NBA Draft 2012: Bradley Beal

I’m starting my 2012 draft analysis with a look at the players who are considered potential 2nd overall picks. Today it’s Florida SG Bradley Beal. Using the 2nd overall pick on a SG has been very rare. We’d have to go back to the 70s when David Thompson (1st overall ’75), Otis Birdsong (2nd overall ’77) and Darrell Griffith (2nd overall ’80) went in the top 2. Since then #3 is as high as any SG has been drafted. While the group drafted at #3 includes the greatest player ever, Michael Jordan in ’84, there have been more reaches and outright busts taken at #3. This group includes Dennis Hopson ’87, Jerry Stackhouse ’95, Ben Gordon ’04, OJ Mayo ’08 and James Harden ’09. What this says is drafting a SG in the top 3 is a risky proposition.

Statistically, Beal measures up OK as a prospect. He has the high RSB40 (combined rebounds, steals and blocks per 40 minutes) and 2PP (2-point field goal percentage), but he didn’t score as frequently as good SG prospects should. The statistic that stands out as a red flag for Beal is his low, 17.4, P40 (points per 40 minutes). Historically it has been important for SG prospects to be at 20.0 and preferably higher. A scorer’s mentality is vital for any NBA SG and it isn’t clear whether or not Beal has this yet. What Beal has going for him is he’s still very young. Freshmen get some leeway on hitting all the benchmarks. In the case of Beal, he joined a college backcourt that already featured a couple of mad bombers in Kenny Boynton and Erving Walker. It is likely Beal found FG attempts difficult to come by as a freshman.

There have been freshmen who overcame low-scoring starts, upped their P40 in subsequent years and became solid NBA SGs. The tables below compare Beal with similar players. Those being SGs who scored less than 18.0 P40 as college freshmen, but also posted a high RSB40. The first group is players who were drafted and went on to have a successful NBA career. The second group is players who were drafted in the first or early 2nd round, but didn’t live up to expectations. In all cases these numbers are from the player’s freshman season.

Successes       2PP     3PP   P40  S40  RSB40

D. Christie     .600   .255   14.6   2.6    11.2

R. Harper        .497*   n/a    16.2  2.8    12.9

H. Hawkins    .581*   n/a    15.7   1.9      9.0

F. Hoiberg       .641     .260  15.8  2.5     9.7

Ed. Jones          .517     .351  17.4   3.0   10.2

A. McKie            .521     .321  15.4   2.5     9.3

J. Richardson .546    .296 13.0  1.4    12.3

L. Sprewell        .541    .339  17.4  1.6    10.6

B. Beal                      .541       .339  17.4    1.6    10.6

Just a quick note, Hoiberg might be a reach as a “success”. I included him, because he was a 2nd round draft pick who played close to 10,000 minutes in his career and was very productive when he played.

Busts                         2PP     3PP   P40  S40  RSB40

S. Burrell               .415     .313    12.7   2.9    12.9

D. Boyce                 .462    .278   17.8   2.9      9.7

J. Grayer                .529*    n/a   14.4   1.2       9.3

D. Hopson             .474*    n/a   11.5    1.6       9.1

S. Jacobson          .517      .321   16.2    1.4     11.7

R. Minor                 .526     .233  14.0    1.9      9.5

B. Rush                    .474     .472  17.0    1.1       9.4

J. Sasser                  .448     .262  18.0    1.8    12.3

J. Trepagnier      .452     .200  15.3    2.4   12.2

B. Beal                      .541       .339  17.4    1.6    10.6

The 2PP numbers for Harper, Hawkins, Grayer and Hopson are simple FG pct. The breakdown of 2- and 3-point percentages weren’t available. What stands out here are two things. The successful group of players had a higher 2-point percentage and more steals as a group. The 2PP being well over .500 seems almost essential for successful prospects. Beal is there at .541. His steals are low, at 1.6, but not low enough that I would even call it a red flag.

The two players Beal most resembles in this group are Sprewell and Richardson. A similar career to either of these players would represent Beal’s best case scenario. Both players were considered among the 5-10 SGs in the league during their prime. Both were at best the #3 player on a contender. That’s not a bad thing and I feel this is probably the best guess at where Beal will be in 10 years.

Whether or not this is a player worthy of the #2 pick is another matter. The second overall pick comes with a high price tag. He’ll probably cost something in the neighborhood of $17 mil for the first 4 seasons. Considering there will be at least a couple of developmental years involved with Beal that seems like a high price to pay just to develop the next Latrell Sprewell.

