography “The Inside Game,” Embry wrote that Walker “said he was working on something with Milwaukee involving Shawn and Vin Baker. Seattle wanted Baker, but Milwaukee was not keen on Kemp. Bob Weinhauer, Milwaukee’s general manager, suggested Walker talk to me about [Terrell] Brandon and [Tyrone] Hill.”
An AP Report on the trade wrote that the Bucks didn’t trade for Kemp because they “would have needed to trade several more players to get far enough under the salary cap to have funds available for re-doing Kemp’s contract.“
The Seattle Times, however, reported that “Walker, who was not interested in anything Cleveland had to offer, said he talked to Milwaukee General Manager Bob Weinhauer on Tuesday and told him he was considering another undisclosed deal. That prompted Weinhauer to get Cleveland involved to work out the details on a three-way transaction.”
I have no idea which version is closest to the truth. I tend to favor Embry’s account because his book was so meticulous in detailing his career. In the end, it does not actually matter but the divergent versions are fascinating.
The Deal
On September 25, 1997, the trade was finalized as follows:
Bucks get: Terrell Brandon, Tyrone Hill and a 1998 first-round pick (it was top 10 protected, ended up being Pat Garrity at 19th overall)
Cavs get: Shawn Kemp and Sherman Douglas
Sonics get: Vin Baker
Bob Sherwin described the deal as favorable to Seattle: “[w]hat matters to the Sonics is they brought in a player who averaged 21 points and 10.3 rebounds last season, which is about what Kemp delivered here. That was Walker’s primary criterium, trading talent for similar talent…..The hidden benefit is that it provides addition by subtraction. Kemp’s antics last season – missing team flights, being late for practices and meetings, uninspired play – may have worn on his teammates. The change could be positive for both.”
Sherwin quoted veteran leader Nate McMillan as recognizing that a deal had to be made: “I’m just glad it’s over…. When he didn’t speak with any member of the team all summer, that made a statement. Me, him and Gary have been together eight years. I didn’t think we had anything to do with his negotiating problems. For him not to return calls all summer, I knew things would be different. He couldn’t just come up to me when training camp started and explain why he didn’t return my calls. I think he pushed it to a point of no return.”
How did the trade turn out?
Baker & The Sonics
In 1997-98, Baker played pretty well for the Sonics (19.2 ppg, .564 TS%, 8.0 rpg, 19.2 PER, 1.0 BPM, 2.2 VORP) and Seattle was still a contender (61-21, second seed overall). A look at the team numbers suggested that the Sonics weren’t quite as good as the Kemp teams. The SRS and point-differential data was down and the Sonics also fell from 2nd in defense rating to 10th.
The cracks showed in the playoffs against the Lakers with Shaq and a very young Kobe. The Sonics went 3-1 against the Lakers and had homecourt advantage for their second round series. After winning Game 1, the Sonics dropped the next four games by 12 or more points each time. Coach George Karl was fired and Seattle management hoped to run it back with a new coach, Paul Westphal, and take another shot. The 1998-99 season was delayed several months due to an owner lockout of the players.
In January 1999, Baker returned from the long lockout carrying an additional 50 pounds–and it wasn’t muscle. He was way out-of-shape and had an abysmal season (13.8 ppg, .461 TS%, 6.2 rpg, 12.5 PER, -3.9 BPM). Baker still opted out of his deal after the season and the Sonics, convinced that the down year was just a hiccup due to the uncertainty of the lockout, gave Baker a seven-year $87 million extension but with a weight clause. Alas, he was never the same player. From 1998-99 to 2001-02, Baker had 14.3 ppg, .498 TS%, 6.5 rpg, 13.7 PER, -3.6 BPM.
By 2003, Baker’s career was effectively over due to a serious drinking problem (thankfully, he has recovered and runs rehabilitation clinics now). The Sonics were a .500ish team for the rest of the Gary Payton Era, which ended when GP was traded during the 2002-03 season.