NBA Draft 2012: Michael Kidd-Gilchrist

The second pick the NBA draft has produced many stars, but also many famous busts. Bob Petit, Bill Russell, Jerry West, Rick Barry, Earl Monroe Dave Bing, Wes Unseld, Rudy Tomjanovich, Bob McAdoo, Isaiah Thomas, Gary Payton, Alonzo Mourning and Kevin Durant were all drafted 2nd, which shows a HOFer can be found. The busts have fallen into 3 categories:

• Big guys who were more big than good: Hasheem Thabeet, Darko Milicic, Shawn Bradley, Sam Bowie and Steve Stipanovich.

• Freshmen forwards: This is a more recent trend and includes only Michael Beasley and Marvin Williams.

• Players who probably weren’t worthy of a high pick, but were considered the next best option in a one-player draft: Stromile Swift, Danny Ferry, Dave Meyers, Marvin Barnes. Jim Brewer and Neal Walk.

The 2012 draft looks like a one-player draft to me, that one player being Anthony Davis. There are plenty of intriguing players, but none who look like a worthy gamble with the 2nd pick. There’s a potential big guy bust in talented, but raw Andre Drummond. There’s also the freshman forward Michael Kidd-Gilchrist and any number of players who could rise past the others during the process and land at pick #2.

I had originally planned to start the 2012 draft preview with a look at my choice for #2, Tony Mitchell of North Texas. Mitchell decided to head back to school so that will have to wait until next year. Instead I’ll start by looking at some of the players who are currently at #2 in the mocks. Leading off is Kentucky SF Michael Kidd-Gilchrist.

The thing that stands out with Gilchrist is the fact that nothing stands out. There is little in his numbers that suggest he’s a star. As a freshman he was something of a super-role player on the nation’s most talented team. But there is nothing about his statistics that suggest lottery pick, let alone the 2nd overall draftee. He finished 4th on the team in scoring, didn’t lead in any statistical categories and put up ordinary offensive efficiency numbers.

In his defense is that he was cast as a role player on a successful team and probably gave up individual stats for the good of the team because of it. Particularly low were the scoring numbers. Gilchrist finished with a 14.8 P40 (Points per 40 minutes). Successful prospects usually hit at least 18.0. To get an idea of how similar players developed, here’s a look at previous NCAA freshmen small forwards who scored less than 15.0 P40 (Points per 40 minutes), but went on to play at least 10,000 NBA minutes.

A quick rundown of the numbers used:

• Adjusted FG pct is points scored on all FGs divided by 2. I like using this efficiency number for SFs as opposed to the simple 2-point pct. I use for all the other positions. The reasons for this is historically it has been more important for SF prospects to post a higher number in this stat and a high AFGP often reveals a player who can score in multiple ways. This is also more important for a SF than other positions.

• P40 and R40 are points and rebounds per 40 minutes.

• ASB40 is combined assists, steals and blocks per 40 minutes. This is also a stat I use exclusively for SFs, because it showcases the diverse set of skills necessary for the position.

• A/TO is assist-turnover ratio. I include this number for all positions, simply because an extremely low A/TO can be a red flag.

Player Adj FG pct. P40 R40 ASB40 A/TO

Detlef Schrempf .452 11.7 7.1 2.3 0.6

Shane Battier .551 12.4 10.4 6.5 1.6

Robert Horry .438 13.6 10.6 6.4 1.0

Derrick McKey .477 9.2 7.4 5.2 1.1

Ty Corbin .417 9.4 11.4 4.2 0.5

Rick Fox .644 14.7 6.8 6.8 0.8

Stacey Augmon .578 14.1 9.3 7.1 0.9

Matt Harpring .540 14.0 7.2 4.6 1.1

Walt Williams .462 12.3 6.0 7.3 0.9

Jared Dudley .496 14.0 7.8 5.1 1.3

Trevor Ariza .462 14.7 8.2 5.3 0.6

Desmond Mason .438 10.7 5.9 3.3 0.5

Bobby Simmons .420 14.6 8.0 5.8 0.9

Malik Sealy .500 13.5 6.7 4.2 0.8

Tom Hammonds .609 15.0 7.9 2.2 0.6

Michael Kidd-Gilchrist .500 14.8 9.4 4.8 0.9

Players are listed in rough order of NBA accomplishment. Schrempf is the only all-star on the list, though Battier and Horry were both all-stars in terms of the intangibles they brought. The thing that stands out most about this group is that these are mainly role players. In the case of Schrempf, Battier, Horry and McKey I’d call them super-role players, but none could be considered more than the 3rd-best player on a contender. So that should be considered the far high end for Gilchrist.