Kemp & Cavs
As for the Cavs, in 1997-98, Kemp declined further (18.0 ppg, .512 TS%, 9.3 rpg, 18.0 PER, 0.6 BPM, 1.8 VORP) but was still an All-Star. Embry wrote that there was some trouble behind the scenes: “after one month with Shawn, [coach] Mike [Fratello] wanted me to trade him away. The coach said he could not handle his tardiness and his lackadaisical practice and workout habits….Mike had fined Shawn several times for being late for practices, flights, and buses. This habitual tardiness was not a good sign. I had learned from my experiences in Milwaukee that tardiness was the first sign of drug abuse. I asked [Kemp’s agent] Tony [Dutt] whether Shawn was using drugs. He confirmed there were problems and pleaded for my assistance in helping Shawn…The more I talked to Tony, the more empathy I had for Shawn….It would not be long before his problems, which were now our problems, would be public knowledge.” The Cavs kept the drug issue in-house and it did not become public knowledge for a few more years.
Despite the drama, the Cavs ended up having a nice year. They went 47-35 with the best defense in the NBA, thanks to Kemp and four promising rookies (Zydrunas Ilgauskas, Derek Anderson, Brevin Knight, and Cedric Henderson). Kemp found his dominant form in the playoffs (26.0 ppg, 10.3 rpg, 25.9 PER, 6.4 BPM) but they lost 3-1 to the Pacers in the first round and, during the series, Sports Illustrated ran an article about Kemp having seven children and paying child support to six different women. Though the season was positive for the Cavs, the article was not great publicity for them or Kemp.
Kemp also came back from the lockout noticeably heavier. He was able to put up his last great statistical season in 1998-99 (20.5 ppg, .578 TS%, 9.2 rpg, 20.5 PER, 4.2 BPM, 2.3 VORP). Embry felt that Kemp’s good stats were illusory: “[a]ctually, his scoring was up. His rebounding was surprisingly good. He was doing it differently. He was using his body more to get position. He could because it was so big. But he had no lift on his jump, which had always separated him from most players of his size. As the season progressed, we were worried he would break down because of the fatigue caused by carrying too much weight.” Embry’s observations were confirmed by the shooting data that showed that Kemp was finishing at the rim less and shooting more long jumpers.
He also broke down late in the season and missed the last eight games. Cleveland, which was 21-21 at the time, finished 1-7 and missed the playoffs. Fans were getting restless and booing the team, especially Kemp.
In 1999-00, Kemp came into the season weighing over 300 pounds and was fined for violating the weight clause of his contract (Embry wrote that his contract mandated Kemp to weigh under 275 pounds–the fines exceeded $300,000). Kemp had decent raw numbers (17.8 ppg and 8.8 rpg) but on .508 TS% (13% below league average) and had a -2.1 BPM. The Cavs went 30-52 and Kemp’s contract went from possibly toxic to polonium.
To make matters more urgent for the Cavs, Kemp’s deal was heavily backloaded. He made about $50 million the first three seasons in Cleveland and was slated to make $71 million in the final four seasons (including $46.5 million for the last two seasons). In late August 2000, the Cavs were able to convince Portland (whose GM Bob Whitsitt had drafted Kemp) to acquire Kemp for Brian Grant, who also had a big contract and struggled with injuries. Grant was routed to Miami, where he was solid and relatively healthy for the next four years. The Cavs got two aging vets on shorter deals, Clarence Weatherspoon and Chris Gatling, plus a first-round pick that became Brendan Haywood (20th overall in 2001).
Unfortunately, Kemp’s athleticism was totally gone. In 2000-01, Kemp dipped to a career low .469 TS% and 53% of his shots were now long two-pointers. He had dunks on 2.4% of his shots, compared with about 9% of his shots in his three years in Cleveland, and 17.5% of his shots in his final season in Seattle. The nightmare season got worse when Kemp admitted publicly that he had a drug problem. He checked into rehab for cocaine abuse at the end of the 2000-01 season and was able to play two more seasons at a slightly higher level, but he was just another big body backup.
Kemp has had some struggles post-NBA but also appears to be in a better space now and now works with Baker to promote awareness on addiction and mental health.