Both Battier and Horry flashed other skills that aren’t as apparent with Gilchrist. Both players were strong rebounders, good passers and posted a very high ASB40. While not on the level of Battier or Horry, Gilchrist is a good rebounder and a decent passer, but his ASB40 is a low 4.8. This is a bad sign, as a common trait among successful SFs has been an ASB40 of at least 5.5.

It is worth noting that Gilchrist’s ASB40 was a much more respectable 5.5 at the end of February. In March and April his numbers fell across the board, but nowhere near as dramatically as they did in steals and blocks. It’s possible he was injured, or even fatigued, what with this being his first ever season at this level. Because he had been at 5.5 before the tournaments I can cut him a little slack here.

Battier, Horry and many of the others here also helped their careers by being able to knock down a 3-pointer consistently. Gilchrist hit only .255 on his 51 3-point attempts, so this is another part of his game that needs works. It isn’t that difficult for a player to develop a decent 3-point shot. With Gilchrist, who is young even for a college freshman and from everything I’ve read has a great attitude and work ethic, I would expect him to do as much. But until the shots actually start dropping this does remain something of a question mark.

As for Schrempf, he was something of an outlier. His numbers are for only 314 freshman minutes in 1982, which was before college basketball had a shot clock. While this does show that all NCAA freshmen have a long way to go and a lot is possible after a weak start, I don’t consider it too relevant.

For some more perspective on where Gilchrist stands, here are some previous freshmen SFs who left college after one year. Like Gilchrist, all played on national powers. Anthony and Williams played on loaded championship teams.

Player Adj FG pct. P40 R40 ASB40 A/TO

Carmelo Anthony .498 24.4 11.0 5.1 1.0

Corey Maggette .580 24.0 8.7 6.0 0.7

Tim Thomas .506 21.6 7.7 6.2 0.7

Marvin Williams .545 20.4 11.8 4.1 0.5

Luol Deng .563 19.4 8.7 5.4 0.8

Michael Kidd-Gilchrist .500 14.8 9.4 4.8 0.9

Gilchrist’s numbers are weak when compared to this group. He wasn’t the scorer the other players were. Successful prospects have with rare exception always scored more often and efficiently than Gilchrist did this past season. This has been regardless of whether they played on a roster loaded with HS all-Americans or not.

Michael Kidd-Gilchrist is not likely to become an NBA all-star. He just hasn’t shown he has the offensive chops to become such a player. His high end is a player in the mold of Battier or Horry. This isn’t a terrible thing as such players are valuable and rarely become overpaid salary cap problems. Everything I’ve read about his attitude and approach has been glowing, so I would even say he has a better chance of reaching the Battier/Horry level than his low ASB40 suggests. But he does have a long way to go. He has to learn to shoot better and because he didn’t put up the dominant defensive stats Battier and Horry did at the same stage of their careers, I would call him something of a longshot to reach that level. All I see in Michael Kidd-Gilchrist is a decent NBA SF who would be quite a reach at the #2 pick.

Playoff Thoughts

1.  Celtics-Hawks: So far, the First Round has been entertaining for individual games but no series has really quite gotten to the point that the outcome has been in much doubt.  In other words, no series have been tied at 2-2 but instead all were at 3-1 or 4-0 sweeps coming into Game 5.  Fortunately for the casual fan, the Hawks win tonight in Atlanta has made its series with Boston a little more fun.   Based upon the play so far, Game 6 will be yet another low scoring, low paced battle of attrition.  The Hawks got a huge lift from Al Horford’s return to form.  He fit right in with the Hawks and Atlanta was +10 with him on the floor.  Boston is still obviously the favorite but with Paul Pierce hobbled and Horford looking tough, the Hawks have a serious shot of bringing this back to Atlanta for Game 7.

2.  Least Dramatic First Round Ever?: As noted, no series in the First Round has gone to 2-2 and we are looking at possibly no Game 7s and only a few Game 6s.    Is this atypical?  Well, since 2002-03 (when the NBA first made the First Round best-of-seven) getting Game 7s in the First Round is far from a foregone conclusion but the NBA usually delivered at least one Game 7 a year but never more than two in season.  In fact, last year was the first time there was no Game 7 in the First Round (though there were four Game 6s).  The most boring First Round of the seven-game era was 2003-04 when four series were sweeps and three series went only five games.  The lone outlier was Heat-Hornets, which went seven but was not particularly exciting with the exception of a game winner hit by some rookie named Dwyane Wade.  The most Game 6s and Game 7s in one year came the year before in 2002-03, when five series went six games and two went seven and the one other series went five games.

3.  Age Limit Again: Turning away from the playoffs for a second, I couldn’t help but notice the concerted push by both the NCAA and NBA to try to raise the age limit to enter the NBA draft from 19 to 20, effectively forcing most players to spend two years in college and not one.  David Stern has avoided any moral judgments in taking this stance and called this a financial issue:  ”Our rule is that they won’t be eligible for the draft until they’re 19. They can play in Europe, they can play in the D-League, they can go to college. This is a not a social program, this is a business rule for us. The NFL has a rule which requires three years of college. So the focus is often on ours, but it’s really not what we require in college. It’s that we say we would like a year to look at them and I think it’s been interesting to see how the players do against first-class competition in the NCAAs and then teams have the ability to judge and make judgments, because high-ranking draft picks are very, very valuable.”

Mark Cuban is also on board but frames this as a moral issue, where the limit would benefit those barred from coming to the NBA:  ”It’s not even so much about lottery busts, it’s about kids’ lives that we’re ruining. Even if you’re a first-round pick and you have three years of guaranteed money, or two years now of guaranteed money, then what? Because if you’re a bust and it turns out you just can’t play in the NBA, your ‘rocks for jocks’ one year of schooling isn’t going to get you far.  I just don’t think it takes into consideration the kids enough. Obviously, I think there’s significant benefit for the NBA. It’s not my decision to make, but that’s my opinion on it.”

Most recently, Steve Kerr wrote a piece in Grantland.com, outlining all sorts of reasons why the age limit helps.  Kerr is a thoughtful guy and touches on both financial and moral reasons why forcing the athletes to get some college experience benefits everyone.  His arguments overlap with both the comments of Stern and Cuban.  Let’s review Kerr’s six identified arguments and see if they hold muster:

1.  High school players aren’t mature enough to be ready to play in the NBA:  Kerr argues that the transition to the NBA is so hard that teenagers need at least two years to adjust to all aspects of the NBA and being adults.  As a consequence, the NBA risks having a choppier product than if the players have spent a few years in college.  It is true that most high schoolers are not ready to play immediately in the NBA (in fact, most college seniors aren’t ready).  No evidence is presented, however, to support that having a few teenagers on the roster drags down quality of play.  The fact is that number of high schoolers to be drafted were very low and consisted mostly of players so gifted that they were quite good by their second seasons (and LeBron James and Dwight Howard were really good as 18-year old rookies).  So, while in the abstract this argument has merit, I don’t think this holds muster.   Good players are good players and good coaches teach players, no matter the league they play/coach in.  Sure, some players could be missing out on basic life experience by going to college for two or three years but the alarming rate of post-career bankruptcies of players in all sports doesn’t support the theory that coping is a skill necessarily learned in college.

2.  The NBA has a financial interest in seeing young players compete so that they can avoid costly speculation in the uncertain high school/teenage athlete market:  This is the core of Stern’s statement but is actually Kerr’s weakest argument by far.  The history of high schoolers in the NBA draft shows a much high success rate than most other pools of tools.  It is almost prosaic to go over this but here is the rundown of United States high schoolers (with no college or juco experience at all) taken in the NBA draft since 1995:

1995: Kevin Garnett (4th)

1996: Kobe Bryant (13), Jermaine O’Neal (17)

1997:  Tracy McGray (9)

1998:  Al Harrington (25), Rashard Lewis (32), Korleone Young (40)

1999:  Jonathan Bender (5), Leon Smith (29)

2000: Darius Miles (3), DeShawn Stevenson (23)

20001: Kwame Brown (1), Tyson Chandler (2), Eddy Curry (4), DeSagana Diop (8)

2002: Amare Stoudemire (9)

2003: LeBron James (1), Travis Outlaw (23), Ndudi Ebi (26), Kendrick Perkins (27)