Brandon & the Bucks
Brandon was excellent for the Bucks in 1997-98 (16.8 ppg, 7.7 apg, 20.2 PER, 3.7 BPM) but missed 32 games with injuries. Milwaukee was 27-23 in games he played (9-23 without him). The Bucks traded him in early 1998-99 to get Sam Cassell, who had a great run for the Bucks as well through 2003 (the Bucks gave Cassell away to Minnesota but that’s a story for another day).
So, there you have the story….now let’s address the burning questions….
Who won the trade?
The Bucks won in a landslide. They acquired above-average point guard play for seven seasons from the deal AND didn’t have to give a huge risky contract to big men with serious health issues. The harder (and more interesting) question is who won the Kemp-Baker challenge. The knee jerk answer is that, with 20/20 hindsight, both Cleveland and Seattle would not have made this trade.
Again, that response dodges the question. If forced to choose, I’d have to say the Cavs got more value. Here are the stats for Kemp in Cleveland versus Baker in Seattle:
Kemp (1997-98 through 1999-00): 204 games, 33.0 mpg, 18.5 ppg, .524 TS%, 9.1 rpg, 18.7 PER, .122 WS48, 0.4 BPM, 4.1 VORP
Baker (1997-98 through 1999-00) 265 games, 33.1 mpg, 14.1 ppg, .514 TS%, 6.5 rpg, 15.0 PER, .081 WS48, -2.5 BPM, -1.6 VORP
Baker had one nice season for Seattle and several very negative ones. Kemp had two good seasons for Cleveland and one terrible season before the Cavs were able to dump him but he was difficult to deal with and the team had only a small amount of success. Kemp wasn’t nearly worth the risk (or the headache) but he clearly imparted more value than Baker.
Was there a chance that Seattle could’ve just kept Kemp and, if so, what would’ve that meant for the Seattle contention?
There was no shot that Kemp was staying in Seattle. He was angry about finances and perceived that management was the enemy and responded by blowing off practices and team flights. This behavior remained an issue in Cleveland even after he got paid. It’s still not clear to me strategically why nuking his relationship with the Sonics would make it more likely for Kemp to get a big deal and seemed more like pure id than any coherent strategy. Ultimately, it just seems that Kemp was an emotional guy who just couldn’t hide his frustration that he was underpaid and that Payton already had a deal.
Turning to the second part of the question, assuming it was possible, retaining a happy Kemp would’ve given Seattle a slightly better team in 1997-98 with a puncher’s chance of making the Finals. Seattle would’ve had to beat two of three great teams: the Shaq Lakers, the Duncan/Robinson Spurs, and the Stockton-Malone Jazz. After doing all that, they still would’ve had to play the MJ Bulls in the Finals. The most likely outcome was a second round exit, albeit on less lopsided terms than the 4-1 loss to the Lakers.
In 1998-99, the Sonics would’ve been better with Kemp but would not have been a contender. George Karl was gone and the new system was not conducive to playoff success. The west remained deep as well. My best estimate is that they would’ve been lower seeded first round fodder. After 1998-99, Kemp was not a starter-level player.
If Kemp had to be traded (and he did), what would’ve the best deal have been?
The options seemed to be quite limited. The Webber deal was the best option, if it had been available. Of the other options, the two best options were Camby or McDyess. Camby had more long-term value but McDyess fit better to the Kemp role as a featured scorer in 1997.
As an aside, I assume the Pacers’ package that Kemp referenced was either Dale Davis or Antonio Davis plus some stuff. That doesn’t seem like a great return either.
Summing it up…..
Basically, the Sonics were screwed once Kemp gave up on them. He was too unhappy to play with, the trade options were limited, and his personal problems made a steep decline inevitable. Baker, even before he was hampered with drinking issues, was not enough to replace prime Kemp. Seattle objectively handled the Kemp dispute well but sometimes a decision process can be sound, and the outcome can go off the rails anyway.
On the bright side, Kemp and Baker have both made peace with the past and they should be remembered for the excellent prime years and not their declines.