2004: Dwight Howard (1), Shaun Livingston (4), Robert Swift (12), Sebastian Telfair (13), Al Jefferson (15), Josh Smith (17), J.R. Smith (18), Dorell Wright (19)

2005: Martell Webster (6), Andrew Bynum (10), Gerald Green (18), C.J. Miles (34), Monta Ellis (40),  Louis Williams (45), Andray Blatche (49), Amir Johnson (56)

I don’t see too many busts here.  In fact, I see many more Hall of Famers than busts, as well as some really good value picks late in the first round and in the second round.  If anything, the high schoolers have usually been undervalued with only a few notable exceptions.  In 2005, the last year of high schoolers, every second rounder from high school was, at least, a useful pro.  If this financial uncertainty is the main argument for a draft limit, we have to call BS on this.  The argument seemed thin in the article and non-existent when the actual lists are reviewed.  If high schoolers were crapping out to often, they would just not be drafted high.  No need to “save” GMs from themselves on this issue.

Kerr doubles down on this argument, stating that he doubted it made any difference to any player that any great player that he got his max contract at 24 as opposed to 22.   College is great if you want it but I don’t know a single player who would sneeze at losing out on $4-10 million those extra two years in college would cost him.  Even more telling, ask Rashard Lewis whether he would give back those two years.   Had Rashard Lewis been two years older when he came to the NBA, he would’ve hit the free agent market for his big contract at 29 and not 27, which could’ve cost him the max contract he did get from Orlando.

3.  Player development is hurt by not going to college: Kerr states that the NCAA prepared players for the pros and demonstrates this by showing that Magic Johnson, Larry Bird, and Michael Jordan had much better numbers as rookies than even the best high schoolers like LeBron and Dwight Howard.  This is true but does not prove the the better numbers resulted from the older players having played in college.  Most players consistently improve from ages 18 to 27 and so the older you are when you enter the league, the better you will probably be.  LeBron improved quite nicely from age 18 to age 23 without college tutorials.  It is definitely true that some players could use the college environment but I, as a fan, would hate to miss out on two years of LeBron or Howard just to make sure that some more marginal players stay in school.

4.  College stars create fan interest for the pros:  Kerr notes that college stars like Patrick Ewing were hugely anticipated coming into the NBA and that this helps fan interest.  This is true on some level but college stardom only matters if the player is actually good as pro.  Bobby Hurley, Christian Laettner, and Tyler Hansbrough were huge college stars.  Conversely, no one knew who Karl Malone or John Stockton were in college and they became NBA legends.  but Any NCAA fanfare quickly burns away if the player doesn’t dominate as a pro.  Laettner was a solid pro but was almost totally forgotten one it was clear that he was not going to be great.   A great college player will have a certain aura about him if he is also great as a pro but do you really think anyone cares that Kobe Bryant didn’t go to Duke now?

5.  College fosters a sense of team that high schoolers don’t get through the whole crazy AAU process: Maybe this is true to some extent but why can’t this same sense of “team” be found in the pros?

6.  College provides mentors in coaches that are key to development: This argument sort of overlaps with some of the other arguments but a great coach can really help a player develop.  But not every college player gets to play with Dean Smith or Lute Olson.  A great coach can help but this is a very minor subsidiary point.

Overall, I think most of the reasons given for limiting high school player access to the NBA are strawmen arguments.  Baseball forces players to declare after high school or wait three years because they have an anti-trust exception and can do whatever they want.  The NFL limits access on the more compelling pretense that 18 and 19 year olds are not physically as strong and could get really hurt in the violent NFL.  I see Stern’s position as illusory.  He doesn’t want his league to get bad press for having too many young players and thus will support an age limit to make the NBA look more socially responsible.  I can understand why he does this and can’t say this is a bad business move but the pretenses for the rule are thin at best.  In an ideal world, the NBA would come up with a rule to let the best players (like LeBron) come out early but I guess we don’t live in an ideal world.

Playoff Thoughts (Western Conference)

1.  Spurs-Jazz: While it appeared that the Jazz’s big front line just might give the Spurs some problems, it has not played out this way so far.  The front court has been irrelevant as Tony Parker destroyed the Jazz guards in Game 1 and the Spurs just collectively clobbered Utah in Game 2, in a game where the Spurs couldn’t miss and the Jazz couldn’t make a shot.  The only question is whether Utah can make this series interesting in Utah.  Jazz’s fans can take solace in the fact that the team played San Antonio much better at home in the regular season, going 1-1 and the one loss was by only 4.    But much cold water can be thrown on those results. Manu Ginobili didn’t play in the first close loss and the Spurs sat Manu, Parker, and Tim Duncan in the one Utah win.  On a larger scale, Utah was terrible on the road all season (11-22) and very good at home (25-8).  Ultimately, though, the Spurs are also really good on the road (22-11) and their superior guard play will make this a short series.  Expect the Spurs to split the next two and end this in Game 5.

2.  Thunder-Mavs: Glass half full or half empty?  The Mavs have given the OKC basically all they can handle on the road but have come up empty both times.  The old saying is that the a series hasn’t started until the home team loses a game so, technically, the Mavs can hold serve in Dallas and still have two more shots at winning a road game.  In reality, this is still very tough.  The key to Dallas’ success has been holding down Kevin Durant, who is a collective 15-44 from the field (thanks mostly to Shawn Marion).   As great as Dallas has done on Durant, you have to think it can’t last.  KD has shot under 40% in three consecutive games only once all year.  Dallas might be able to hold serve and keep this series going but Durant will get hot and end this thing.

3.  Lakers-Nuggets:   Remember how Kobe Bryant got quite mad at the Lakers from refusing to trade a young Andrew Bynum for Jason Kidd in 2007?  Kidd was still solid player at that point but since that time, Bynum has never had a PER under 20 and it’s pretty likely that Kobe would’ve gotten no more titles if the deal had been cut as he wanted.  This is not to disparage Kidd but he’s older and the fact is point guards have a very subsidiary role in the Phil Jackson triangle.   Getting back to the present, Bynum has looked like the best player in this series and he has totally prevented Javale McGee from any offensive opportunities.  The Lakers are plus 17.5 when Bynum plays (according to NBA.com).  In Denver, the Nuggets may have to go with Ty Lawson and Andre Miller back court more often, as Corey Brewer can’t stop Kobe or score enough on offense, while Miller and Lawson will give Kobe some problems on the defensive end.  Denver has historically had a huge home court advantage but have been a little weaker than usual this year (20-13).  They look overwhelmed so far this series and will need Lawson to go crazy to win both games in Denver.

4.  Clippers-Grizzlies: The only really compelling series out West so far.  L.A. and Memphis look really well matched.   We have had a ridiculous comeback and then Memphis immediately answer a crushing loss and winning Game 2, which should help debunk any talk of “momentum.”  Even still, the Clipps look to be in a good spot going back to Los Angeles.  Memphis is a weak road team and the Clipps have been really good at home so far at 24-9.   A cause for concern, though, is Vinny Del Negro’s use of Bobby Simmons in place of the injured Caron Butler.  Simmons actually shot really well, atypical for him, but this probably won’t happen again and might only encourage Del Negro to ignore the last five years of bad shooting and try to ride a hand that isn’t actually that hot.  The Clipps will have to find another scorer behind Chris Paul and Blake Griffin but that is much more likely to be Randy Foye or Nick Young and not Simmons.  As for Memphis, they obviously can take a game back in L.A. but are looking at an uphill battle.   As a side note, Game 2 also had a nice illustration of the limits of plus/minus when Quincy Pondexter led the team at +12 in his 15 minutes of mostly not doing much but being fortunate enough to play while Memphis made its best run.

Quick Thoughts

1. Tanking: The theme of the final month of the NBA season has been tanking.  Namely, that the bad teams have quit trying in an attempt to amass ping pong balls for the NBA Lottery.   But is this true?  Well, the anecdotal evidence overwhelmingly supports this assertion.  Of the 16 teams currently in the NBA playoffs, all are at least 5-5 in their last ten games, except Orlando (which is 4-6 and has been reeling with the injury to Dwight Howard).  Of the 14 teams now outside of the playoff picture, only four teams are 5-5 in the past ten games and two of those teams (Phoenix and Milwaukee) are still actively competing for the playoffs.  Ten of those 14 teams are 3-7 or worse in their past ten.  Of course, one would expect the poor teams to play poor in any random sampling of ten games but the ineptitude is palpable and most of these bad teams have shut down key players already.

Of course, there is little incentive for bad teams to really try to win once they obviously won’t make the playoffs.  Indeed, teams get a better chance to win the Lottery with more losses.   There is some value to finishing strong, as winning will give the bad team some positive feelings with fans for the next season.  But good feelings aren’t going to be too strong enough merely because a team the goes from loser to competitive non-playoff team.  Throw in that competing requires risk to your best players for the next season, and the slim benefits of finishing strong are clearly dwarfed by the benefits of losing.  So, unless you are on the perimeter of the playoff race, the only real incentive to compete after a team has established itself as bad is where the coach or GM who is at a risk of job loss and hopes to show intra-season improvement sufficient to avoid being fired.

Henry Abbott over at ESPN argued that tanking is deleterious to the NBA and rewards bad decision making and should, therefore, be eliminated.  Tanking is not really good for the NBA but it is difficult to think of a system that incentivizes competition over tanking.  The concept of the NBA Lottery was invented to limit tanking (particularly after the Rockets were accused of tanking to get the pick that became Hakeem Olajuwon in 1984).  The Lottery initially gave all non-playoff teams an equal shot of winning the Lottery and thus a team on the verge of the playoffs had as much of a shot of getting the top pick as the worst teams.  The NBA figured that the system wasn’t fair to the really bad teams and could even encourage border line playoff teams to junk a run at a low playoff seed for the shot at the top pick.  So, the weighted Lottery system was adopted and being bad became the best way to possibly get a better pick, even if you weren’t sure to have a top three pick.

Is this current system a problem?  Well, it isn’t good that bad teams look like even bigger pushovers come April but fixing this only creates more problems.  The best idea put forward came from Bill Simmons, who has talked about a tournament between the non-playoff teams, with the winner getting the best pick.  This would encourage teams to play harder for better seeding in a theoretical tournament but the incentive still isn’t that great.  Playing hard won’t help because the seeding isn’t really that important since none of the really bad teams are usually so good that getting a top seed in a loser’s bracket would be that big a deal.  For example, if we were to fictionally create a loser’s tourney right now for 2011-12, the Suns would be the top seed and would have a bye but the third seeded Bucks would draw the Bobcats, not exactly a huge disadvantage for Houston.  Also, the moderately bad teams, like the Nets or Raptors probably wouldn’t care which top seed they draw and winning a round in the bad tourney wouldn’t exactly excite the fans. A loser’s tourney has the distinct stench of the NIT, much ado about nothing to the fans.   At the end of the day, the Lottery is the best way to balance between making sure the decent teams shoot for the playoffs teams and the bad teams are given a better chance but not a guaranteed shot at the highest picks and no artificial system is really going to fix this.  For now, we just have to accept that the bad teams will be worse by the end of the season.

2. Bobcats Are Quite Bad: It may be a shortened season but Charlotte is threatening to have the lowest winning percentage in modern history.  At 7-56, the Bobcats are worst offensive and defensive team in the NBA and their expected won-loss doesn’t short change them either, as the point differential projects to the same 7-56 record.  It is clear that Charlotte has been managed horribly from day one and it is important for the team to get another win just to avoid another humiliation for the continually alienated local fans.  At the end of the day, though, the Bobcats already bottomed out with some terrible drafts and the trading of Tyson Chandler for nothing but financial savings.  It seems, though, that the Bobcats have figured this all out and Michael Jordan has finally hired a competent GM in Rich Cho.  If Charlotte gets Anthony Davis, Thomas Robinson, or Michael Kidd-Gilchrist, they will have a nice building block.  The fans may never feel for the Bobcats like they did for the Hornets but better the Bobcats are doing the right thing in dumping their mediocre vets and starting over.  Now they just have to not screw up the coming draft choices.

3. Metta World Elbow: I caught much of the fun Lakers/Thunder game on Sunday.  A great game was lost to the side story of Metta World Peace’s hard elbow to the head of James Harden.  World Peace was rightfully tossed from the game and has earned a suspension of five games or so.  World Peace claimed after the game that the elbow was unintentional and part of his celebration of a made basket.  In reviewing the tape, World Peace seemed very much aware of Harden’s presence and meant to shove him off, though he probably didn’t  mean to hit him so squarely in the head.  The elbow looked very similar to one that World Peace threw at Chris Paul earlier in the season.

While World Peace definitely deserves his punishment, this incident should not be looked at as a back slide to his reckless behavior from many years ago, when he started a brawl in Detroit.  The elbow on Harden was vicious but is a part of the game.  Being guilty of serial elbow is not a character defect, as Bill Cartwright, Dikembe Mutombo, and Karl Malone can attest.

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